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ART. I.—*Life of Joseph Brant Thayendanegea: including the Border Wars of the American Revolution, and Sketches of the Indian Campaigns of Generals Harmer, St. Clair, and Wayne, and other matters connected with the Indian Relations of the United States and Great Britain, from the Peace of 1783 to the Indian Peace of 1795.* By William L. Stone. 2 vols. 8vo. Dearborn: New York. 1838.

It was a matter of surprise to us, at first, to find two ponderous volumes occupied with the life of an Indian chief; but upon perusal, we found that the hero of the history takes up a small space in the body of the work. He is, it is true, a prominent actor in the transactions recorded in these volumes; but if they contained nothing more than the events in which Joseph Brant was personally concerned, they would be of small value compared with that which they intrinsically possess. The fact is, that the American public are indebted to Col. Stone, for an entirely new history of the war of the revolution. This history is not only new as being composed in a lively style, and as containing much graphic description of interesting scenes by an original writer; but by means of new sources of information, and authentic documents, not possessed by any former historian, the author has presented

many of the events of the war under a new aspect; and has been able to bring into view many transactions of stirring, and sometimes tragical interest, of which the public have hitherto received no authentic information.

The military operations of the Indians on our borders, it is known to all, formed a very important part of the revolutionary war; but until now, our accounts of these transactions have been meagre, and in many instances, not sufficiently authenticated. But in these volumes this great desideratum in our history has been supplied; and if it had been neglected a little longer, the work never could have been satisfactorily accomplished, as many of the richest sources of information would have been inaccessible. Especially would this have been the case in regard to the testimony of aged men, who were witnesses, and frequently actors, in the scenes which they have described. The history, as it relates to the Indian wars in the north and north west, seems to be complete, but the same cannot be said respecting those of the south west. Of the numerous tribes in this quarter, the author gives, occasionally, a passing notice; but a full and authentic account of the hostile movements of the Cherokees, Creeks, and Choctaws, during the revolutionary war, is still a desideratum; which we hope some qualified person will supply, before the sources of authentic information are entirely beyond our reach. To show how soon this will be the case, we mention a single fact. We received from two different persons, who had a knowledge of all the transactions, a particular narrative of the fierce and bloody war waged with the Cherokees, in the years 1777, 1778, 1779, the seat of which was the country on the head waters of the Tennessee, now denominated East Tennessee. Both these persons have died within a few years, one of them, whose information was exact, no longer ago than last year. It is not known to us that any history of the events of this war has been given to the public. And the same may be said of the hostilities of the Creeks and Choctaws; for as for the Chickasaws, it has ever been their boast, that they have never shed the blood of a white man.

It gives us much pleasure to remark, that the historian is careful to designate his authorities, whether living or dead; and also that he has exercised an impartial, independent judgment, in regard to persons and things: and, in our opinion, has often succeeded in dispelling the clouds which prejudice and misrepresentation had spread over certain char-

acters and transactions. He has vindicated the Indian race from undeserved obloquy, as it regards their mode of warfare; and he has not shielded from merited reproach, men who, under the name of civilization and Christianity, have been guilty of deeds of cold blooded cruelty, at which even the savages stood aghast. If in any thing there is a semblance of prejudice, it relates to those called tories; and our only reason for supposing that even here there is any partiality is, that the description of their cruelties and faithlessness, is without mitigation or apology.

To some readers it may appear to have been unnecessary, in the history of the Indian wars on our borders, to introduce all the leading events of the revolution; but a little consideration will convince such, that without some comprehensive view of the whole, the parts can never be correctly understood: all the military transactions of that period of our history have an intimate relation to one another; and the succinct mention of the principal transactions of this eventful war, in their proper time and place, greatly relieves the monotony, which must have existed in a continuous narrative of the invasions of savages and tories.

Although, then, we have found this work to be very different from what we expected; yet our disappointment has been of the agreeable kind. These volumes must be considered a very important part of the history of a country which seems destined, in providence, to be one of the most remarkable and populous that ever existed. Extracts from this work, such as we could insert in this article, would be unsatisfactory. Every American, who takes an interest in the history of his country, will choose to peruse the whole. It may, however, be gratifying to one class of our readers, to give a brief sketch of the life of Joseph Brant, the principal hero of the story.

This remarkable man was born on the banks of the Ohio, in the year 1742; although the proper residence of his parents was at Canajoharie Castle—the central castle of the Mohawks. His father was a sachem in his tribe. Of his early youth nothing remarkable is known; except that when only thirteen years of age, he joined the warriors of his tribe under Sir William Johnson, and was present at the memorable battle of Lake George, in which the French were defeated, and their commander mortally wounded. Two of his brothers, older than himself, were also engaged in this war. “The youthful warrior likewise accompanied

Sir William during the Niagara campaign of 1759; and in the brilliant achievements of the Baronet, after the chief command had devolved upon him, by the death of General Prideaux, is said to have acquitted himself with distinguished bravery." On this occasion the French, under Monsieur D'Aubrey, were defeated with great loss. The Indians behaved uncommonly well, and Brant was among them. At this time, the Rev. Mr. Kirkland, a graduate of Nassau Hall, was stationed as a missionary among the Mohawks, through whose influence Sir William Johnson was induced to select a certain number of young Indians of the Mohawk tribe, to be sent to the "Moor Charity School," at Lebanon, Connecticut, which was under the direction of the Rev. Dr. Eleazer Wheelock, afterwards the founder and president of Dartmouth college. Indeed, the aforesaid school was the foundation of this college. Among those selected was Joseph Brant; and the Baronet's partiality for him can readily be accounted for, when it is known that after the death of his first wife, he had taken into his house, and ever treated as a wife, the sister of this young man; familiarly known at that time by the name of "Miss Molly."

The precise year in which he was placed under the charge of Dr. Wheelock cannot be ascertained; but it was probably about 1761. It has been asserted, that he did not remain long at the school, and while there did not make much proficiency in learning. However that may be, it is certain that the Rev. Charles Jeffrey Smith, a missionary to the Mohawks, took Brant as an interpreter, in 1762, and gave him an excellent character; from which it may be inferred that his scholarship was not so contemptible as has been alleged. His teacher, also, in his memoirs, says, "Sir Wm. Johnson, superintendent of Indian affairs, was very friendly to the design of Mr. Wheelock, and at his request sent to the school, at various times, several of the Mohawks to be instructed. One of them was the since celebrated Joseph Brant; *who, after receiving his education*, was particularly noticed by Sir William Johnson, and employed by him in public business. He has been very useful in civilizing his countrymen, and for a long time past has been a military officer of extensive influence among the Indians in Upper Canada." This school seems to have been instituted expressly for the education of promising youths of the aborigines; and this also was the original and professed object of the college of Dartmouth. Of all the boys who were sent to the

school at Lebanon, only two had patience to continue at study until they were graduated.

The exigencies of the frontier did not allow Brant to remain long associated in the mission with Mr. Smith. In one of the Rev. Mr. Kirkland's earliest reports, the following paragraph appears, "Joseph Brant, a Mohawk Indian, and of a family of distinction in the nation, was educated by Dr. Wheelock, and was so well accomplished, that the Rev. Charles Jeffrey Smith (a young man who out of love to Christ, and the souls of men, devotes his life, and such a fortune as is sufficient to support himself and an interpreter, wholly to this glorious work) took him for his interpreter, when he went on a mission to the Mohawks, some three years ago. But the war breaking out, at that time, between the back Indians and the English, Mr. Smith was obliged to return; but Joseph tarried and went out with a company against the Indians, and was useful in the war; in which he behaved so much like the Christian and the soldier, that he gained great esteem. He now lives in a decent manner, and endeavours to teach his poor brethren the things of God, in which his own heart seems much engaged. His house is an asylum for the missionaries in that wilderness." From this war, young Brant returned early in the spring of 1764. In 1765, Brant, having been previously married to the daughter of an Oneida chief, was settled at Canajoharie, as appears by a letter from the Rev. Theophilus Chamberlain, one of the missionaries to the Six Nations, dated July 17th, of this year, in which he says, "I am now at Joseph Brant's house, very poorly with the dysentery, which hath followed me near a week. Riding in the rain sometimes, wading through tracks to get along, and lodging on the cold ground the other night, have made me almost down sick: but my business keeps me alive. Joseph Brant is exceeding kind."

Three years afterwards he was still leading a peaceable life, at the same place, as appears by an entry in the journal of Mr. Ralph Wheelock, who had been sent to Oneida, to relieve Mr. Kirkland, who was sick.

"March 16, 1766. At my old friend Joseph Brant's, I met one of the chiefs of the Onondagas (who is, by way of eminence, called the wise-man) on his return to his tribe, with his wife and child; and by Joseph Brant's help, I was able to discourse with him, and delivered my message to his nation." During the next three years, no information has been received of Brant's manner of life. As the country

was at peace, however, he was probably leading a life of repose at home; except when commissioned by Sir William to transact business with the Indians. It is not improbable, however, that he was at this period connected with the Episcopal missions to the Mohawks, which had been commenced, as early as 1702, and continued down to the beginning of the revolutionary war. Having been employed by one of the missionaries as an interpreter before; and as the Rev. Dr. Ogilvie, the predecessor of Dr. Barclay in that mission, was engaged, in 1767, in preparing the Mohawk Prayer Book, it is highly probable that Brant may have been employed as an assistant in that labour; since he was partial to exercises of that description.

In the year 1771, the Rev. Mr. Stewart conducted a school at Fort Hunter; a venerable friend of the author of the history now under review, living at Albany, was at that time a pupil in Dr. Stewart's school, and had frequent opportunities of seeing Brant, and formed an acquaintance, which, interrupted only by the war of the revolution, continued until the death of the warrior. He there formed an excellent opinion of the young chief in regard to talents and good disposition; and it is his opinion, that at this time, he was much employed at home by the Baronet, in the discharge of the multifarious duties incident to his important official station. He was also frequently sent upon distant embassies among the western tribes, and his talents and tact, as a diplomatist of the forest, were qualities pertaining to his character through life.

Thayendanegea was thrice married; having been twice a widower before the war of the revolution. His first two wives were of the Oneida tribe. Dr. Stewart says, that he first became acquainted with him in 1771. He was still residing at Canajoharie, on visiting which village, he found him comfortably settled in a good house, with every thing necessary for the use of his family. At that time his wife was sick of the consumption, and died soon afterwards. He had then but two children, a son and a daughter. After the death of his wife, he repaired to Fort Hunter, and resided with the Rev. Dr. Stewart, who was then engaged in another revision of the Indian Prayer Book, in which work Joseph assisted him.

He applied to Dr. Stewart in 1772-3 to marry him to his deceased wife's half sister, but the divine refused, on the ground of its being a forbidden relationship. Brant, how-

ever, vindicated the lawfulness of such a connexion and got a German ecclesiastic to perform the ceremony.

It was about this period of his life that Brant was brought under serious impressions of religion, and attached himself to the Episcopal church. From his serious deportment, and the anxiety he had ever manifested to civilize and Christianize his people, great hopes were entertained of his future usefulness in the cause. At this time he gave every evidence of sincerity in his profession; but his continual engagement in scenes of war after this, it must be confessed, greatly effaced these deep impressions of religion. Still his religious principles were not entirely eradicated, as is manifest from his future life.

In conformity with a custom prevalent among the Indians he, at this time, selected a bosom friend, a lieutenant Provost, a half-pay officer residing in the Mohawk valley. Those unacquainted with Indian usages, are not probably aware of the intimacy of this relationship, or of the importance attached to it. The selected friend is, in fact, the counterpart of him who chooses him; and the attachment often becomes romantic. They share each other's secrets, and are participants of each other's joys and sorrows. In this case, however, the pleasures and advantages expected from friendship, were not realized: for lieutenant Provost was ordered to his regiment, and on foreign service, greatly to the regret of the Indian chief. His grief at this separation was so deep, that Doctor Stewart advised him to select another friend, offering himself as a substitute; but the young chief declared that such a transfer of his affections was impossible; for he was Capt. John's friend, and two such friends could not be in existence at the same time. As a testimony and memorial of his inviolable friendship, he procured and sent to lieutenant Provost, to the West Indies, an entire Indian costume, of the richest furs he could obtain.

The Shawanese, in the year 1774, being spread along the Ohio river from Wheeling as far south as the borders of Kentucky, frequent acts of murder and robbery were committed, both by the savages on the frontier settlements of white people, and as frequently by a set of white people on the Indians, who even exceeded the red sons of the forest in the atrocity of their acts. According to the author of this history, the fierce and bloody war which now commenced between the Virginians and the Shawanese and their auxiliaries, was provoked by the outrages of Col. Cresap, Daniel

Greathouse, and one Tomlinson, and by the murder of the Indian chief Bald Eagle, who spent much of his time among the whites. But it is not our purpose to go into an inquiry respecting the causes of this war, and the culpability of the parties respectively. We shall do no more than merely notice the battle of the Point, as it is called, in Virginia, because fought very near Point Pleasant, where the Great Kanhawa forms a junction with the Ohio. General Andrew Lewis commanded the Virginians in this engagement. His troops were all riflemen, principally collected from the great valley west of the Blue Ridge; and many of them were among the most respectable men of that country. The plan of the campaign, according to which Governor Dunmore was to have co-operated with Gen. Lewis, was, for some cause not ascertained, entirely defeated. To reach the Point, Gen. Lewis had to march his men for one hundred and sixty miles through a trackless wilderness, and over lofty mountains. The Indians, consisting of Shawanese, Delawares, Mingoës, Wyandots, and Cayugas, have been variously stated to have numbered from six hundred to fifteen hundred men; and were commanded by the great Shawanese chief Cornstock, by his son Ellenipsico, and the Red Eagle. The battle occurred early in the morning of the 10th of October, and continued hot until afternoon, and with short intervals until night. Col. Charles Lewis commanded the right wing of the Virginians, which was in advance of the rest of the forces, and was shot dead early in the day. Thus fell a brave man in the flower of his youth. The Virginians, like the Indians, sought every advantage by fighting from the shelter of trees and bushes. The left wing was commanded by Col. Flemming, who was also severely wounded early in the engagement, having received two balls through his arm, and one in his breast; but he continued, notwithstanding, to encourage his men, urging them not to lose an inch of ground, but to out-flank the enemy. The onset of the Indians at this time was so impetuous, that two regiments appeared to be giving way on the right; and now on the left some indications of the same thing was apparent, when Col. Field's regiment was brought with great spirit into the action, by which seasonable movement, the fortunes of the day were retrieved. The Indians seem to have singled out the general officers; for Col. Field, at the very moment when he had given a favourable turn to the battle, was shot dead on the field; and was succeeded by Capt. Isaac Shelby, afterwards the brave and

hardy old governor of Kentucky; famous in Indian warfare even to old age. The Indians, though checked and in some measure driven back, made a valiant stand, at their breast-work, until near night. The attacks of the Virginians on this breast-work seemed to have no other effect than to weaken their own forces, already much exhausted. Three companies were detached, under Capt. Shelby, to endeavour to get into the rear of the Indians. The ground and the tall weeds favoured the enterprise, so that these companies passed the enemies flank without being observed: and falling vigorously on their rear, drove them from their lines with precipitation. It being night, and the Indians supposing that a reinforcement had arrived, fled across the Ohio, and continued their retreat to the Scioto. The exact loss of the Indians was never known: the Virginians scalped twenty. Their own loss was severe; among whom were two colonels, four captains, and many subordinate officers; and about fifty or sixty privates; besides a much larger number wounded. The Indians, when they reached Chillicothe, held a council to determine whether they should continue the war or sue for peace. After some discussion, the latter was determined on: and in a short time the war was ended.

Cornstock was at first in favour of continuing the war, but when he found the leading men of the tribe reluctant to enter the conflict again, he immediately declared in favour of peace, and accordingly a treaty was made at Chillicothe, which the Shawanese had, for some time past, made their chief residence. He now became very much the friend of the colonies; and while the more northern tribes were engaging in the contest in favour of the British, this distinguished chief resisted all solicitations to join the confederacy. And as the Virginians had erected a fort at Point Pleasant, he seemed to take pleasure in visiting the place, where he was treated with much kindness and respect by Capt. Arbuckle, the commanding officer. It was when he and his son Ellenipsico were on a friendly visit to the fort, that both of them were cruelly murdered by the whites, in a time of profound peace, and when they entertained not the slightest apprehension of danger; under the following lamentable circumstances. As he frankly admitted that he should be unable to prevent his tribe from joining the Indians of New York, it was judged expedient to detain him, and a Delaware chief, named Redhawk, who had accompanied him to the fort, as hostages for the good behaviour of his tribe. Nor did they remain un-

willingly, little suspecting the tragical end which awaited them. His son had not gone with Cornstock, and not knowing how to account for his father's long delay, went to the Point to look after him. Unfortunately the day after the arrival of the young warrior at Point Pleasant, two white men having crossed the Kanhawa on a hunting expedition, were fired upon by some straggling Indians, and one of them, whose name was Gilmore, was killed. The other escaped. No sooner was the event of Gilmore's death known, than the cry of revenge was raised, and a party of ruffians, under the command of Capt. Hall, assembled—not to pursue and punish the perpetrators of the murder, but to fall upon the peaceable and friendly Indians in the fort. Arming themselves, and cocking their rifles, they proceeded directly to the little garrison, menacing death to any who should oppose their nefarious designs. A friend of the hostage chiefs attempted to apprise them of their danger: but the savage mob was too close upon their heels to allow of their escape. At the sound of the clamour without, Ellenipsico appeared to be somewhat agitated. Not so the veteran Cornstock. He had too often grappled with death on the war-path to fear his approaches now. Perceiving the emotion of his son, he calmly said, "*My son, the Great Spirit has seen fit that we should die together, and has sent you to that end. It is his will, and let us submit.*" The infuriated mob had now gained the apartment of the victims. Cornstock fell, perforated with seven bullets, and died without a struggle. The son, after the exhortation of his father, met his fate with composure, and was shot upon the seat on which he was sitting. Redhawk, the young Delaware, died with less fortitude. Another friendly Indian, in the fort at the time, was killed, and his body mangled by the barbarians in a manner that would have disgraced savages of any other complexion. "Thus," says an Indian chronicler, "perished the mighty Cornstock, sachem of the Shawanese, and king of the northern confederacy, in 1774—a chief remarkable for many great and good qualities. He was disposed to be, at all times, the friend of white men, as he was ever the advocate of honourable peace. But when his country's wrongs summoned him to the battle, he became the thunderbolt of war, and made his enemies feel the weight of his arm. His noble bearing, his generous and disinterested attachment to the colonies, his anxiety to preserve the frontier of Virginia from desolation and death, all conspired to win

for him the respect and esteem of others; while the untimely and perfidious manner of his death caused a deep and lasting feeling of regret to pervade the bosoms even of those who were enemies to his nation, and excited the just indignation of all towards his inhuman murderers."

As it is our object to furnish to our readers some specimens of the high learning and noble character of some of the aborigines of this country, we will now give some account of another chief of the Shawanese, who is not mentioned in this history of Brant, but who was a distinguished leader in all the wars which this tribe carried on with the whites for more than half a century. We refer to Black Hoof, whose Indian name is Cata He Cassa. In the splendid work now in a course of publication in Philadelphia, entitled, "History of the Indian Tribes of North America, with Biographical Sketches of the principal Chiefs—embellished with one hundred and twenty portraits, copied from the Indian gallery, in the department of war, at Washington," we have a biographical sketch of this famous warrior, accompanied by a striking portrait. He was present with his tribe in the battle in which Braddock was defeated and killed, in 1755; and it is asserted that Black Hoof was engaged in every battle fought by his tribe until the treaty of Greenville, in 1795. His fame as a warrior was very great; and he was also distinguished as an orator in his tribe. Col. Johnson, of Pequea, describes him to have been the most graceful Indian he ever saw. His stature, however, was moderate, about five feet, eight inches. He never had more than one wife, and was always opposed to the practice of tormenting prisoners. When he found that all the efforts of the Indians against the whites must be ineffectual, he became favourable to peace, and gave his consent to the treaty of Greenville.

When Tecumsee and his brother the prophet rose into notice in the tribe, Black Hoof was highest in authority. This new chief equalled, or excelled him in talents, but was of different politics. Tecumsee, actuated by a lofty ambition, thirsted for opportunities of distinguishing himself. And when, by the instigation of the British, a new war was enkindled, he engaged in it with ardour. His brother, the prophet, a deceitful man, had great influence with his tribe, in exciting them to war, by his pretended revelations. But Black Hoof continued firm in his adherence to the treaty of peace; and, through his influence, the best part of the nation were restrained from engaging in the war; but the younger

men, and the lower sort, were led on by Tecumsee, and suffered much in the end, in consequence.

Black Hoof lived to extreme old age. When ninety years old he shot a deer; and survived until the year 1831, when, it is supposed, that he was considerably above a hundred years of age; probably a hundred and twelve.

Many years ago we recollect to have heard from a gentleman of intelligence, a particular account of a visit paid to Col. Lewis, when he was at Point Pleasant, by a very aged chief of the Shawanese tribe; conjectured at that time to be more than a hundred years old. The old chief could by no means be induced to cross the Ohio, but pitched his tent on the shore opposite to Point Pleasant, and remained there for several weeks; receiving frequent visits from Col. Lewis, and communicating to him many interesting facts respecting his own history and that of his tribe. Although the name of this old chief was not mentioned, yet we cannot doubt that he was no other than Black Hoof. And this opinion is confirmed by the coincidence between the history which he gave of the migrations of the Shawanese, and that which is found in the biographical sketch of Black Hoof in the work before mentioned. These accounts agree in saying that this tribe had resided on the Gulf of Mexico, and migrated to the Delaware shortly before Penn received the grant of Pennsylvania. The old chief who visited Col. Lewis, said that he distinctly remembered when the first log house was built in the city of Lancaster. When the settlement of the whites approached too near, the Shawanese retreated first to the Cumberland valley; next they crossed the Alleghany mountains, and fixed their residence on the Ohio, near Pittsburg; where they resided at the time of Braddock's defeat. Afterwards they passed down the Ohio to the Little Kanhawa; then to the Great Kanhawa; and finally to Chilicothe on the Scioto; where they continued until defeated by Wayne. By these incessant wars with the whites, and by other causes, this tribe, once powerful, is now reduced to a small number; and will soon, in all probability, cease to exist as a separate tribe. A few of them still remain on the Indian reservation north of the Ohio, and a remnant have migrated to the "Western Territory," beyond the Mississippi.

It is time now that we should return to Capt. Brant; but our narrative has already swelled to such a size, that we must pass very rapidly over the many important transactions in which he acted a conspicuous part, during the war of the re-

volution, and after its close. Indeed, these transactions are so implicated with the whole history of the war, as carried on in the western parts of New York and Pennsylvania, that in order to obtain a satisfactory view of his course, and of the important part which he acted, it will be necessary for the reader to peruse the full and particular detail of events as recorded in the history, and we can promise that he will not lose his labour, or regret the time which will be occupied in turning over these pages. With these views, therefore, we shall condense, within a brief space, all that we shall yet say of this distinguished chief; selecting only a few of the more remarkable transactions in which Brant was engaged as a prime agent.

The Americans were fully aware of the influence of the sachem of the Mohawks both over his own tribe and over the other tribes associated with it; and they were not remiss in using endeavours to secure the friendship of this important man on the side of the colonies, in the approaching contest. The provincial congress of Massachusetts, before the affair of Lexington, addressed a letter to the Rev. Mr. Kirkland, the faithful missionary of the Oneidas, to use his influence with the Six Nations, and with the sachem of the Mohawk tribe, to prevent their taking an active part in favour of the mother country. The Americans, at first, aimed at nothing more in regard to the Indians than to keep them in a state of strict neutrality between the contending parties. But the close connexion between Brant and the Johnsons frustrated all efforts of this kind. At the commencement of hostilities, Brant was secretary to Guy Johnson, the British superintendent of Indian affairs; and as both he and Sir John Johnson, the son and heir of Sir William, engaged with extraordinary zeal in opposition to the colonies, it was very natural for Brant to be carried away by their influence and example. We find him, therefore, at an early period of the war, exerting himself with great effect in exciting hostile feelings in the minds of the Indian tribes, and in making hostile incursions into the white settlements. His power and influence was about this time greatly augmented by being constituted the head and principal chief of the confederated tribes of the Six Nations. Although this high office was elective, yet the choice of a chief was, by usage, always made out of the Mohawk tribe.

About the close of the year 1775, Brant, accompanied by Capt. Tice, sailed for England, where he remained only a

few months; but he staid long enough to form an intimate friendship with some distinguished noblemen, and to become more fully confirmed and decided in his adherence to the royal cause, in the contest which had now become inevitable.

Brant's return to America was early in 1776, soon after which he was present in the battle of the Cedars, and after the surrender of Capt. Sherburne, exerted himself successfully to restrain the Indians, and prevent the massacre of the prisoners. All the American officers concerned in this engagement and shameful surrender, fell under the severe censure of Washington and of the public.

In the year 1777, General Herkimer, an old friend and neighbour of Brant, marched with a considerable force into the region of Brant's residence, and sought a friendly interview with the chief; which took place on middle ground between the Indians and Herkimer's forces, in the presence of only a few attendants. All Herkimer's arguments to bring over the Indian chief to the side of the Americans, were unavailing; and also his efforts to induce him to surrender certain Tories, who were under the protection of the Indians. Herkimer, on this occasion, disgraced himself and the cause which he wished to promote. For when the first day's conference broke up rather abruptly, the Indians, suspecting some treachery, retiring, seized their rifles, and raised the war whoop. Great pains were now taken to convince Brant that no evil was intended; and a proposal was made and urged to meet Herkimer the next day. In the morning, Gen. Herkimer gave express orders to Capt. Wagoner and three others, as soon as Brant and his companions came to the meeting, to shoot them down. Nothing can be conceived more cruel and dishonourable than such an order; and if it were not too well authenticated, it would be incredible. This bloody treachery was only hindered from being carried into effect by the prudent foresight of Brant; who, suspecting some evil, took effectual measures to prevent a surprise.

In May of this year (1777) Brant collected some forces and made an incursion into Cherry Valley. The people had formed to themselves a sort of fort around the house of Col. Samuel Campbell, and the boys were exercising and parading on the esplanade in front of the house, when Brant and his Indians unexpectedly came in sight; and from a hill at the distance of a mile, he surveyed the fort, and the juvenile company on parade, which led him to suppose that his force was insufficient to carry a place apparently so strongly fortified;

therefore he led off his men to a lurking place near the road leading to the Mohawk river. A young man named lieutenant Wormwood, had been sent to inform the inhabitants that a detachment of Col. Klock's regiment was to march to their defence the following day; this young man who belonged to one of the most opulent families of the Palatine, when on his return, accompanied by a young man, passed near the place where the Indians lay concealed, and when he came up they shot him, and Capt. Brant scalped him with his own hands. Upon ascertaining who the young man was, the chief was much grieved, for he had been not only an old acquaintance, but a friend. He was fired upon, on the supposition that he was an officer of the continental army.

The siege of Fort Stanwix, or Schuyler, as it was afterwards called, is one of the most memorable events of the war, with which Brant had a personal connexion. General Gansevoort, with about seven hundred and fifty men, defended this fortress, and had provisions for only about six weeks. Col. St. Leger commanded the royalists, who laid siege to the fort, and Capt. Brant the Indians. Col. Marinus Willet, with his regiment, was directed to join the garrison. The besieging army under St. Leger, including Indians, consisted of more than seventeen hundred men. General Herkimer, as soon as he heard of the siege of Fort Schuyler, endeavoured to arouse the militia of Tyron county. The people seemed to have dismissed their fears which had so lately seized them, and discovered now a readiness to come forward to the assistance of their distressed countrymen. They therefore rallied round the standard of Gen. Herkimer, and appeared eager to be led on against the enemy. Indeed, their alacrity was so great, that they went forward in their march with very little order: and when the general expressed a doubt whether it was safe to advance farther, until they received a reinforcement, some of his principal officers considered it a mark of cowardice, and declared their determination to push on. But they had not proceeded more than two or three miles, before the vanguard were shot down, by an invisible foe. The fact was, that Col. St. Leger, having heard of the approach of Gen. Herkimer, had sent the Indians, under Brant, and a number of select companies of Rangers and Greens to ambuscade the army of Herkimer on its way. Brant had chosen his ground with consummate judgment, stationing his men in almost a circle, leaving open a narrow pass for the provincials to enter. The effect of this stratagem was, that

nearly the whole force of Herkimer was surrounded, before he was aware of the presence of an enemy. His men were by the suddenness of the attack and the concealment of the enemy, who fired from beneath thick bushes and from behind trees, thrown into great disorder, and early in the battle the general himself was severely wounded, having one of his legs shattered; but causing himself to be rested against a tree, he continued to issue his commands, in the midst of the thickest of the battle, with the most perfect firmness and composure. The destruction of the provincials was dreadful, until forming themselves into circles, they were more successful in repelling the furious attacks of the savage foe. Just at this time the battle was interrupted by a heavy shower of rain, which raged with fury for an hour. During this suspension, the provincials took the opportunity of gaining a more favourable piece of ground. About this time a firing was heard in the direction of the fort; and upon the appearance of the men, they seemed to be a reinforcement for the provincials; but it was soon discovered that they were enemies in the guise of friends. Capt. Gardinier, who was first to detect the true character of these forces, attacked them with incredible ardour, and with his own hands slew several of the foremost; and his men, stimulated by his example, performed prodigies of valour on that occasion. The Indians now began to give way, and the Greens and Rangers retired towards the fort, where it was understood that their assistance was needed. This was undoubtedly one of the severest conflicts which took place during the revolutionary war. Both parties suffered severely, but the provincials kept possession of the ground. The brave general was carried off in a litter. Never did a man give fuller evidence of true courage than Herkimer on this occasion. The Indians murdered a few of the prisoners, and more would have fallen a sacrifice to their cruelty, had they not been restrained by their officers. Two brothers were on this day engaged on opposite sides. Major Frey, on the side of the provincials, was wounded and taken prisoner; when his own brother, who was among the loyalists, made the attempt to murder him outright, but the fratricide was prevented by the bystanders.

Immediately after the rain, Col. Willet made a sortie from the fort with a chosen band of soldiers. This sortie was intended to favour the entrance of Herkimer into the fort, and he, when apprized of its being made, was to rush forward; but being attacked beforehand, this well concerted plan was

frustrated, as to its primary object. But the celerity and impetuosity of Col. Willet's movements were such as to throw the enemies' camp into the greatest disorder. Most of the Indians too, and some of the best troops of the British, were at that moment engaged in the battle of Oriskany. Those that remained in the camp, being thus unexpectedly and vigorously attacked, fled to the woods for shelter, where they were pursued by Willet's men. The baggage and camp equipage of the enemy fell in large quantities into the hands of the garrison. Among other things taken were five British standards, and the baggage of Sir John Johnson. At this time St. Leger, who was on the opposite side of the river, made a movement to intercept Col. Willet in his return to the fort; but they got back without the loss of a single man.

General Herkimer did not long survive the battle of Oriskany, in which he was wounded so severely, and behaved so bravely. He was conducted to his own house on the Mohawk, where he died in the faith of the gospel. Congress passed a resolution requesting the governor and council of New York to erect a monument to his memory, which however was never accomplished. He was of German descent, and his family were among the first who settled in the Mohawk valley.

Fort Schuyler continued beleaguered for some time longer; and many interesting events occurred which we have no room to mention. A panic seized the besieging army, occasioned by the report of a strange being, called Hon Yost Schuyler, who reported that Arnold, with two thousand men, was rapidly advancing. The siege was suddenly raised, and both St. Leger and Sir John Johnson commenced their retreat with all possible expedition. Arnold was indeed advancing, and reached the fort soon after the enemy had decamped.

In the opening of the season, in 1778, Thayendanegea had returned to his former haunts on the Susquehanna, Oghkwaga, and Unadilla. He soon proved himself an active and a dreaded partisan. No matter for the difficulties or the distance, wherever a blow could be struck to any advantage, Joseph Brant was sure to be there. Secrecy, energy and celerity characterised his conduct in the border warfare then waged against the white settlements. Without the least previous warning whole neighbourhoods were cut off, the houses

burnt, and the inhabitants murdered, or carried off prisoners. In these scenes of savage cruelty, the tories were often the instigators of the Indians, and commonly their companions.

During this year Brant made a descent upon Springfield, a small town at the head of Otsego lake. The chieftain burnt the entire settlement, with the exception of a single house, into which he conducted all the women and children, and left them uninjured.

In this same year (1778) occurred the melancholy and tragical invasion of Wyoming valley. A detailed, and we presume, an authentic history of this valley is given by our author, in the fifteenth chapter of his work. The whole is very interesting; but that part which relates to the massacre of the white inhabitants by the Indians has been consecrated by an elegant English poet,* who represents Brant as a monster of cruelty, and as the principal actor in this bloody scene. But our author undertakes his vindication; and if his proof of one part is satisfactory, nothing more is necessary to rescue the character of his favourite Indian from the foul stain cast upon it by the poet; and this fact is, that Brant was not present, at all, in that expedition. His son, when in Europe, entered into a correspondence with the poet, and successfully vindicated his father's memory from the calumny. Our historian corrects all our former accounts of the affair of Wyoming, even that of Marshall in his life of Washington, and asserts, "that after the capitulation, no massacre took place."

The most considerable transaction of this year, in which Brant was a leader, was the destruction of the populous settlement of the German Flatts. This is the most beautiful portion of the Mohawk valley. Here was the residence of the Herkimer family; and the fort, therefore, was called Fort Herkimer. At this time there were about thirty houses on each side of the river. The year had been fruitful, and the barns were abundantly filled. Some suspicion of Brant's design had been entertained, and a scout of four men was sent to gain intelligence. Three of them were killed; but the fourth made his escape and gave the alarm. The inhabitants gathered into the forts, Dayton and Herkimer. It was on the evening of one of the last days of August, that Brant arrived at the edge of the settlement: but as the night was dark and rainy, he halted with his forces in a ravine near the house of a tory, named Shoemaker. Here he lay until the storm

* Campbell's "Gertrude of Wyoming."

broke away, towards morning—unconscious that his approach had been notified to the people, by the scout, in season to enable them to escape the blow of his uplifted arm. Before the dawn he was on foot, and his warriors were sweeping through the settlement; so that the torch might be almost simultaneously applied to every building it contained. Just as the day was breaking in the east, the fires were kindled, and the whole section of the valley was speedily illuminated by the flames of houses and barns, and all things else combustible. The spectacle to the people in the forts was one of melancholy grandeur. Every family saw the flames and smoke of its own domicile ascending to the skies, and every farmer the whole product of his labour for the season dissolving into ashes. The Indians, however, having no larger guns than rifles, made no attempt on the forts, but busied themselves in driving off the cattle of the inhabitants. Although this descent of the Indians on the beautiful settlement of the German Flatts was disastrous, as it related to the property of the inhabitants, yet no more than two persons were killed.

A much more disastrous and fatal attack was made on Fort Schuyler this year, then under the command of Col. Ichabod Alden; a man little acquainted with Indian warfare. All reports of the approach of the Indians and loyalists were discredited by him, and he refused to permit the inhabitants of the surrounding country to come into the fort, with their most valuable articles, for safety. On the 10th of November, Butler with his rangers, and Brant with his Indians, encamped within a mile of the fort and village of Cherry Valley. The officers of the garrison were in the habit of lodging in the houses of the respectable inhabitants in the vicinity. Col. Alden, and his lieutenant Col. Stacia, lodged with Robert Wells, Esq., a gentleman of great respectability, and recently a judge of the county. The Indians would have taken them by surprize had not a man been shot at and wounded, who, however, escaped to the fort and gave the alarm. But still Col. Alden could not be persuaded that there was any thing more than a straggling Indian or so; but he was soon convinced of his error; for before the guards could be called in, the Indians were upon them. The Senecas, the most ferocious of the Six Nations, were in the van; the Rangers had stopped a little to dry their arms wet with the rain. The house of Mr. Wells was instantly surrounded by the warriors of the tribe, and several

tories of no less ferocity. The family, at that time, consisted of himself, his mother, his wife, his brother and sister, John and Jane, three of his sons, Samuel, Robert, and William, and his daughter Eleanor. All these were murdered. The only survivor of this large family was John, then at school, at Schenectady. Col. Alden himself was pursued some distance by an Indian, and, refusing to surrender, his pursuer threw his tomahawk at his head with unerring aim, and then came up and scalped him. Lieut. Col. Stacia was made prisoner. One of the tories boasted that he had killed Mr. Wells while at prayer. "His sister Jane was distinguished alike for her beauty, her accomplishments, and her virtues. As the savages entered the house she fled to a wood-pile on the premises, and endeavoured to conceal herself. She was pursued by an Indian, who with perfect composure wiped and sheathed his dripping knife, and took his tomahawk from his girdle. At this instant, a tory, who had formerly been a domestic in the family; sprang forward, and interposed in her behalf—claiming her as a sister. The maiden too, who understood somewhat of the Indian language, implored for mercy. But in vain. With one hand the Indian pushed the tory from him, and with the other planted the hatchet deep into her temple.

Among the other families massacred, was that of the Rev. Mr. Dunlop. Mrs. Dunlop was killed outright; and thus shared the fate of Mrs. Wells, who was her daughter. Mr. Dunlop and another daughter would have been murdered, but for the interposition of Little Aaron, a chief of the Oghkwaga branch of the Mohawks, who led the old gentleman, tottering beneath the weight of years, to the door, and stood behind him for his protection. But this venerable servant of God survived the shock but a little while: he died within a year afterward.

The case of a certain Mr. Mitchell was still more painful. He was in the field, at work, when he beheld the Indians approaching: and being already cut off from his house, his only course was to betake himself to the woods. On returning, after the enemy had retired, he found his house on fire, and within its walls were his wife and three of his children. The fourth, a little girl of ten or twelve, had been left for dead; but signs of life appearing, the parent having extinguished the fire, brought her to the door, and while bending over her, discovered a straggling party of the enemy approaching. He had but just time to conceal himself, when

a tory named Newberry rushed forward and extinguished, by a blow of his hatchet, what little hope of life had been left. The whole of the inhabitants killed were thirty-two, mostly women and children; and sixteen soldiers beside. A greater number were made prisoners. Some few escaped, among whom was Mrs. Clyde, wife of Col. Clyde, who was absent at the time. She succeeded in reaching the woods with three of her children, where she lay concealed until the next day. The eldest daughter likewise had made a successful flight, and returned in safety. Colonel Campbell was also absent; but hastening home on hearing the alarm, he arrived only in time to see the destruction of his property, and to ascertain that his wife and family were carried into captivity. Every building in the village was burnt to the ground. The prisoners, who amounted to thirty or forty, were marched, on the evening of the massacre, about two miles, to the place where the Indians encamped. Fires were kindled all around them, and they were crowded into a narrow circle in the midst, exposed to the hearing of the horrid yells of exultation from the savages. A division of the spoil was made in the night; and in the morning their march was resumed. They had not proceeded far before a halt was made, and it was announced that all the women and children would be released, excepting Mrs. Campbell, and Mrs. Moore, and a few others. These it was resolved to retain in captivity, as a punishment to their husbands, for the active part they had taken in the war. The rest were sent back to the fort with a letter from Capt. Walter N. Butler, the commander of the Rangers.

They then, disencumbered, proceeded on their march, but Mrs. Cannon, the mother of Mrs. Campbell, being infirm and incapable of marching rapidly, was put to death by the side of her daughter, on the second day of their march. Mrs. Campbell, having a child only eighteen months old in her arms, was driven along before the uplifted hatchet with barbarous rapidity, until she fell into the hands of a more humane master. "Thus terminated the expedition of Walter N. Butler and Joseph Brant to Cherry Valley. Nothing could exhibit an aspect of more entire desolation, than the village, on the following day, when the militia from the Mohawk valley arrived too late to afford assistance."

"Next to the destruction of Wyoming, that of Cherry Valley stands out in history as having been the most conspicuous for its atrocity. And as the case of Wyoming, both in

history and popular tradition, Joseph Brant has been held up as the foul fiend of the barbarians, and of all others deserving the deepest execration." But Capt. Brant, as he was not present in the Wyoming expedition, so he was not the leader in this; and he asserted, and there is no reason to question his veracity, that on the morning of the attack, he left the main body of the Indians, and endeavoured to anticipate their arrival at the house of Mr. Wells, for the purpose of affording protection to the family; but having to cross a ploughed field, he was unable to accomplish his purpose.

The author thus endeavours to shield from the odium of the cruel murders of Cherry Valley the character of his hero. How successfully, we leave the reader to judge; but hope that before he makes up his opinion, he will read the whole story, as given by Colonel Stone.

The next remarkable military expedition, in which Capt. Brant acted a conspicuous part, was the invasion of Minisink. This town, though very remote, and much out of the way, is one of the oldest in this part of America. Its whole history too is romantic and interesting. A severe battle was fought with the Indians here as early as July 22, 1669, the bloody horrors of which yet live in the traditions of that neighbourhood. It was about the 20th of July, 1779, that Brant made his descent on this ancient village. His object probably was to take both prisoners and plunder. The place had unhappily been left without any protection, and the inhabitants were taken entirely by surprize. Ten houses and twelve barns were burnt. Several houses were in flames before the sleeping inhabitants awoke. Several persons were killed, and some prisoners taken. The farms were laid waste, and the cattle driven away. Brant had accomplished this destruction with a select band of his warriors, having left the main body of his Indians at Grassy Brook. Having completed his design, he immediately returned. When the fugitives from Minisink arrived at Goshen, about ten miles east, the alarm was quickly spread, and a company of a hundred and forty-nine men rendezvoused and rallied round Col. Tusten. The question whether they should attempt a pursuit was agitated. Col. Tusten was opposed to it, until they could receive a reinforcement; but others were for immediate pursuit, and spoke contemptuously of the Indian force. Of this class was Maj. Meeker, who, flourishing his sword over his head, cried out, "Let the brave men follow me, and the cowards may stay behind." This decided the matter. All marched

forward. On the second day, having been joined by a small reinforcement under Col. Hathorn of the Warwick regiment, they proceeded until they arrived at the camp occupied by the Indians the previous night. Here again the question of immediate pursuit was agitated. Col. Tusten was strongly in favour of delay, but again the more ardent spirits prevailed. Capt. Tyler, having been sent forward to ascertain the condition and distance of the enemy, was shot down by an unseen enemy. Very soon the whole body of the Indians were seen marching in a direct line towards a ford of the Delaware. Col. Hathorn determined to intercept them, but in doing this he necessarily lost sight of them. Brant, no doubt, suspecting his design, wheeled about, and crossing a ravine, came upon the rear of Hathorn's force; and contrived to cut off entirely from the main body about one third of his men. The battle, however, was long and bloody. The number of Indians being much greater than the Goshen militia, they were able nearly to hem them in on all sides. The battle continued from eleven o'clock, A. M., until sun down. The fighting was in the Indian fashion, from behind trees, rocks, and bushes. About sun down, the ammunition of the militia gave out, and they attempted to retreat, but many of them were killed. Col. Tusten, who, being a physician, acted as surgeon to his corps, had a number of wounded under his care behind a cliff; but the Indians came upon them and killed the wounded, and tomahawked Tusten himself. Among the slain were many of the first citizens of Goshen; and of the whole number that went out, only thirty returned to tell the melancholy story.

Brant has been censured for the cruelties perpetrated, or alleged to have been perpetrated, in this battle. He always maintained that he had been unjustly blamed, and that his conduct had been the subject of unjust reproach. He asserted, that he informed the commander of the militia that he had men enough in ambush to overwhelm his force; and advised him, at once, to surrender; but that while they were parleying, the Americans began to fire, on which he gave the signal to his warriors, and they darted forth, tomahawk in hand. The militia also, in crossing a creek, had broken their ranks, and had not time to form again, until the Indians, with their dreadful war whoop, were upon them. Col. Gabriel Wisner, one of the Goshen volunteers, was mortally wounded, and taken prisoner. Brant seeing that he could not live, and must be left behind, to save him from the agonies of a lingering

death, engaged him in conversation, and then suddenly with his tomahawk struck him dead on the spot. Here was indeed the humanity of a savage.

We have, in the first chapter of Vol. II., an account of the capture of lieutenant Boyd, by Brant and his Indians, after nearly all his men had been killed. The employment of the sign by which the fraternity of free-masons recognize each other, had the effect of inducing Brant, who was a free-mason, to spare the life of Boyd; but it was only to rescue him for tortures of the most ingenious cruelty of which we have any authentic account: not, it is true, by the consent of Brant, who had been called away, but by the tory Butler, who, when Boyd refused to make any communications respecting the condition of Sullivan's army, to which he belonged, gave him up to the tender mercies of the savages. The manner in which he was tortured, we shall give entire. "Having been denuded, Boyd was tied to a sapling, where the Indians first practised upon the steadiness of his nerves, by hurling their tomahawks apparently at his head, but so as to strike the trunk of the sapling as near to his head as possible without hitting it—groups of Indians, in the mean time, brandishing their knives and tomahawks, and dancing round him with the most frantic demonstrations of joy. His nails were pulled out, his nose cut off, and one of his eyes plucked out. His tongue was also cut out, and he was stabbed in various places. After amusing themselves sufficiently, in this way, a small incision was made in his abdomen, and the end of one of his intestines taken out and fastened to the tree. The victim was then unbound, and driven around the tree, until all his intestines had been literally drawn from his body, and wound round its trunk. His sufferings were then terminated by striking his head from his body."

One of the most considerable and hotly contested battles which occurred in this war, took place the 29th of August, this year (1779). The American forces, under Sullivan, were under the particular commands of Clinton, Hand, Poor, and Maxwell. The Indians were, as usual, commanded by Brant, whose force was estimated by Sullivan, at fifteen hundred, but by their own account, less than half that number. The regular troops and savages were led by Col. John Butler, Sir John and Guy Johnson, Major Walter Butler, and Capt. M'Donald. The dispositions and orders of Sullivan were very judicious, and were carried into effect with precision. Both Indians and tories fought bravely, and stood a hot cannon-

ade in their front, for more than two hours. But Poor with his brigade having gained their flank, their ranks were broken; and although Brant, who was every where in the hottest of the battle, endeavoured to rally his men, yet his efforts were ineffectual. The Indians were terrified and confounded with the thundering of the cannon, and having raised the *retreat-halloo*, they fled with precipitation, leaving their packs and in many cases their arms. Eleven of their dead were found on the field; but most of them, according to their custom, were carried off. The Americans had adopted the savage custom of scalping their enemies: and on this occasion took eight scalps. The loss of the Americans was surprisingly small; only five or six men were killed, and between forty and fifty wounded. This battle was fought near to Newtown, now called Elmira.

An incident which proved Brant's regard for the customs of Christian and civilized life, occurred at the fort of Niagara. A Miss More, who had been detained in captivity with Mrs. Campbell, was to be married to one of the officers of the garrison. Thayendanegea, being present at the wedding, although he had been some time united to his wife by the ties of an Indian marriage, now embraced the opportunity of having the English marriage ceremony performed.

The chief was never long inactive. The month of April, 1780, found him on the war-path, at the head of a small party of Indians and Tories, whom he led against the settlement of Harper's Field, which was taken by surprise and destroyed. Most of the inhabitants, however, had left the settlement, so that there were but few persons killed, and only nineteen prisoners taken. It was the intention of Brant, on this incursion, to have destroyed the fort of Schoharie also; but falling in with a company from the fort, engaged in sugar-making, he surrounded and took them, after having killed three of the number. Capt. Alexander Harper was at the head of this little company, and among the prisoners, from whom Brant received such an account (though not true) of the force of Schoharie, that the chief did not consider himself sufficiently strong to attack the fort. The Indians, suspecting the truth of his narrative, had him examined again, when Brant scrutinized his countenance, to discover whether any signs of falsehood could be detected, but Harper so governed every muscle, and so exactly repeated what he said at first, that the desired effect was produced; and no attempt was made on Schoharie, which was in a most defenceless state.

But a new trial awaited the prisoners. On the march, Brant detached eleven of his men to make another descent on Minisink, who took prisoners five athletic men. When night came on, the prisoners being bound, the Indians lay down to sleep; one of the prisoners found means to release himself from his bonds, and then silently unloosed his companions. They now took from the sleeping Indians as many tomahawks as they wanted, and immediately fell upon them and killed nine, and wounded the tenth; the remaining Indian made his escape. When Brant came up, the death-yell of this solitary man startled him; and, upon drawing near, he found the bodies of the slain Indians. The most violent rage now seized the Indians. They determined at once to take vengeance on the prisoners. But while they were unsheathing their knives, the Indian who had escaped the massacre of his brethren, ran into the camp, and, being a chief, his address was listened to by his companions. The plea which he urged why the prisoners should not be slain, was, that they were innocent of the massacre, and ought not to suffer for the guilty. By the earnestness of his address, and the force of his argument, he obtained a suspension of the stroke. This Indian chief, it seems, had resided in Schoharie, and knew, personally, all the prisoners. This, no doubt, had its effect on his conduct; but it was a noble action, and would have conferred immortality on the chief, in the palmy days of Greece and Rome. The prisoners, however, were obliged to run the gauntlet, which is a painful and degrading punishment. The Indians arrange themselves in two lines, and the prisoner is forced to run between them, from one end to the other, every one giving him a kick or a stroke as he passes.

After the war was terminated, Brant negotiated with Sir Frederick Haldimand for a tract of country lying on Grand river, and thither the Mohawks removed. This land he and his tribe considered as made over to them as fully as the country was possessed in the Mohawk valley: but after some time a difficulty arose on the subject of the title, which was a source of great trouble and anxiety to Brant.

The majority of the Six Nations, and especially the Mohawks and Senecas, having taken part with the British, and having fought against the States to the close of the war, might have been treated as enemies by the American government; for their friends, the British, had made no stipulations in their behalf, in the treaty by which the war was concluded,

and the independence of the United States acknowledged. But instead of dealing rigourously with these sons of the forest, Washington and the congress appeared anxious to conciliate their friendship, and to treat with them not merely on principles of justice, but of generosity. Accordingly, on the 22d of October, 1784, a treaty was signed, by which the United States gave peace to the Mohawks, Senecas, Onondagas, and Cayugas; and received them under their protection, on condition that all prisoners should be delivered up. The Oneidas and Tuscaroras, who had been the friends of the Americans, were secured in possession of the lands then in their occupation. To secure the return of the prisoners, hostages of some Indian chiefs were required. Brant and many others were much dissatisfied with this treaty; and especially, with the detention of any of the chiefs as hostages. On which occasion he addressed an expostulatory letter to Col. James Monroe.

In 1785, Brant again sailed for England. His object, it was alleged, was to obtain remuneration for his Mohawks, for their sufferings and services, during the war. The reception of the distinguished chief in the British capital was all that the proudest forest king could have desired. Here he met with many with whom he had been well acquainted in America, who received him most cordially. Among these were the Earl of Dorchester, formerly Sir Guy Carlton, Earl Moira, who had served in America as Lord Rawdon, Sir Charles Stuart, fourth son of the Earl of Bute, who had often slept under the same tent with him. With the Duke of Northumberland, then Lord Percy, he had likewise formed an acquaintance in America, which ripened into a lasting attachment, and was maintained by a correspondence only interrupted by death. He had also become acquainted with several noble and distinguished persons on his former visit to England. And at this time many sought his acquaintance; such as Charles Fox, James Boswell, and the bishop of London. Fox presented him with a silver snuff-box bearing the initials of his name. He was also a great favourite with the king and queen; and equally well did he stand with the Prince of Wales.

While in London, he addressed two letters to Lord Sidney, respecting the claims of his tribe; and one, written in a magnanimous spirit, to Sir Evan Nepean, respecting a proposal of some persons, that he should receive, during life, half-pay, as a British captain, which he declined. His dress and public

appearance attracted much attention; his costume was half military and half savage. His countenance was manly and intelligent, his manners easy and dignified, and his conversation fluent and sensible, and, when he pleased, uncommonly witty.

His great object, after his return to America, was to unite all the Indians by a solemn league, and, by a definite line of demarcation, to set some bounds to the encroachment of the whites on the Indian territory. But Gen. St. Clair defeated his purpose by entering into separate treaties with several of the tribes. And from the published correspondence, it is certain, that congress dreaded such a confederacy; and that their agents laboured to prevent its formation.

The treaties formed with the Indians by St. Clair did not, however, bring about a pacification. Indeed, it was not long before hostilities commenced; and the repeated defeats of the Americans, under Harding and Harmar, and, finally, the disastrous overthrow of St. Clair's army raised the confidence of the Indians very high, and furnished a subject of deep mortification, as well as great expense of blood and treasure, to the United States. Whether Brant was in any of these battles is uncertain. Our author seems to think that he was an active leader at St. Clair's defeat; but his name has never been mentioned in any of the accounts which we have seen of this battle. If he had been present, doubtless, he would have been conspicuous above all the chiefs who were engaged in that affair. The Americans never suffered more in any battle with the Indians than this. "Thirty-eight commissioned officers were killed on the field, and four hundred and ninety-three non-commissioned officers and privates killed and missing;" while the loss of the Indians was about one hundred and fifty killed, and a considerable number wounded. This defeat was chiefly owing to the cowardice and insubordination of the militia; but there was a great want of wise generalship in the commander in chief; although during the battle he behaved as well as could have been expected from a man confined to his litter with the gout. As to the presence of Brant, Col. Stone merely says, without alleging any authorities, "Gen. St. Clair probably died in ignorance of the fact that one of the master-spirits against whom he contended was none other than Joseph Brant Thayendanegea."

Great pains were now taken to gain the friendship of Brant, by the American government. The Rev. Mr. Kirkland, before mentioned, was engaged to write to the Mohawk

chief; and General Knox, the Secretary of War, addressed a letter to him in his own name, earnestly inviting him to visit Philadelphia, and assuring him that he would be well received by the president, General Washington.

In June, 1792, Brant arrived at Philadelphia, where he was kindly and courteously received by the president, heads of departments, and all other persons of distinction about the government. He appeared to enter very sincerely into the views of the American government, as it related to a general peace with the Indians, and promised his influence and mediation to effect the object, as far as they would go. But other means of accomplishing the same object were not neglected. Messengers of peace were sent to visit the several nations: and Timothy Pickering, Beverly Randolph, and Benjamin Lincoln, were commissioned to go out to the Indian country, and treat with as many of the Indians as could be collected in a general council. After long delays, the council met in August, 1793, at the Miami Rapids, and their address, in which they laid down their terms of peace, was signed by the Wyandots, seven nations of Canada, Delawares, Shawanese, Miamis, Ottawas, Chippeways, Senecas, Pottawattamies, and several other less considerable tribes. The Six Nations and Brant did not sign it, as they were professedly desirous of peace; and the address of the council gave no reason to hope for any thing but war. The commissioners before mentioned were very desirous to be present at the deliberations of the council, but this privilege was not granted them. The ultimatum of the Indians, or rather their preliminary condition, was, that the Ohio river should be the boundary between the whites and Indians. This put an end to all expectations of a peace; and active preparations were made on both sides to prosecute the war.

General Wayne had already been appointed to succeed St. Clair, and a large force was enlisted, and officers of known courage and skill were commissioned.

On the 12th of August, 1794, General Wayne brought the Indians to action, and by a judicious disposition of his forces, and the courage and activity of his men, under the favour of Providence, gained a complete victory over the savage foe. The loss of the Americans was about one hundred and seven killed and wounded, including officers: the loss of the Indians is not known, but must have been considerable.

Whatever may have been Brant's real sentiments, after visiting Philadelphia, there is too much evidence that he now

advised the Indians not to make peace, except on the conditions before offered, of making the river Ohio the line. He was probably led to take this course, because there was a prospect of a war between Great Britain and the United States. But from this time the Mohawk chief was no more connected with military operations; we shall therefore conclude our narrative, by exhibiting him more fully in a civil capacity.

We have already mentioned his concern about the lands granted to the Mohawks on Grand river; and the difficulty which arose about the title. To obtain the interference of the British government in favour of the rights of his tribe, he sent his adopted nephew, John Norton, to England, with letters to Lord Dorchester and others: but through the communication of a council at which Red Jacket was the presiding spirit, all Norton's efforts proved ineffectual.

The duke of Northumberland, the unceasing friend of Thayendanegea, in a letter to him, strongly dissuaded him from exchanging the Indian habits, and the hunting life, for the pursuits of agriculture; alleging, that one free, independent Indian, was of more value than ten plodding labourers in the earth. Joseph Brant, however, entertained very different sentiments on this subject, and had nothing more at heart than to see his people civilized, and to induce them to change their roving, restless habits, which prevented all improvment and domestic comfort, for those of the white people; which in his own person and family he had long adopted. But his views were still higher. When young he appeared to be under deep religious impressions, and entered the communion of the Episcopal church; but whether these serious impressions were entirely effaced by the active and arduous duties of a military life we undertake not to say. One thing is certain, that Brant retained through life a firm belief in the divine origin of the Christian religion; and wished to see his people brought under its influence. It has been seen how zealously he assisted in preparing books for the Indians, assisting the missionaries in making a version of the Prayer Book into the Iroquois language: and he himself devoted much time to a translation of the gospel of Mark into the language of his tribe. When he entered into stipulations for the country on Grand river, he insisted on three things, a church, a school-house, and a flour-mill. And when the war was terminated, he again turned his attention to the means of having religion established among the Mohawks. He therefore used

great exertion to obtain a missionary; and having found a gentleman, as he thought, well qualified for a religious instructor, he applied repeatedly and earnestly to the bishop of Quebec to ordain him, and failing here, he applied to the bishop of New York, who acceded to his wishes. He also entered into correspondence with some distinguished members of the Missionary Society of New York, particularly the Rev. Doctors Mason and Miller; and when this Society sent to the Indians, Mr. Holmes, a pious missionary, he received him kindly. Indeed, his house was always the missionaries' home when in his neighbourhood; where they were hospitably treated when well, and tenderly nursed when sick.

Brant left several children; two of whom were educated at Dartmouth College. He died after a painful illness, Nov. 24, 1807, at his residence near the head of lake Ontario, in the full possession of his faculties, and according to the belief of his attendants, in the full faith of the Christian religion.

ART. II.—*Bible Class Manual: or a System of Theology, in the order of the Westminster Shorter Catechism, adapted to Bible Classes.* By John M'Dowell, D.D., Pastor of the Central Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. Vol. I. 12mo. pp. 382. Philadelphia: William S. Martien. 1838.

It ought to be the great object of every minister of the gospel, and indeed of every one who wishes to promote the spiritual benefit of his fellow men, first of all, and above all, to bring their minds into contact with the word of God. He who does this most simply, diligently, affectionately and perseveringly, takes a course best adapted to promote the temporal and eternal welfare of those whom he addresses. Whether he approaches the young or the old, the rich or the poor, the learned or the illiterate—it is all the same—the Bible—the Bible ought to be his main instrument—and under God, his chief dependence for “preparing the way of the Lord” in the hearts and lives of all whom he wishes to lead in the way of holiness and salvation.

It is gratifying to observe how much more amply and

happily the times in which we live are furnished with helps for the attainment of this object, than were the times of our fathers. We are apt to think the former days better than the present. But in whatever other respects this may be said, it cannot be justly said in reference to aids for the instruction of the rising generation. It would be happy for us all if they were employed with as much diligence and skill as they have been produced.

The appearance of every manual which tends to render the Bible more familiar to the minds of the young, and better understood by them, may be regarded as a public benefit. We have long been persuaded that, unless the minds of children and young people are early imbued with religious knowledge; unless they are made intimately acquainted, in the morning of life, with well composed elementary works in this branch of knowledge, they will be apt to manifest the disadvantage arising from this defect in their youthful training, as long as they live. Even if they afterwards become pious, and ever so diligent in theological study, still the loss of accurate youthful instruction seems, in many cases, never to be really compensated. It is storied of a young candidate for the ministry, recently on trials before an ecclesiastical body, that, being at some loss for an answer when asked—“What is Justification?” a spectator remarked to one seated beside him—“Poor young man! what a pity his mother did not teach him the Catechism!”—Upon the same principle, no doubt, it was that the late Principal Robertson, of the University of Edinburgh, when consulted, as he of course often was, by candidates for the ministry in the Scottish Church, he was in the constant habit of recommending to them, as the first book to be carefully studied, after the Bible, Vincent’s explanation of the *Catechism*. And when they expressed surprise, as they sometimes did, that a work so simple and elementary, and so much better adapted to school-boys and children than to theological students, should be recommended to those who were taking their places in a more elevated form; he never failed to inculcate the vitally important lesson, that even a theological student is not prepared to proceed with advantage in his professional studies, until he has read, digested, thoroughly mastered, and fully deposited in his memory, the first principles of gospel truth, as exhibited in well prepared formularies. He was wont to insist, that, without an intimate acquaintance with such formularies, even a man of real talents and learning, will be apt

to be less simple, clear and elementary in his views of truth, and far less ready in exhibiting and applying them to the capacities of the young and the ignorant, as well as of the better instructed, than if he were early made at home in such compositions.

The counsel of this celebrated man does him great honour. None but a vain and superficial thinker ever thought little of well constructed ecclesiastical formularies, and of judicious commentaries, adapted to make them popular and useful. This the venerable Calvin well understood and appreciated, when, immediately after his return to Geneva, after the banishment, disgraceful to the hostile faction only, which had sent him away,—he began to employ himself diligently in Catechisms and other compends intended to instruct all, and especially the rising generation, in the principles of true religion.

We are deeply persuaded that the early and diligent study of the Bible is of more importance in the formation of the intellectual and moral character, than is commonly supposed even by reflecting and serious people. Many imagine that a deficiency in the private study of the scriptures may be supplied by the instruction of the pulpit. But such persons forget that preaching itself is likely to be in a great measure useless without a previous acquaintance with the word of God. Without this, the very language of the sacred writers will appear strange and unintelligible; and the allusions of preachers to the sentiments, the characters, and the examples of the Bible will be in a great measure lost. Pastors and parents, then, can never prepare the youth committed to their care for a profitable attendance on the sanctuary, without unwearied labour to imbue their minds with elementary knowledge, and especially to make them familiar with the contents of the sacred volume. The more we see and hear of the scenes passing before us, the more we are persuaded that, with all our Sabbath schools, and other boasted privileges of the day, a radical deficiency in the religious instruction and training of the youth of the church is one of the great crying sins of our age. We never had so many popular religious books; and, at the same time, so little solid religious reading. Never so many facilities for imbuing the minds of children with elementary knowledge; and, at the same time, so little of that discriminating indoctrination in first principles which is adapted to prepare the rising generation to be intelligent Christians, and “witnesses for the truth,” when

the solemn trust of ecclesiastical responsibility shall be devolved upon them.

The Catechisms of our church have a degree of excellence at once peculiar and pre-eminent. We know of none that can claim the most distant title to a preference. Their richness and density of thought; their clearness and felicity of diction; and their remarkable accuracy and comprehensiveness of instruction, are absolutely without a parallel in the whole catalogue of ecclesiastical formularies. They have been the theme of the admiration and praise of all competent and impartial judges for nearly two hundred years. And yet, though our fathers used and lauded them: and though their beneficial influence has been so strikingly manifested; their use, for the last thirty years, has been in a great measure banished from our churches. They have been either superseded by others of far less value; or they have been suffered to drop out of use, as too sectarian, without the adoption of others, of even tolerable character, to supply their place. Of late, indeed, there has appeared to be some little waking up to the proper estimate and use of these admirable compends of Gospel truth; but we have, as yet, seen nothing to revive the hope, that the good old habits of our Scottish and Puritan fathers, with regard to these formularies, were about to return: habits of thoroughly committing to memory the larger as well as the shorter catechism, and making the recitation of them not merely a quarterly or half yearly task; but the business of every week, and sometimes of every day.

With these views, we greatly rejoice that the highly respected author of the manual before us, has thought proper to employ himself in a work so important, and so well adapted to reward labour as the preparation of the volume under review. Dr. M'Dowell, about ten or eleven years ago, published a system of theology, in the form of sermons, in two volumes, octavo, which were considered as a monument of the author's solid merit, both as a divine and a sermonizer. The substance of the first of these volumes he has here presented in an abridged and improved form; and exhibiting what we hope will prove an acceptable and useful offering, not only to the youth of his own large and important flock, but also to the young people of many other congregations. The work is executed with judgment and with care, and we hope it will soon be completed by the addition of the second volume, which we take for granted the author intends to give.

The author, in a short preface, speaks thus of his work—
“It has been revised, and is now offered to the public in the form of a continued treatise, divided into chapters, instead of sermons. In preparing it in this form, the introductions to the several sermons, and the practical observations at the close of them, have generally been omitted. The special object of the author in this edition has been to prepare the work for the use of his own bible class, that the Scriptures may be studied in connexion with our own excellent catechism, and the great doctrines of religion in systematic order. To facilitate this object, he has made out a course of questions on each chapter. The questions on each chapter are preceded by a portion of Scripture as the subject of the bible lesson, in which portion the doctrine of the chapter is the prominent subject. The plan of the author, in his bible class, is to ask general questions, suggested by the portion of Scripture, which is given as the lesson; and then to take up the doctrine of the chapter in the system, and dwell particularly on this. If any pastor should see proper to introduce this work into his bible class, he can, according to his judgment, give any other portion of Scripture, as the foundation of the lesson on any particular doctrine.”

In reading this volume we have been struck with the fact, that the doctrines which it teaches are, strictly, those of the Confession of Faith and Catechisms of our Church. The author has not only adopted, as his title page intimates, “the *order* of the Westminster Shorter Catechism;” but he has followed its *spirit* throughout. We hope this will be borne in mind by our readers. There are those, at the present day, claiming to be, pre-eminently, “revival preachers,” who contend, that the “old fashioned doctrines of Calvinism” are unfriendly to revivals of religion, and tend to lull their hearers asleep in supineness and sloth. We have before us a specimen of the habitual preaching of Dr. M'Dowell. We see here how he instructs the old and the young who are committed to his pastoral charge. Perhaps the preaching of no modern pastor is in more strict accordance with what some are fond of calling the “old dead orthodoxy” of the Reformers and our Puritan fathers. And yet the ministry of few pastors in the United States has been more frequently and signally blessed by powerful revivals of religion than his. By the instrumentality of those great truths so often and so profanely derided, have sinners in great numbers been convinced and converted, and believers edified and comforted

under his ministry. These were the doctrines too, unceasingly preached by Whitefield, by the Tennents, and by other men in their day, who were as eminently favoured with revivals of religion as any men who ever trod the American soil. It is altogether too late, then, to tell us, that the preaching of these doctrines tends to lull men asleep in sin, and to destroy the hopes of the lover of revivals. Not only the word of God, but the whole history of the church, contradicts this allegation, and shows it to be a vain dream. Nay, the very reverse of this allegation is the fact. It is notorious, from the annals of the church, in every period of her progress, that the prevalence of Pelagian and Semipelagian opinions, instead of promoting, as their advocates promised, vital piety, and evangelical zeal, has never failed to be ultimately destructive of both; and to beget either fanatical excitement, or lifeless formality, according to the circumstances of each particular case.

Never have the reformed churches been in a better condition since the time of the reformers, than when the doctrines of strict Calvinism universally reigned; when a profession of faithful adherence to Calvinistic formularies was exacted of every pastor and elder; and when the youth of the church were trained with uniformity and fidelity in the same system. Then, in all cases, has the church exhibited the largest share of vital piety; the most enlightened and steady zeal in doing good; the richest fruits of holy living; and the most happy success in training up a seed to serve God, who were "accounted to the Lord as a generation."

Were it possible, therefore, so to lift up our voice as to cause it to be heard by every pastor, by every ruling elder, and by every professing Christian in our beloved church, we would exert it in saying to them, let the children of the church be the objects of your vigilant and unceasing care. Let them be familiar, from their mother's lap, with the Bible, with the Catechisms of the church, and with such judicious compends of Christian doctrine as shall pre-occupy their minds with divine truth, to the exclusion of the countless errors which are ever found to assail their opening faculties. Let the officers of the church, as their moral parent, regard them as, in some respects, the most precious part of their charge; providing for their instruction; suppressing every kind of vice and immorality in them; reminding them of their baptismal dedication; putting in the Master's claim to their affections and services; and

accompanying every effort with unceasing prayer with them, and for them, that the Holy Spirit may accompany and crown with success all the means employed for their benefit.

Such must be among the means unceasingly employed, if we wish our church to be built up in knowledge, in purity and in peace; if we wish harmony and orthodoxy to reign in all our borders; if we desire our children to take the place of their fathers when we are sleeping in the dust, and to bear forward the ark of God to victory and glory in the future contests with error and sin, when we shall have resigned to them our armour. He who expects the church to gain such blessings without the use of such means, may just as well hope to "gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles." Without the faithful use of such means, if the church were to-day perfectly pure and united, we might expect to find her, in a few years, torn by divisions, forsaken of her children, and her best interests given to the winds.

ART. III.—1. *Elements of Psychology, included in a Critical Examination of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, with Additional Pieces.* By Victor Cousin, Peer of France, Member of the Royal Council of Public Instruction, Member of the Institute, and Professor of the History of Ancient Philosophy in the Faculty of Literature. Translated from the French, with an Introduction and Notes, by the Rev. C. S. Henry, D.D. Second Edition, prepared for the use of Colleges. New York: Gould and Newman. 1838. pp. 423. 12mo.

2. *Introduction to the History of Philosophy.* By Victor Cousin, Professor of Philosophy of the Faculty of Literature at Paris. Translated from the French, by Henning Gottfried Linberg. Boston. 1832. pp. 458. 8vo.

3. *An Address delivered before the Senior Class in Divinity College, Cambridge, Sunday, 15th July, 1838.* By Ralph Waldo Emerson. Boston. pp. 31. 8vo.

It is we think undeniable, that since the death of Doctor Thomas Brown of Edinburgh, metaphysical research has been at a stand in Great Britain. In the southern part of the island this had been the case for a much longer period, but the sharp and sceptical enterprise of the Scotch kept

philosophical debate in motion for a time, so that a sect was formed, and we speak as familiarly of the Scotch school as we do of the Pythagorean or the Eleatic. But that line seems to have reached its term, and the few who publish at this time are either the lowliest compilers from Stewart and Brown, or, as is more frequently the case, such as have gone off in a direction altogether different, in search of a profounder philosophy. Of the latter sort, there are some among ourselves, and we have it now in view to point out some of the causes which may account for the essays to introduce a modified transcendentalism.

In America, the earliest school of metaphysics was founded by the followers of Locke; and with the clew of this great inquirer in his hand, Jonathan Edwards ventured into a labyrinth from which no English theologian had ever come out safe. By the just influence of his eminently patient, and discriminating, and conclusive research, this greatest of modern Christian metaphysicians put his contemporaries and their descendants upon a sort of discourse which will perhaps characterise New England Calvinism as long as there is a fibre of it left. In speaking of Edwards, we distinctly avow our conviction that he stands immeasurably above many who have followed in his steps, and attempted his methods. If the species of reasoning which he introduced into American theology is susceptible of easy abuse, and if, in fact, it has been abused to disastrous ends, we rejoice to acquit this great and holy man of willingly giving origin to the evil. And in what we shall cursorily remark concerning New England theology, we explicitly premise that we do not intend our Congregational brethren indiscriminately, but a defined portion of them, well known for many years as daring speculators. The theology of this school has always been, in a high degree, metaphysical; but the metaphysics is of a Hyperborean sort, exceedingly cold and fruitless. In the conduct of a feeble or even an ordinary mind, the wire-drawing processes of New England theologizing become jejune and revolting. Taught to consider mere ratiocination as the grand, and almost sole function of the human mind, the school-boy, the youth, and the professor, pen in hand, go on, day after day, in spinning out a thread of attenuated reasoning, often ingenious, and sometimes legitimately deduced, but in a majority of instances a concatenation of unimportant propositions. It has too often been forgotten by the disciples of this school, that a man may search in useless mines, and

that it is not every thing which is worth being proved. Hence the barrenness and frigidity of the sermons which were heard from the pulpits of New England during the latter half of the last century. Many of these and many of the dissertations and treatises which poured from the press were proofs of remarkable subtilty, and patience of investigation, and showed how easy it is to draw forth an endless line from the stores of a single mind. For, in this operation, it was remarkable, that the preacher or philosopher relied almost exclusively on his own stores. There was little continued unfolding of scriptural argument, and little citation of the great reasonings of ancient or modern philosophy. Each metaphysician spun by himself and from his own bowels. The web of philosophical argument was dashed with no strong woof from natural science, embroidered with no flowers of literature. Where this metaphysics was plied by a strong hand, as was that of President Edwards, it was noble indeed; deriving strength and honour from its very independence and self-sufficiency. In the hands of his son Dr. Edwards, there was equal patience, equal exactness, equal subtilty, but no new results: still there were undeniable marks of genius; as there were also in the controversy which then began to be waged among the dwindled progeny of the giants, on the great questions of liberty and necessity, moral agency, and the nature of virtue.

But when the same products were sought in a colder climate, and from the hands of common and unrefined men; when every schoolmaster or parish clergyman found himself under a necessity of arguing upon the nature of the soul, the nature of virtue, and the nature of agency; when with some this became the great matter of education, to the neglect of all science and beautiful letters, then the consequences were disastrous; and a winter reigned in the theology of the land, second only to that of the scholastic age, and like that dispersed only by the return of the sun of vital religion.

In the hands of a subtile errorist, such as Emmons, these metaphysical researches led to gross absurdities, some of which still survive. We believe a few of the elder and less sophisticated preachers of New England are to this day teaching, and that their staring auditors are to this day trying to believe, that the soul is a series of exercises; that God is the author of sin; and that, in order to escape damnation, one must be willing to be damned. Others, running away with an error less innocent because lying nearer the source of

moral reasoning, and less alarming in its guise, reasoned themselves and their hearers into the opinion, that all sin is selfishness, and that all holiness is the love of being in general. Taking the premises of the great Edwards, they deduced a system of false theology, which under its first phase as Hopkinsianism, and under its second phase as Taylorism, has been to our church the *fons et origo malorum*, and which, in union with the Epicureanism of the Paley school, has assumed the name of Calvinism to betray it to its enemies.

It is only great wisdom which can avoid one extreme without rushing to the other. The golden mean, so much ridiculed by zealots, is precisely that which imbecility could never maintain. In philosophy, as well as in common life and religion, we find individuals and bodies of men acting on the fallacy that the reverse of wrong, as such, is right. Human nature could not be expected to endure such a metaphysics as that of New England. It was not merely that it was false, and that it set itself up against our consciousness and our constitutional principle of self-love; but it was cheerless, it was arctic, it was intolerable: a man might as well carry frozen mercury in his bosom, as this in his soul. In a word, it had nothing cordial in it, and it left the heart in collapse. If it had remained in the cells of speculative adepts it might have been tolerated; but it was carried to the sacred desk, and doled forth to a hungry people under the species of bread and wine. No wonder nature revolted against such a dynasty. No wonder that, in disgust at such a pabulum, men cast about for a substitute, and sought it in tame Arminianism or genteel Deism.

The calculating people of our country, in certain portions of it, have long been enamoured of a system of ethics which is reducible to the rules of Loss and Gain. It is much more level to the apprehensions of such to say that two and two make four, or that prodigality makes poor, or that doing good makes profit, or that gain is godliness, or that virtue is utility, than to plead for an imperative law of conscience, or for an eternal distinction between right and wrong. The former systems came home to the business and bosoms of the calculator. Though he had learned to speak evil of Epicurus, yet he clasped Paley to his bosom; and as all men admitted that this philosopher and divine was a mighty reasoner, and a fascinating writer, so the calculator went further, and adopted his ethical heresy as the basis of all morals. Some, who could not take the system in its gross form, re-

ceived it under that modification, which appears in the theology of President Dwight. Long, therefore, before the mask was completely cast away by Bentham, Mill, and the Utilitarians of England, there were hundreds of young men who had imbibed the quintessence of the poison, through their college text-books, or through the introduction of the same principles into the received authorities of law-schools and courts of justice. We think it possible to show, that the prevalence of this degrading view of the nature of holiness, namely, the view which allows to virtue no essence but its tendency to happiness, has directly led to a laxity in private morals, to a subtlety of covert dishonesty, to an easy construction of church symbols and of other contracts, and to that measurement of all things divine and human by the scale of profit, which is falsely charged upon our whole nation by our foreign enemies. We think it possible to show that such is the tendency of Utilitarianism. And such being its tendency, we should despair of ever seeing any return from this garden of Hesperides, with its golden apples, were it not for a safe-guard in the human soul itself, placed there by all-wise Providence. For the system runs counter to nature. Reason about it as you will, the soul cannot let so monstrous an error lie next to itself; the heart will throb forth its innate tendency, and conscience will assert its prerogative. Nor will men believe concerning *virtue*, any more than concerning *truth*, that it has no foundation but its tendency to happiness; even though such tendency be as justly predicable of the one as of the other. The very consideration of what is involved in the monosyllable OUGHT, is sufficient to bring before any man's consciousness the sense of a distinction between virtue and utility, between that which it is prudent to do, and that which it is right to do. In process of time, as more adventurous and reckless minds sailed out further upon this sea of thought, especially when some theologians went so boldly to work as to declare, that in turning to God, we regard the Supreme Being in no other light than as an infinite occasion of personal happiness to ourselves; when this began to be vented, thoughtful men were taken aback. They queried whither they were going. They remembered that their religious emotions had included other elements. They reconsidered the grounds of the adhesion they had given in, to Paley, to Epicurus, and to self. They paused in their rapid career and looked at the system of general consequences. And in a good number of

instances, they were ashamed of the way in which they had been trepanned out of their original ideas, and sought for something to put in the place of the idol they were indignantly throwing down. We know such men; we know that they will read these pages; men who have gone down after their guides into the vaults of the earth-born philosophy, hoping to see treasures, and gain rest to the cravings of their importunate inquiries, but who have come up again, lamenting their error, and mortified that they had been abused. These things we have said concerning the Utilitarian ethics, now prevailing under different forms in America, and chiefly in the northern and eastern states, as furnishing an additional reason for the eager search that undeniably exists, after a more spiritual, elevating, and *moral* philosophy.

In tracing the irresistible progress of thought and opinion, as it regards philosophy, we have seen two sources of that dissatisfaction which for several years has prevailed, with respect to hitherto reigning metaphysics: namely, a disrelish for the coldness, heartlessness, and fruitlessness of the New England methods, and a dread of the doctrine of Utilitarianism. It might have been happy for us, if the proposal for a change had come *ab intra*, if one of our own productive minds had been led to forsake the beaten track, and point out a higher path. But such has not been the case. It has so happened, that no great native philosophical leader has as yet arisen to draw away one scholar from the common routine. This has been very unfortunate. If we are to make experiment of a new system, we would fain have it fully and fairly before our eyes, which can never be the case so long as we receive our *philosophemata* by a double transportation, from Germany via France, in parcels to suit the importers; as fast as the French forwarding philosopher gets it from Germany, and as fast as the American consignee can get it from France. There is a great inconvenience in the reception of philosophical theories by instalments: and if our cisatlantic metaphysicians import the German article, we are sometimes forced to wait until they have learned the language well enough to hold a decent colloquy in it. Such, however, is precisely the disadvantage under which the young philosophers of America now labour. We hear much of German philosophy and of the revelations which have been made to its adepts; much very adroit use of certain disparaging terms, easily learned by heart, and applied to the old system, as "flat," "unspiritual," "empirical," and "sensuous;" we hear

much of the progress made in ontological and psychological discovery, in the foreign universities. But, if we hear truth, the hierophants of the new system among us are not so much more intimate with the source of this great light than some of their silent readers, as to give them any exclusive right to speak *ex cathedra* about transcendental points. Some of them are busily learning French, in order to read in that language any *rifacimento* of Teutonic metaphysics which may come into their hands. Some are learning German; others have actually learnt it. He who cannot do either, strives to gather into one the Sibylline oracles and abortive scraps of the gifted but indolent Coleridge, and his gaping imitators; or in default of all this, sits at the urn of dilute wisdom, and sips the thrice-drawn infusion of English from French and French from German.

It might have been happy for us, we say, if the reformation in our philosophy had some root of its own in our own soil. But what is this vaunted German philosophy, of which our young men have learned the jargon? We shall endeavour to give an intelligible answer to so reasonable an inquiry. In attempting to offer a few satisfactory paragraphs on this, it is far from our purpose to profess to be adepts. We have seen a little, heard a little, and read a little, respecting it. We have even during the last fifteen years turned over one or two volumes of German metaphysics, and understood perhaps almost as much as some who have become masters; yet we disclaim a full comprehension of the several systems. The Anglo-Saxon *dummheit*, with which Germans charge the English, reigns we fear in us, after an inveterate sort. We have tried the experiment, and proved ourselves unable to see in a fog. Our night-glasses do not reach the transcendental. In a word we are born without the *Anschauungsvermögen*: and this defect, we are persuaded, will 'stick to our last sand.' We once said to a German friend, speaking of Schleiermacher, 'But we do not understand his book.' 'Understand it!' cried the other, with amazement, 'what then? but do not you *feel* it?' We deem ourselves competent, nevertheless, to give the plain reader some notices of the progress of Transcendental Philosophy.

The German Philosophers whose names are most frequently heard in this country, and who indeed mark the regular succession of masters, are Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. It would be easy to multiply names, but these are the

men who have carried forward the torch, from hand to hand. Though there were German metaphysicians before Kant, it is needless to name them, as he borrowed nothing from them, and certainly has the merit of standing forth to propagate a system altogether underived from his countrymen. Perhaps the best way to put our readers in possession of the peculiar tenets of Kant, would be to direct them to an able syllabus of his system by Professor Stapfer, already inserted in the *Biblical Repertory* for the year 1828. But to maintain the connexion of our remarks, we shall furnish further information; and if we enter somewhat more into detail here than in what follows, it is because the transition to Kant from his predecessors is more abrupt than from this philosopher to any who succeeded him. In order to get a glimpse of what he taught, we must as far as possible lay aside all the prepossessions of the British school. We must not only cease to attribute all our knowledge to sensation and reflection, as our fathers were taught to do, but we must lay aside as unsatisfactory all the explanations of Reid and his followers respecting first truths and intuitive principles. We must no longer regard philosophy as a science of observation and induction, and must dismiss all our juvenile objections to a purely a priori scheme of metaphysics. It is the first purpose of Kant, in his own terms, to inquire "how synthetical judgments a priori are possible, with respect to objects of experience:" as, for example, how the idea of necessary causal connexion arises, when it is conceded that nothing is given by experience but the mere succession of events.* Indeed it was Hume's speculations on Cause and Effect which, as Kant tells us, first "broke his dogmatic slumbers." Proceeding from this to all the other instances in which we arrive at absolute, necessary, universal, or intuitive truths, he proves that these are not the result of experience. No induction, however broad, can ever produce the irresistible conviction with which we yield ourselves to the belief of necessary truth. "Experience (and this is the concession of Reid himself) gives us no information of what is necessary, or of what ought to exist."† In such propositions as the following, "A straight line is the shortest between two points: There is a God: The soul is immortal," &c. there is an amal-

* *Kritik d. reinen Vernunft.* Leipzig, 1818, p. 15.

† *Essay on the Active Powers*, Edinb. quarto, 1788. p. 31, p. 279, also *Intellectual Powers*, *Essay vi. c. 6.*

gamation (*synthesis*) of a subject with an attribute, which is furnished neither by the idea of the subject, nor by experience. These synthetical judgments therefore are *a priori*, or independent of experience; that is, there is something in them beyond what experience gives. There is therefore a function of the soul prior to all experience, and to investigate this function of the soul, is the purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason. "Let us," says Stapfer, in a happy illustration, "imagine a mirror endued with perception, or sensible that external objects are reflected from its surface; let us suppose it reflecting on the phenomena which it offers to a spectator and to itself. If it come to discover the properties which render it capable of producing these phenomena, it would find itself in possession of two kinds of ideas, perfectly distinct. It would have a knowledge of the images which it reflects, and of the properties which it must have possessed previous to the production of these images. The former would be its *a posteriori* knowledge; whilst in saying to itself, 'my surface is plain, it is polished, I am impenetrable to the rays of light,' it would show itself possessed of *a priori* notions, since these properties, which it would recognise as inherent in its structure, are more ancient than any image reflected from its surface, and are the conditions to which are attached the faculty of forming images, with which it would know itself endowed. Let us push this extravagant fiction a little further. Let us imagine, that the mirror represented to itself, that external objects are entirely destitute of depth, that they are all placed upon the same plane, that they traverse each other, as the images do upon its surface, &c., and we shall have an example of objective reality attributed to modifications purely subjective. And, if we can figure to ourselves the mirror as analysing and combining, in various ways, the properties with which it perceived itself invested; (but of which it should have contented itself, to establish the existence and examine the use;) drawing from these combinations conclusions relative to the organization, design, and origin of the objects which paint themselves on its surface; founding, it may be, entire systems upon the conjectures which the analysis of its properties might suggest, and which it might suppose itself capable of applying to an use entirely estranged from their nature and design; we should have some idea of the grounds and tendency of the reproaches which the author of the critical philosophy addresses to human reason, when forgetting the ve-

ritable destination of its laws and of those of the other intellectual faculties;—a destination which is limited to the acquisition and perfecting of experience, it employs these laws to the investigation of objects beyond the domain of experience, and assumes the right of affirming on their existence, of examining their qualities, and determining their relations to man.”

Instead therefore of examining the nature of things, the objective world without us, Kant set himself to scrutinize the microcosm, to learn the nature of the cognitive subject. In pursuing this inquiry he finds, not that the mind is moulded by its objects, but that the objects are moulded by the mind. The external world is in our thoughts such as it is, simply because our thoughts are necessarily such as they are. The moulds, so to speak, are within us. We see things only under certain conditions: certain laws restrain and limit all our functions. We conceive of a given event as occurring in time and in space. But this time and this space are not objective realities, existing whether we think about them or not: they are the mere *forms a priori*. Our minds refuse to conceive of sensible objects, except under these forms. Time and space therefore are not the results of experience, neither are they abstract ideas: for all particular times and spaces are possible, only by reason of this original constitution of the mind.*

According to this system, all that of which we can be cognizant is either necessary or contingent. That which is necessary is *a priori*, and belongs to the province of pure reason. That which is contingent is *a posteriori*, and belongs to the province of experience. The former he calls *pure*, the latter *empirical*: and it is the circle of knowledge contained in the former which constitutes the far-famed Transcendental Philosophy.†

Every English and American reader must fail to penetrate even the husk of German and mock-German philosophy, unless he has accepted the distinction between the reason and the understanding. We are not aware that the distinction ever obtained any footing in our modern English science, until the time of Coleridge, who in several of his works has striven *pugnis et calcibus* to instal it into our philosophical terminology. “The understanding,” says Kant, “is the faculty judging according to sense.” “Reason,” says

* Kritik d. R. V. p. 28—p. 43.

† Ib. p. 19.

Coleridge, "is the power of universal and necessary convictions, the source and substance of truths above sense, and having their evidence in themselves."* Resuming, then, the thread which we have dropped, the Prussian philosopher dissected the cognitive subject or soul into three distinct faculties; viz. 1st. Sense, or Sensibility. 2d. Understanding. 3d. Reason.

Sense receives and works up the multiform material, and brings it to consciousness. This it accomplishes partly as a mere 'receptivity,' passively accepting sensations, and partly as an active power or spontaneity. The Understanding is a step higher than sense. What sense has apprehended, the understanding takes up, and by its synthetizing activity (*die synthetisirende Thätigkeit*;) presents under certain forms or conditions, which, by a term borrowed from logic, are called Categories. These are twelve, classified under the heads of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality. Of Quantity: 1. *Unity*. 2. *Plurality*. 3. *Totality*. Of Quality: 4. *Affirmation*, or *Reality*. 5. *Negation*, or *Privation*. 6. *Limitation*. Of Relation: 7. *Substance and Accident*. 8. *Cause and Effect*. 9. *Action and Reaction*. Of Modality: 10. *Possibility and Impossibility*. 11. *Existence and Non-Existence*. 12. *Necessity and Contingency*.† Whatsoever now the understanding takes cognizance of, it knows under some of these forms; and every intellection receives the object as connected with at least four of these categories at once, from the four different classes. Kant attributed to the understanding the function of reducing multiplicity to unity. The result of this reduction to unity, in our consciousness, is a Conception (*Begriff*). All possible conceptions are produced under the twelve categories as their necessary forms. These are therefore the conditions of all thought; yet they afford no knowledge of the objects *per se*; and have not the slightest significance independent of time and space. Time and space are the ways or forms under which objects are made sensible; and the categories are the ways or forms under which the same objects are understood (*begriffen*.)

The Reason, finally, is the sublime of human spontaneity. It takes cognizance of that which is self-evident, necessary,

* Even in German, this distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft* was not always recognised. See a philological analysis of the latter term, in Herder's *Metakritik*, vol. II. p. 11. See *Kritik d. R. V. Elementarl. II. Th. II. Abth. I. Buch*.

† *Kritik der reinen V.* p. 78.

absolute, infinite, eternal. Its objects are beyond the sphere, not merely of time and space, but of all ratiocination: and it is among these objects, "above the stir and smoke of this dim spot, which men call earth," that the transcendental philosophers have most successfully expatiated. While the understanding is discursive, and collects proof, and deduces judgments, referring to other faculties as its authority, the reason is self-sufficient, intuitive, immediate and infallible in all its dictates. In the pure reason, there reside, *a priori*, three ideas, viz. 1. Of that which is absolute and of itself, whether subjective or objective; the former being the theme of psychology, the latter of ontology. 2. Of a supreme and independent real cause of all that is; namely, of God: this being the object of theology. 3. Of an absolute totality of all phenomena; namely, the universe, τὸ πᾶν; being the object of cosmology.

The eagerness of the philosophical public to discover how these principles might legitimately affect the interests of ethics and theology, led Kant to publish, in 1787, his *Critique of Practical Reason*. In this, as in several other similar works indicated in our volume for 1828, he declared himself, to a certain extent; still leaving it a matter of dispute among his adherents whether he was a Deist or a Christian. His adversaries assert, that his argument for the being of a God is inconsistent with his system, and unworthy of being admitted: and even his friends admit that he never gave his assent to the supernatural origin of Christianity. Nothing, however, in the whole system is more striking than the foundation which it gives to morals; for here, and no where else, Kant forsakes the character of a mere critic, and lays down absolute and final dictates of reason. There is, he teaches, an original and invariable law, residing in the depths of human consciousness, and commanding what is right. This he calls the *categorical imperative*. It urges man to act virtuously, *even at the expense of happiness*. Translated into words, it runs thus: "Act in such a manner, that the maxim of your will may be valid in all circumstances, as a principle of universal legislation."* Proceeding from this he builds his natural theology on his ethics; argues the necessity of another life and an almighty and omniscient Judge. The three

* Handle so dass die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Princip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten koenne. Kritik der Practischen Vernunft. 5te Aufl. Leipz. 1818. p. 54.

"postulates of the Practical Reason," are God, Freedom, and Immortality.* It is now, we believe, generally conceded, that these moral and theological speculations, are an after-thought, a supplement to the main structure, and scarcely worthy of reverence for their consistency, however interesting as proofs of the strong leaning of their author towards the faith of his childhood. It was the desire of Kant to appear favourable to Christianity. At his day Infidelity had not grown so bold as it has since done; and it is especially worthy of consideration, that whenever Kant speaks of the Divine Being, he distinctly conveys the idea of a personal God, objectively existing, separate from nature, and independent of the cognizance of finite spirits.†

It deserves to be noticed that Kant, in pursuance of his vocation as a *critical* rather than a constructive philosopher, did not attribute to Reason those divine and active powers which later philosophers have assumed, and which are claimed for her by some of our American imitators, who, we would gladly believe, are ignorant of the apotheosis of reason which they thus subserve. The genuine Kantians have always maintained that in what their master delivered concerning the absolute and the infinite, he simply meant to attribute to pure reason the power of directing the cognitive energy beyond its nearer objects, and to extend its research indefinitely; but by no means to challenge for this power the direct intuition of the absolute, as the veritable object of infallible insight.

The chief objection which was made to the Critique of Pure Reason, and to the other works of the same author, was that they were purposely obscure; and it cannot be denied, that in addition to the inherent intricacy of the subject, the reader is greatly perplexed by a multiplicity of new-coined words, and still more by an arbitrary wresting of familiar terms to meanings remote from their common acceptation. It is partly for this reason, that Kant, like another great innovator of the age, Jeremy Bentham, has been best represented by the pens of his disciples: and that

* Kritik d. P. V. p. 213. ff.

† Those who choose to pursue this subject further, will find satisfaction, in the following works, viz. Kant's Religion innerhalb der Ideen d. Menschl. Vernunft. 2te Aufl. 1792. and the reply to it, by Sartorius. Die Religion ausserhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft, u. s. w. Marburg. 1822. In this work, (p. 62) he quotes from Vincent, the following observation, which is not here out of place; "Who can refrain from a smile, at beholding Christ and his apostles, brought into the train of philosophy, and made successively Wolfians, Crusians, Kanteans, Fichteans, and Schellingeans!"

aid which Bentham owed to Dumont, was afforded to Kant by Schulze, a chaplain of the king of Prussia.* This writer acknowledges however that at the time when he wrote, that is in 1791, the diction of his master still remained a hieroglyphic to the public.† In 1798, when Coleridge was in Germany, he heard much the same statement from the venerable Klopstock. "He said the works of Kant were to him utterly incomprehensible; that he had often been pestered by the Kantians, but was rarely in the practice of arguing with them. His custom was to produce the book, open it, and point to a passage, and beg they would explain it. This they ordinarily attempted to do, by substituting their own ideas. I do not want, I say, an explanation of your own ideas, but of the passage which is before us. In this way I generally bring the dispute to an immediate conclusion."‡ Coleridge, however, declares that in that very year almost all the professors in Germany were either Kantians, or disciples of Fichte, whose system is built on the Kantian: and in the twelfth chapter of the work just cited, he vindicates Kant from the charge of needless obscurity. At the same time he tells us that the disciples, during their master's life time, quarrelled about the meaning of his dicta, and that the old philosopher used to reply to their appeals, 'I meant what I said, and at the age of near four score, I have something else and more important to do, than to write a commentary on my own works.'

In spite of this obscurity, however, the Critical Philosophy assumed the empire in the German universities; but not without opposition from the highest sources. The celebrated John George Haman, uttered a touching caveat against the irreligious tendency of Kant's system. He declared, in his letters to Jacobi, and elsewhere, that the new philosophy owed many of its deductions to a mere play on words, and perplexed its readers in a maze of unwonted expressions; that the Kantian *τὸ ὄν* was a mere conception, of which the objective existence or non-existence could not be determined by reason. He warned the student of philosophy against a system of delusion, in which man is made every thing and God is made nothing: a warning infinitely more appropriate as applied to the systems which have succeeded Kant, and

* *Erläuterungen ueber des Herrn Professor Kant Critik der reinen Vernunft*: von Johann Schulze, u. s. w. Königsberg, 1791.

† Schulze, p. 6.

‡ *Biographia Literaria*, Vol. ii. p. 160. N. Y. edition.

which are proffered to the credulous complaisance of the American public.* In 1799 the still more celebrated Herder, entered the field as an antagonist, in his *Metakritik*.† Like Haman he brings the charge of perplexed language, and the misunderstanding and abuse of abstractions. He characterises the Critique of Pure Reason in general, as *transcendental mist* (transcendentalen Dunst), a *fog of fine-spun verbiage* (nebelichtes Wortgespinnst), calculated by means of dialectical sorcery to confound the very implement of reason, namely, language. The attention of the reader is the rather called to this judgment, as it is common to attribute the obscurity of our philosopher to some accidents of his vernacular tongue, rather than to his own phraseology; but here is the verdict of a German, a scholar, a philosopher, and a pupil of his own. If space were allowed, we might go much further, and dilate upon the denunciation of the Kantian idealism, by a number of eminent men, such as Garve, Eberhard, Tiedemann, Tittel, Nicolai, and Jacobi: of whom the first two were formally answered by Kant, while the last is the sole representative of a system which founds all philosophy in an affectionate religious faith, independent of revelation.‡

But it is time we should leave Kant, and consider his great successor. John Theophilus Fichte, who was born in 1762, and died in 1814, is thought by the initiated to have carried philosophy forward from its critical towards its scientific condition. He was familiar with Kant, and wrote in his manner, so that his first important work, published in 1792, was attributed to the great master. Kant had set out with a critical analysis of Understanding, Reason, and Judgment. Some of his followers, especially Reinhold, had started with the phenomenon of consciousness. Fichte simplified a step further, and began, not with a thing, or a faculty, but an act. Fichte, say his admirers, leaves us at the apex of the pyramid.§ True enough, but then the pyramid is upside down: the apex and support being the monosyllable I. The

* Jacobi's Schriften, Vol. I. 1781. pp. 371—390. Vol. IV. p. 31. Goethe's *Dichtung und Wahrheit*: Werke Vol. 26.

† *Verstand und Erfahrung: eine Metakritik zur Kritik d. r. Vernunft*; von J. G. Herder, Leipzig, 1799.

‡ See Jacobi von den Göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung, 2te Aufl. Leipzig. 1822: see also Rixner's *Handbuch d. Geschichte d. Philosophie*; Sulzbach, 1829, Vol. iii. § 143. § 144.

§ See a similar expression, in Mr. Linberg's note to Cousin's *Introduction*, p. 455.

notion of a thought which is its own object, and the notion of I, are identical. The *Ego* looks at itself; and thus we have the idea of *Ego* as knowing, and *Ego* as known, the intelligent and the existent I. This *Ego*, absolute and free, has regard to an object, or *Non-Ego*: it creates this *Non-Ego* by its own activity: in a word, it creates objective nature.* The whole of the Fichteian philosophy is a following out of this track. It creates the world out of the mind's act: and it regards the outward universe as nothing but a limit of our being on which thought operates; a limit, moreover, springing from the mind's creative power.† In such a system as this, what place is found for the Great Author of the Universe? Fichte replies, that the being of the Godhead, (which he holds to be identical with the active and moral *ordo mundi*) is an object not of theoretical knowledge, but of rational faith; and that this faith is purely moral. On a certain occasion, we are told by Madame de Staël, he said to his auditors that in the following lecture he would proceed to create God; an expression in perfect harmony with his principle, but one which gave just offence to the public. "According to Fichte," says Cousin in his Introduction to the History of Philosophy, "God is nothing but the subject of thought conceived as absolute; he is therefore still the I. But as it is repugnant to human thought, that the I of man, which might indeed be transferred into nature should be imposed upon God, Fichte distinguishes between a twofold I, the one phenomenal, namely, the I which each of us represents; the other is itself the substance of the I, namely, God himself. God is the absolute I."‡ Even Coleridge, who regarded Fichte as giving the first idea of a system truly metaphysical, admits that it "degenerated into a crude egoismus; a boastful and

* That our syntax, as well as our philosophy, is becoming a new affair, may be seen from the following specimen of Dr. Henry's English: "The fundamental fact of consciousness is a complex phenomenon, composed of three terms: first, the *me* and the *not me*, &c." Introd. page xx. Now if we must have nonsense, we feel that it is our privilege as descendants of Englishmen, to have it in good grammar. Apropos of this, we find some of our contemporaries quoting Plato in Cousin's version: surely our scholarship must be near its ebb! If the Greek is absolutely unintelligible, and if we have neither Sydenham nor Taylor, let us get a friend to English it for us. It is quite in the style of the French pulpit, when we find Dr. Henry citing the Vulgate, (page xxii.) "It is the Logos, the Word of St. John, which 'lighteth every man that cometh into the world:' *'illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.'*" The reader must be left to divine why Dr. Henry here quotes Latin.

† Biographie Universelle, Vol. XIV. p. 486.—Rixner, Vol. iii. p. 337. ff.

‡ Linberg's Translation, page 398.

hyperstoic hostility to NATURE, as lifeless, godless, and altogether unholy: while his *religion* consisted in the assumption of a mere ORDO ORDINANS, which we were permitted *exoterice* to call God.”*

In a seeming ecstacy of admiration, the translator of Cousin's Introduction says of this system: “Fichte has, in arriving at this point, indeed reached the very summit of the pyramid of human science; and if the man lives, or has lived, who has as yet discovered a flaw in the chain of reasoning that leads to this point, I am ignorant of the fact.”† It may be observed of many of the systems with which it is sought to render our youth gradually familiar, that at the first approach they have a horrid aspect of atheism; but that the adepts have the most ingenious method imaginable of correcting this impression. There is probably not a Pantheist in America who will own the name; nor is there a greater certainty concerning things future, than that the free ingress of transcendentalism will smooth the way for the denial of all that we adore and love in the august idea of God. Fichte was at first reputed to be an atheist; and one of his works was instantly confiscated with rigour throughout all Saxony. As is usual in such cases, he and his abettors wrote appeals and apologies. Herder, then vice-president of the Weimar consistory, took part against him. All Germany rang with the quarrel. It was at this memorable crisis that Schelling arose in opposition to Fichte, in behalf of a system still more transcendental; of which more hereafter. He became the fashionable philosopher of Jena, for there are fashions in philosophy, especially in Germany. Poor Fichte fought as he could, but the public having tasted a more intoxicating beverage could never return to a flatter metaphysics. Fichte is supposed to have advanced in his later years to a more consistent idealism. He always declared that the Kantians did not comprehend their master's system: we believe as much ourselves: but, he added, that in the new system of idealism he was only giving consistent development to the principles of Kant.

It was reserved for other hands to complete the structure; or if we acknowledge that the pyramid was now complete, it afforded a test for the flight of more consistent, or more adventurous minds, into the transcendental empyrean. It

* *Biographia Literaria*, vol i. p. 95.

† Cousin's Introduction, by Linberg. Boston, 1832. p. 454-5.

was Frederick William Joseph Schelling, who, to use the phrases of his admirers, brought philosophy to its perfection, as the science of the Absolute. Kant had scrutinized the cognitive subject, and determined, except in regard to the moral imperative, that absolute knowledge is unattainable. Fichte followed him, and out of the productive *Ego*, created the objective world, still giving countenance however to the figment of a seeming dualism, and discriminating between the thinker and that which is thought. But Schelling, with a boldness unequalled in every previous attempt, merged all in one, and declared as the great discovery of the age, and first truth of absolute wisdom, that subject and object are one, that the *Ego* and the *Non-Ego* are identical. Knowledge and Being are no longer different. His system was therefore expressively called the system of identity, or the philosophy of the absolute.*

Here, as in a former case, we ask, what place is left for the Most High? Schelling is at no loss for an answer. God is in truth the very object of all philosophy; but it is God revealing himself in the universe. The divine being, once hidden, has a perpetual tendency to self-revelation; a process of evolution which is for ever going onward, and producing the world, or nature. It is this development which we see and feel and of which we are a part. The universe therefore becomes as important a portion of the philosophy of Schelling, as of that of the ancient Gnostics, or of Spinoza.† We do not wish to be understood as comprehending this profane modification of atheism, for we almost tremble while we write, we will not say the notions, but the expressions of men who treat of the genesis of divinity, as coolly as Hesiod

* Rixner, Vol. III. §. 167.

† In the new philosophy, there is little reference had to the distinction between matter and spirit; in this respect the grand error of the ancient Greeks reappears, and the inevitable result is an inextricable tangle of physics with metaphysics. Material images are always dangerous aids in the philosophy of the mind; but the Germans are so far from being aware of this, that a large part of their statements are merely transformation of sensible images into expressions of pure thought. By running away with analogies, a puerile imagination may see resemblances between material and immaterial objects, which a puerile judgment may stamp as verities. Hence, in the system of Schelling, galvanism, electricity and magnetism have place in the very midst of psychology. Hence, in the system of Cousin, expansion and concentration become elements of mental analysis. Hence, also, England being an island, her philosophers cannot be transcendental. The ridiculous passage in which this truly French statement is conveyed, is too striking to be omitted: "England, gentlemen," says M. Cousin, "is a very considerable island; in England *every thing stops at certain limits*, nothing is there developed on a great scale." Introduction, p. 380.

of the birth of gods: yet we will proceed. In the absolute philosophy, God is a principle, not personal, but tending to personality, becoming personal (*eine werdende Persönlichkeit*); a tendency manifested in, and producing, the phenomena of the universe. This eternal development is a mighty effort towards self-consciousness; and the consciousness of human reason is indeed the consciousness of God; a state in which the absolute spirit views itself.*

This, we need scarcely say, is a highly flattering illusion to the soaring mind. The infinite chasm between heaven and earth is no more. Human action is the action of the infinite. Man can know the infinite by immediate insight, because he is himself infinite. God is all things, and all things are God: we are ourselves in God and God in us. And here the happy language of a writer in the *Edinburgh Review* for 1829, whose article on Cousin is highly praised and largely quoted by Dr. Henry, may be cited by us, though with an intention very different from that of the latter. "In this act of knowledge, which, after Fichte, Schelling calls the Intellectual Intuition, there exists no distinction of subject and object—no contrast of knowledge and existence,—all difference is lost in absolute indifference,—all plurality in absolute unity. The intuition itself—reason—and the absolute—are identical. The absolute exists only as known by reason, and reason knows only as being itself the absolute."† As a natural consequence, this direct cognition of the absolute, the unconditioned, and the infinite, implies the annihilation of consciousness; for it is of the very essence of consciousness to conceive of the object of thought as separate from its subject. It is a further consequence that there can be no personal immortality of the soul; the hope of which he characterises as a vain solace (*eitle Freude*):‡ in return for which fond illusion, Schelling cheers us with an immortality in which the qualities of the soul re-enter into the universal mass: "an immortality," says Madame de Staël, "which terribly resembles death: since physical death itself is nothing but universal nature reclaiming the gifts she had made to the individual."§

Such is the philosophy which up to this very hour is taught

* See Bretschneider, *Ueber die Grundansichten der theologischen Systeme* der Prof. Schleiermacher und Marheineke. Leipzig, 1828. p. 5.

† *Edinburgh Review*, Oct. 1829, Art. XI. p. 208.

‡ Bretschneider, *ubi supra*, p. 12.

§ *De l'Allemagne*, t. iii. p. 114, ed. Paris, 1814.

in several of the German universities, by Protestant teachers of religion, and to which, more alarming still, a goodly number among our neophytes in metaphysics are endeavouring to attain. But M. Cousin somewhat sneers at our apprehension of the "bugbear" Pantheism, and we may yet be called upon by American clergymen to abandon all belief in a personal God, or any Deity but the universe. It is very true, as we shall see, that M. Cousin does not avow himself to be a disciple of Schelling. It is further true, that he diverges from him in important particulars, and earnestly, though, as we think, vainly endeavours to wrest his own system into a conformity with revelation; yet his whole scheme is a conduit from the stream of German transcendentalism at the most corrupt part of its current; and his works abound with expressions which savour too strongly of doctrines more *prononcées* than those which he has avowed. In the following sentences we know not to what school he can allude, if not, to that of Schelling, Oken, or Hegel: * "Fichte died in 1815, and even before his death a new philosophy, unable to stop at the system of absolute subjectivity, and the summit of the pyramid of the me, has redescended to the earth, and returned to nearer views of actual reality. The contemporaneous German philosophy, which now exerts as great an influence, and possesses as high an authority in Germany, as ever did that of Kant or Fichte, bears the title of the philosophy of nature. The title alone indicates some return towards reality." †

We have sometimes been strongly tempted to suspect that many of the enthusiastic admirers of Coleridge's prose works are entirely unaware of the extremes to which their master's principles of philosophizing would legitimately lead them. None can be more open than ourselves to impressions from the great genius and inimitable diction of this philosopher and poet: we have felt its fascinations, and in hanging over his pages, and especially his noble denunciations of the utilitarian Ethics, we have almost forgotten how indeterminate and fruitless are most of his reasonings, and how rotten the foundation of his scheme. After our declaration that the system of Schelling is a system of Pantheism, or that sort of Atheism which denies the personality of God, many will be startled when we assure them that Coleridge maintained the great principles of this very school. We dis-

* Cousin's *Introd. to Hist. of Philosophy*, page 427. Boston.

† The title of one of Schelling's works, *Ideen zur Naturphilosophie*; 1797.

claim indeed the intention of representing this learned man as having coincided with the German pantheist in all the remote consequences of his theory, however legitimate. But that the system of Coleridge and the system of Schelling are the same in their leading principles will be denied by no one who is familiar with both. Nay, we have Coleridge himself making the most ample avowal of this coincidence, for the purpose, as it should seem, of escaping the charge of plagiarism from the German philosopher. Let us hear himself; "In Schelling's 'NATUR-PHILOSOPHIE,' and the 'SYSTEM DES TRANSCENDENTALEN IDEALISMUS,' I first found a genial coincidence with much that I had toiled out for myself and a powerful assistance in what I had yet to do." And then, as if to account for the somewhat singular fact that the dissertation in the *Biographia Literaria*, on the reciprocal relations of the *esse* and the *cogitare* is a literal translation from the Introduction to a work of Schelling, he proceeds to say: "We had studied in the same school; been disciplined by the same preparatory philosophy, namely, that of Kant; we had both equal obligations to the polar logic and dynamic philosophy of Giordano Bruno," &c. &c. And again: "To me it will be happiness and honour enough, should I succeed in rendering the system itself intelligible to my countrymen, and in the application of it to the most awful of subjects for the most important of purposes."† After reading these avowals, and after having learned the ravages of this very philosophy among the present generation of clergymen in Germany, we are heartily thankful that Coleridge never summoned sufficient energy to give us any thing more than fragments; while we are filled with amazement at the sight of Christian ministers among ourselves, men of education and piety, either subscribing to statements which they do not comprehend, or giving the weight of their authority to the

* This seeming plagiarism is set in the best light of which the facts admit, in the preface to the 'Specimens of the Table Talk,' New York, 1835, p. xxv. ff. But the whole vindicatory argument is singular in the history of literary borrowing. See, on the same topic, the *British Magazine*, for January, 1835.

† *Biographia Literaria*, Vol. I. p. 95, 97. The reader, in order to do justice, at once, to us in bringing so grave a charge, and to the memory of Coleridge, should not fail to consult the work here cited. On p. 169, will be found this pregnant declaration. "We begin with the I KNOW MYSELF in order to end with the absolute I AM. We proceed from the SELF, in order to lose and find all self in God." See also *The Friend*, Essay xiii. p. 76, note; likewise p. 451, ed. Burlington, 1831; likewise *Aids to Reflection*, note 50, p. 284, ed. 1829.

conclusions which by the best theologians even of Germany are denounced as incompatible with the fundamentals, we say not of Christianity, but of natural religion. Let our young metaphysicians learn from Coleridge and Cousin to tolerate and admire Schelling, and they will soon learn from Schelling himself that God is every thing.*

We almost shrink from the attempt to conduct our readers any lower down in the circling vaults of German wisdom; we have not yet reached the end, for in the lowest deep a lower deep still opens wide, in the system of Hegel and his followers.† When we speak of this professor, we shall not be scrupulous in distinguishing between his own opinions and those of his immediate and acknowledged followers; and, this being premised, it may be said that his was the system prevailing in Germany on the arrival of the last steamer.

George Frederick William Hegel was born in 1770, and died within the last three or four years. He was professor, first at Jena, and afterwards at Heidelberg and at Berlin; in the last of which chairs he succeeded Fichte, in 1818. His system purported to be an improvement on that of Schelling. It is said by the Hegelians, that in contradistinction from that of Fichte, which was a subjective idealism, and from that of Schelling, which was an objective idealism, the scheme of Hegel takes the true position as an absolute idealism.‡ Hegel, no less than Schelling, maintained universal identity, or that all things are the same: but while the former postulated this, as an intellectual intuition, the latter proceeded to prove it by a scientific process.§ Both teach, but with the same difference as to the origin of the dogma, that thought and being are identical. In his earliest work, Hegel undertook to show how the I, through manifold and multi-form self-evolutions, comes to be, first Consciousness, then Self-Consciousness, then Reason, and, finally, Self-Comprehending and Religious Spirit.||

* In all that we have written about Schelling, we have had reference to his published systems. What changes have taken place in his way of thinking within the last ten years, we have not been in a situation to know. It is, however, said that he has abandoned some of his anti-christian notions.

† Io sono al terzo cerchio della piovra

Eterna, maladetta, fredda, e greve.

Dante. Inferno, Canto VI.

‡ Conversations-Lexikon, Art. Hegel.

§ Rixner, Vol. III. p. 437. Marheineke: Dogmatik. §§ 1—68.

|| Die Phaenomenologie des Geistes: Bamberg, 1807.

All philosophy, according to Hegel, is but an attempt to answer a simple question, viz. *Quid est?* And the answer to this involves all Truth, all Reason: for whatever is, is Reason. All reality is reasonable, all that is reasonable is real. Hence the only real existence is the ideas of Reason. All reality (*Wirklichkeit*) being thoroughly rational, is also divine; yea is God revealing himself or developing himself. Nature is God coming to self-consciousness.* God reveals himself in creation, or in the universe, by a series of eternal unfoldings, some in matter, some in mind; and thus the Deity is in a perpetual effort towards self-realization.† The history of Physics is therefore the necessary career of divine self-evolution: indeed God thinks worlds, just as the mind thinks thoughts.

In order to philosophize aright, we must lose our own personality in God, who is chiefly revealed in the acts of the human mind. In the infinite developments of divinity, and the infinite progress towards self-consciousness, the greatest success is reached in the exertions of human reason. In men's minds therefore is the highest manifestation of God. God recognises himself best in human reason, which is a consciousness of God (*Gottesbewusstsein*). And it is by human reason that the world, (hitherto without thought, and so without existence, mere negation) comes into consciousness: thus God is revealed in the world.‡

God is the Idea of all Ideas, or the absolute Idea: hence our ideal thought is divine thought, and this is no other than reason.§ “The doctrine of the being of God, is no other than that of the revelation of himself in the Idea of him.”|| “God *exists* only as knowledge (*Wissen*): in this knowledge, and as such, he knows himself, and it is this very knowledge *which is his existence*.”¶ We may therefore say with truth *God exists as an Idea*.**

* Baur: *Christl. Gnosis*. p. 672.

† Rixner, p. 444.

‡ Marheineke, *Dogmatik*. § 229. ff. Bretschneider, u. s. p. 49.

§ Bretschneider, u. s. p. 40.

|| Marheineke, § 147. p. 87.

¶ Marheineke, § 153, as cited by Bretschneider; but in our edition, the 3d, these words do not occur, but we read “*Das Seyn Gottes also ist selbst noch etwas anders, als dessen Bestimmtheit selber oder das Wissen.*” It will not seem strange to any one familiar with the present condition of philosophy, that we cite Marheineke as an authentic expounder of Hegel; it is just so to regard him, and we may presume that those points of the system which are anti-christian will, to say the least, not be exaggerated by a theological professor.

** Marheineke, *Dogmatik*. § 174, *apud* Bretschneider's *Grandansichten*, p. 43.

After thus arriving at an ideal God, we learn that Philosophy and Religion draw us away from our little selves, so that our separate consciousness is dissolved in that of God. Philosophy is Religion; and "true Religion frees man from all that is low, and from himself, from clinging to *I-hood* (Ichheit) and subjectivity, and helps him to life in God, as the Truth, and thereby to true life."* In this oblation of personal identity, we must not claim property even in our own thoughts. By a step beyond Emmonism, Hegel teaches that it is God who thinks in us; nay that it is precisely that which thinks in us, which is God. Marheineke himself manifests tokens of alarm, when he states this doctrine.† The pure and primal *substance* manifests itself as the subject; and "true knowledge of the absolute is the absolute itself." There is but a step to take, and we arrive at the tenet, that the universe and God are one.‡ The Hegelians attempt to distinguish this from the doctrine of Spinoza, but their distinctions are inappreciable; 'tis the same rope at either end they twist: their scheme is Pantheism. And as God is revealed by all the phenomena of the world's history, he is partly revealed by moral action, and consequently by sin, no less than by holiness. Sin is therefore a part of the necessary evolution of the divine principle; or rather, in any sense which can affect the conscience, there is no evil in sin—there is no sin. This is a part of the philosophy of Hegel which has given great pain to pious men in Germany, who have repeatedly complained of it as subverting the first principles of morality, not merely in theory but in practice; and begetting a fatalism which threatens alike the foundations of religion and of state. A late pantheistic poet teaches us that all which we regard as sin, is necessary, and therefore good, and may, to other intelligences, justly appear most lovely!§ But there are conclusions of the new philosophy still more surprising, for which our inchoate metaphysicians should be getting ready. It is well said by an acute writer already quoted, that when according to the demands of Schelling we annihilate first the object and then the subject, the remainder

* Bretschneider, p. 45. Marheineke, p. 83. See also Hegel's *Encyklopædie*, p. 593. ff. Baur's *Gnosis*: p. 672.

† *Dogmatik*, p. 67.

‡ Bretschneider, *Grundansichten*, p. 50. Rixner, himself a devotee to this German Buddhism cites what follows: "The knowledge of the absolute identity of God and the Universe (des Alls) is *Reason*: the crown and perfection of self-recognising and self-comprehending Reason is philosophy." Vol. iii. p. 392.

§ Schefer.

is zero.* Though Schelling is not known to have admitted this, his critics were not slow to perceive it. Schulze, in particular, declared that according to this system *Every thing is Nothing, and Nothing is Everything*;† and Köppen called this the philosophy of Absolute Nothing. It was reserved for Hegel to abandon all the scruples of six thousand years, and publish the discovery—certainly the most wonderful in the history of human research—that *Something and Nothing are the same!* In declaring it, he almost apologizes, for he says, that this proposition appears so paradoxical, that it may readily be supposed that it is not seriously maintained.‡ Yet he is far from being ambiguous. Something and Nothing are the same. The Absolute of which so much is vaunted is nothing.§ But the conclusion which is perhaps already anticipated by the reader's mind, and which leaves us incapacitated for comment, is this—we shudder while we record it—that after the exhaustive abstraction is carried to infinity in search of God, we arrive at nothing.|| *God himself is nothing!*

The German philosophy was first made known to the French by the *Allemagne* of Madame de Staël. It attracted some attention as an extravaganza of the German mind, but it made few proselytes until it was taken up by M. Cousin. It was in the year 1816 that he first commenced the importation of the German metaphysics. He had been at that time recently appointed assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Literature at Paris. He continued to lecture until 1820, when he incurred the disapprobation of the French government, and his lectures were suspended. In 1827 he was restored to the exercise of his functions as a Professor of the Faculty of Literature, and continued to lecture until 1832, when he was made a Peer of France.¶

* Edinb. Rev. Oct. 1829. p. 208.

† Schulze's Aphorismen. p. 141 of Rixner.

‡ Hegel's Encyclopaëdie, 3te Ausg. p. 103. "Seyn und Nichts ist dasselbe."

§ Ib. p. 101.

|| Ib. p. 102. ff. The same is expressly taught by Marheineke, Dogmatik, § 125, and as our allegation is too important to be left without evidence, here are his words: "In dieser Unbestimmtheit ist Gott das Gedankenlose, die noch in sich selbst beharrende, unmittelbare Einheit des Seyns und Nichtseyns und kann Alles, was von Gott bejaht wird, ebenso sehr verneint werden."

¶ Dr Henry, who seems anxious to give his readers an exalted idea of the philosophic temperament of M. Cousin, says, that "he rarely speaks in the Chamber of Peers—that he takes part in the discussions of that body only where some question relating to public instruction is before the Chamber; or on extremely rare occasions, when no good citizen should keep silence." Dr Hen-

The principal original works which M. Cousin has published are his Introduction to the History of Philosophy, comprising the course of Lectures delivered by him in 1828; and the History of Philosophy of the 18th Century, containing his Lectures for 1829. His other contributions to philosophy have been given in the form of prefaces and notes to various translations which he has published. The first of the above named works has been translated for us by Mr. Linberg; and Dr. Henry has translated and published, under the title of Elements of Psychology, that part of the other which contains M. Cousin's criticisms upon the philosophy of Locke.

It would be difficult to define precisely how far the philosophical system which Dr. Henry is seeking to domiciliate among us, agrees with the mis-shapen phantasies which we have brought before the notice of our readers. When language has ceased to be the representative of ideas, it is not easy to tell what are intended to be equivalent forms of speech. M. Cousin moreover professes to discard the phraseology of Kant, even where he adopts his ideas, and deprives us thus far of the means of recognition. But unhappily we do not find that the "way in which men express themselves in France" is any more intelligible than the dialect of "Königsberg." Even Mr. Linberg, "the accomplished translator" and admirer of Cousin, finds it difficult occasionally to understand what M. Cousin precisely means,* and M. Cousin himself now and then betrays an obscure consciousness of having "reached a height, where he is, as it were, out of sight of land."†

We are farther embarrassed in the interpretation of his system, by the material consideration that no full exposition of it has as yet been given to the world. Though it is now twenty-three years since he "first faltered the name of Eclecticism," and entered upon the establishment of a new school in philosophy, we are still left to gather its principles as they lie scattered in Fragments, Prefaces, Programmes of Lectures, and Historical Criticisms. While the system has only this

ry calculates rather largely upon the ignorance of his readers as to the transactions and debates of the French Chamber of Peers. We need only refer, in illustration of the philosophic elevation of M. Cousin, to one of the most disgraceful scenes that ever occurred in any legislative body, in which this gentleman, in the course of a debate upon the question of Spanish intervention, gave the *lie direct* to Count Molé, one of the ministry.

* Cousin's Introd. p. 450.

† Cousin's Introd. p. 123.

fragmentary existence, it is too early to pronounce of it, as Dr. Henry does, "that it is a distinct scientific theory, having its method, its principle, and its consequences."* We do not feel ourselves competent to decide upon the coherency and completeness of a system of philosophy, which has as yet received only a partial development "in its applications, by history and criticism;" nor are we willing to defer in this matter to the judgment of Dr. Henry, unless some of the letters of M. Cousin "to the present translator" contain a more full and systematic exposition of the principles of eclecticism, than is to be found in his published writings. There seems to be evidence that the translator has gained light from some quarter during the interval between the two editions of his work. In the first, when he had received no letters from M. Cousin, he says, "we come now to an important point—the *fundamental peculiarity* of M. Cousin's system; this is the two-fold development of reason." He then proceeds to explain the distinction between the spontaneous and reflective reason, which he again tells us, "constitutes and determines the peculiar system of M. Cousin."† But in his second edition we are told that it is "M. Cousin's attempt to fix the infinite as a positive in knowledge, which constitutes the chief and fundamental peculiarity of his system."‡ And again he says, "the position taken by Cousin upon this subject (the positive idea of the infinite) constitutes the chief pretension and systematic peculiarity of his philosophy."§

The applications of M. Cousin's philosophy are to us however more valuable than the scientific exposition of his principles. The formulas of transcendentalism are, in most cases, as Berkeley styled the vanishing ratios of the modern mathematical analysis, "the mere ghosts of departed quantities;" but when the truths which they are supposed to contain are applied to morals and religion, they assume a more substantial form. Here at least we can try the spirits by the test of what we already know to be true. Our only elements for a judgment upon the trackless path of German philosophy are afforded by its line of direction while within the scope of our vision.

* Dr. Henry may have sources of information that are not open to the public. He has taken care not to leave his readers ignorant that he is in correspondence with M. Cousin. It was hardly necessary to inform the public that he was "indebted to M. Cousin himself for a copy" of the highly eulogistic memoir from which he has compiled his biographical notices of this philosopher.

† Elements of Psychology, 1st Ed. p. XXI and XXII.

‡ Elements of Psychology, p. XXXI.

§ Elements of Psychology, p. 110.

We class M. Cousin with the German school, because the chief part of his philosophy, as far as he has developed it incidentally in its applications to history and criticism, is evidently derived from that source. In a passage already cited by us, he avows his sympathy with a particular contemporary school in Germany, in terms which draw all regards to his personal friend Hegel, and to those of his followers who have attempted to bridge over the gulf between transcendental chaos and the world we live in; and every page of his works shows that he has been "plunged in the womb of unoriginal Night and Chaos wild." But mindful of the famous saying of Fontenelle, he has opened just as many fingers of his handful of truth as he finds convenient. He glories in the name of Eclectic, and claims to be the founder of a new school which is to comprehend and supersede all others. "Our philosophy, he says, is not a gloomy and fanatical philosophy, which being prepossessed with a few exclusive ideas, undertakes to reform all others upon the same model: it is a philosophy essentially optimistical, whose only end is to comprehend all, and which therefore accepts and reconciles all."* It is a fundamental position with M. Cousin that every form of belief that has existed contains within it some truth, and he seems to be equally strong in the faith, that in his philosophical alembic every creed will part with its error. He finds in the 18th century four philosophical schools which he designates as the Sensual, the Ideal, the Sceptical, and the Mystical. Each of these schools has existed, and therefore truth is to be found in each, and can only be entirely obtained by effecting a composition between them all. But where are we to find the test that will separate the elements of truth and error combined in each of these systems? And where the principle of unity which is to group together the particular truths disengaged from each? These can only be found in a new system. But this system, according to M. Cousin's reasoning, as it exists in common with many others, can contain only a portion of truth, and the skimming process must be applied to this in common with the rest. We see no end to this method of exhaustions. M. Cousin's philosophy has in truth no better claim to the name and character of eclectic than any other system. It accepts what agrees with its own principles, and rejects what does not, and this is precisely what every other system does.

* *Introd. to Hist. of Phil.* p. 416.

If further evidence were wanting of the affectation and charlatanry of this title, it might be abundantly found in the additional reasons which M. Cousin assigns for assuming it. One of these is that consciousness demands eclecticism. And the case is thus made out. "Being, the me, and the not-me, are the three indestructible elements of consciousness: not only do we find them in the actual development of consciousness, but we find them in the first facts of consciousness as in the last; and so intimately are they combined with each other, that if you destroy but one of these three elements you destroy all the rest. There you behold *eclecticism* within the limits of consciousness, in its elements, which are all equally real, but which to form a psychological theory, need all to be combined with each other.* Another reason is that "even logic demands eclecticism," for all systems of logic turn either upon the idea of cause, or that of substance; and from the alternate neglect of one or the other of these ideas, we have the "two great systems which at the present day are distinguished by the names of theism and pantheism." Of these systems, the author adds, that "both the one and the other are equally exclusive and false."† Hence even logic demands eclecticism. But the most amusing argument which M. Cousin urges in behalf of eclecticism is that which he draws from the spirit and tendencies of the age. We cannot follow him through it as it is spread over seventeen octavo pages. He rejects from consideration England and Scotland, on the ground of their lack of philosophy, and pronounces Germany and France to be the only two nations worthy of notice. He passes in review the general state of philosophy and of society in these two nations, declaims upon the French monarchy, the revolution and the Charte‡—and at length arrives at this conclusion; "If all around us is mixed, complex, and mingled, is it possible that philosophy should be exempt from the influence of

* Introd. to Hist. of Phil. p. 418. † Ib. p. 419.

‡ The following passage which occurs in this connexion, will give our readers some idea of M. Cousin's method of applying his philosophy to history. "You know that it is not the masses of population which appear upon fields of battle, but the ideas, the causes for which they combat. Thus at Leipzig and Waterloo the ideas which encountered each other were those of paternal monarchy and military democracy. Which prevailed, gentlemen? Neither the one, nor the other. Which was the conqueror? Which was the vanquished at Waterloo? Gentlemen, none was vanquished. No! I protest that none was vanquished; the only conquerors were European Civilization, and the Charte." We assure our readers that this is a fair average sample.

the general spirit? I ask whether philosophy can avoid being eclectic when all that is around it is so; and whether consequently the philosophical reformation which I undertook in 1816, in spite of every obstacle, does not necessarily proceed from the general movement of society throughout Europe, and particularly in France?"* There is something in all this that is either above or below our comprehension. We can readily conceive that they who see and feel its force, would find no impediment to glorying in the fancied possession of the culled wisdom of all other sects.

Before dismissing this point, it is right that we should hear Dr. Henry's account of the boastful title of the new school in philosophy. "Its *eclectic* character consists precisely in the pretension of applying its own distinctive principles to the criticism of all other systems, discriminating in each its part of truth and its part of error—and combining the part of truth found in every partial, exclusive, and therefore erroneous system, into a higher, comprehensive system."† If we rightly apprehend the writer's meaning here, it involves a strange confusion of ideas. Eclecticism, he maintains, is a distinct, scientific theory, possessing its own method and principles, and of course reduced to a system. And yet its method and principles are applied to all existing systems to gather from them the materials for a higher and comprehensive system which is to embrace the whole. The test to be applied implies the existence of a philosophical creed, and yet this creed is still to be formed from the parts of truth extracted, by the application of itself, to all others! The system of M. Cousin has, in truth, no more claim to the title of Eclectic, than any other that has ever existed. It is quite as Procrustean in its character as others, stretching or lopping off to suit its own dimensions, and differing from them, in this respect, only in its catholic pretensions.

We cannot for reasons already given undertake to put our readers in possession of M. Cousin's complete system. But one of its chief peculiarities, in the judgment of Cousin himself, and of his translator, is to be found in the distinction which he draws between the spontaneous and the reflective reason, and this we will endeavour to explain. The fundamental fact of consciousness, according to M. Cousin, is a complex phenomenon, composed of three terms, namely, the *me*, and

* Int. to Hist. of Phil. 440.

† Elem. of Psychology, p. xxx.

the *not me*, limited, bounded, finite; then the idea of something different from these, of the infinite, of unity, &c.; and again the relation of the *me* and the *not me*, that is, of the finite to the infinite, which contains and unfolds it: these are therefore the three terms of which the fundamental fact of consciousness is composed. Every man who bends his thoughts inwards, and penetrates only his own consciousness, will find there each of these three elements. If one of these terms is given, the others are given also, nor is it in the power of any man to deny any one of them. Such is now the case, but was it always thus? The distinguishing characteristic of every phenomenon, as now manifested in the consciousness, is the conviction of having tried to deny its truth, and the discovery of an inability to do so. But intelligence could not originally commence with such a denial, seeing that every denial supposes an affirmation of denying. Nor do we commence with reflection, since reflection supposes an operation anterior to itself, and cannot add any terms to those which are given by that operation. Reflection adds itself to that which was, it throws light upon that which is, but it creates nothing. There must have been therefore an instinctive development of intelligence, a perception of truth prior to reflection, and independent of the will, a pure affirmation not yet mingled with any negation. This primitive intuition contains all that will at a later period be contained in reflection:—the *me* and the *not me*,* the infinite and the finite, unity and variety, substance and phenomenon, are contained, though obscurely, in the first flashing forth of spontaneity. This is the spontaneous reason as distinguished from the reflective. The spontaneous reason seizes upon truth at first sight; comprehends and receives it, without asking why it does so. It is independent of the will, and therefore impersonal. It does not belong to us: though in us, it is not of us, it is not ours. It is absolute, and gives pure truth, and in all men the same truth. But in the reflective reason, our own voluntary activity is concerned, and here is found the source of difference and error.†

* We quote M. Cousin's description of a man's finding himself. "We do not commence with seeking ourselves, for this would imply that we already know that we exist; but, on a certain day, at a certain hour, at a certain moment,—a moment, solemn in existence!—without having sought ourselves, we find ourselves:—thought, in its instinctive development, discloses to us that we are; we affirm our existence with profound assurance,—with an assurance, unmingled with any negation whatever."—*Int. to Hist. of Phil.* p. 164.

† The preceding account of the two-fold development of reason is drawn chiefly from the sixth Lecture of the Introduction to the History of Philosophy:

Such is substantially M. Cousin's account of the distinction between the spontaneous and the reflective reason. He claims it as a discovery of his own, which he lighted upon "in the recesses of consciousness, and at a depth to which Kant did not penetrate." Kant paused at the apparent relativity and subjectivity of the laws of thought, but by diving deeper M. Cousin "detected and unfolded the fact, instantaneous but real, of the spontaneous perception of truth—a perception which not reflecting itself immediately, passes without notice in the interior consciousness, but is the actual basis of that which, at a subsequent period, in a logical form, and in the hands of reflection, becomes a necessary conception."

We can now show the reader the ground which M. Cousin's philosophy affords him for a belief in the objective existence of the world, and God. The system of Kant led to scepticism, inasmuch as it taught that all the laws of thought are altogether subjective, and the evil consequence was remedied only by assigning an illogical office to the Practical Reason. But M. Cousin has gained the same end, and saved his logic. "All subjectivity expires in the spontaneity of perception. Reason, it is true, becomes subjective by its relation to the free and voluntary *me*, the seat and type of all subjectivity; but in itself it is impersonal; it belongs to no one individual rather than another, within the compass of humanity: it belongs not even to humanity itself." Reason therefore being impersonal, it follows that it is absolute, and that the truths it gives are absolute truths. Here is the only resting-place given us for our belief in the objective existence of the finite or the infinite—the spontaneity, hence the impersonality, and hence the absolute character of reason. He who does not "possess the strength to penetrate deeply into the recesses of his own mind, to pierce through reflection, (we know not with what instrument) in order to arrive at the basis of all reflection," or who, when he has arrived at this deep place, is not fortunate enough to find there "a pure affirmation, not yet mingled with any negation, and containing in it all that has subsequently been given by reflection," has no proper evidence for the spontaneity of reason upon which this solution of the problem of the objective rests. It is to this pure affirmation, sometimes represented as "so pure that it escapes notice,"

it is perhaps a work of supererogation to say that it is given in the author's own phraseology, though abridged, since we are sure our readers will acquit us of the ability to construct it ourselves.

so bright that we can not see it, that the appeal is made in proof of what is styled, the spontaneous reason. We must therefore find this "pure affirmation" in our consciousness, or we must admit in deference to M. Cousin's logic, that it exists there, though so brightly that we cannot see it, before we can believe in any objective existence. That is, unless we have strength enough to make the discovery in the recesses of our own minds, a task to which M. Cousin acknowledges that but few men are equal, we must admit that there exists in our consciousness something of which we are nevertheless not conscious, in order to be satisfied of the objective existence of either the world or God: and we regard this as so uncertain a path for arriving at certainty, that we believe few on this side of the Atlantic will trust their feet in it:

Whom shall we find
Sufficient? who shall tempt with wandering feet
The dark unbottom'd infinite abyss,
And through the palpable obscure find out
His uncouth way?

There are some other results of the non-subjectivity of the spontaneous reason which are more startling. It is the pure affirmation, the spontaneous perception of the reason, which gives us the finite and the infinite. Whence comes this reason which enlightens us, but does not belong to us? "This principle, M. Cousin says, is God, the first and the last principle of all things." Human reason therefore "becomes divine in its own eyes." "Reason is literally a revelation, a necessary and universal revelation which is wanting to no man, and which enlightens every man on his coming into the world. Reason is the necessary mediator between God and man, the Logos of Pythagoras and Plato, the Word made flesh, which serves as the interpreter of God and the teacher of man, divine and human at the same time." There is no hesitation on the part of M. Cousin in drawing from this the conclusion that "humanity is inspired,—the divine breath which is in it, always and every where, reveals to it all truths under one form or another according to the place and the time." "Every man thinks, every man therefore thinks God, if we may so express it." "Every where present, he (God) returns as it were to himself in the consciousness of man, of which he indirectly constitutes the mechanism and phenomenal triplicity by the reflection of his own nature and of the substantial triplicity of which he is the absolute identity."*

* Elem. of Psychol. p. 400. See Marheineke Dogm. §§ 229. ff. Bretschneider, ubi supr. p. 49.

In human reason there are found three ideas, a triplicity in unity; the infinite, the finite, and the relation which subsists between them;—the passage from these ideas to God, says M. Cousin, is not difficult; “for these ideas are God himself.” We earnestly call attention to this as one of the most hideous heads of the pantheistic hydra. The dogmatic theologians of this sect have put it in the place of the incarnation, and the poets of ‘young Germany’ are teaching the intoxicated youth to regard themselves as sublime realizations of the divine reason. So Schefer, in his passionate verses, designates man as *the Son of God*, as *godlike*, nay, as the *God-man*; and in a phrensy of self-apotheosis proceeds to call the human head the *city of the gods*!

But to resume our thread, as in human consciousness there are found only two ideas and their connexion, forming three elements, so in nature, two corresponding laws and their connexion govern the material universe. We find in the world the same triplicity in unity as in ourselves. “The world accordingly is of the same stuff with ourselves, and nature is the sister of man.” And here we find in God, man, and the world, the triplicity in unity again, which figures so largely in the Eclectic philosophy. The unity of the three is not obscurely taught in the following passage. “The interior movement of the energies of the world, in the necessary progress of their development from degree to degree, from kingdom to kingdom, produces that wondrous being whose fundamental attribute is consciousness, and in this consciousness we have met with precisely the same elements which, subject to different conditions, we had already found to exist in nature:—the same elements which we had recognised in God himself.”* M. Cousin has not permitted the shadow of a doubt to rest upon the pantheistical tendency of his philosophy. “God, he tells us, is at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause, being substance only in so far as he is cause, and cause only in so far as he is substance, that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence and life, indivisibility and totality, principle, end and centre, at the summit of being, and at its lowest degree, infinite and finite together, triple in a word, that is to say, at the same time God, nature and human-

* Introd. to Hist. of Phil. p. 158.

ity. In fact, if God be not every thing, he is nothing, if he be absolutely indivisible in himself, he is inaccessible; and consequently he is incomprehensible, and his incomprehensibility is for us the same as his destruction.”* M. Cousin has attempted to forestall the charge of pantheism, by pronouncing it the bugbear of feeble imaginations. This is a very common, and not a very creditable artifice. But we trust that there is, in our country at least, enough of this feebleness of imagination to be affrighted by the bugbear, and to shrink back with horror from such a philosophical aliment as is offered by an infidel philosophy; and the more so when we see in every new arrival of European journals, that there is scarcely a doctrine of orthodox Christianity, on which these harpies have not descended, claiming it as their own, and so defiling it by impious misuse as to give us poison under the shape of food.

No sincere and earnest inquirer after truth, humble and reverent in his self-distrust, as he must needs be, can fail to take offence at the bold and confident tone in which M. Cousin settles all questions; and especially will the pious mind recoil from his unhallowed intrusions upon the nature and essence of the Deity. He professes indeed to believe and teach the existence of God. He professes too, sad omen at the outset, thoroughly to comprehend his nature and essence. He does not pretend to deny, he pleads guilty to, the accusation of seeking “to penetrate into the depths of the Divine Essence, which common opinion declares to be incomprehensible.† “So little is God incomprehensible, that his *nature* is constituted by ideas—by *those* ideas whose nature it is to be intelligible.” “The measure of the comprehensibility of God is the measure of human faith.” They who falter and draw back from this rushing in of fools, where angels dare not tread, are reproached with “pusillanimous mysticism.” He admits that God “is incomprehensible as a formula, and in the schools,” but we should consider that “mysticism is the necessary form of all religion”—“the symbolical and mystical form is inherent in religion”—and “to speak plainly, the religious form and the philosophical form are different from each other.” Though religion therefore must of necessity present truths under a mysterious and incomprehensible form, it is the right of philosophy to pene-

* Elem. of Psychol. p. 399.

† Introd. to Hist. of Phil. p. 132.

trate this form, and disengage the ideas; it is its duty "to comprehend nothing and to admit nothing but in so far as it is true in itself, and in the form of ideas." God exists only so far as we comprehend him. His nature is constituted by ideas, and those ideas are wholly within the stretch and compass of our reason. "I will speak," says our author, "plainly and unequivocally upon this point. Mystery is a word which belongs not to the vocabulary of philosophy, but to that of religion."*

With this for his point of departure, it is not surprising that M. Cousin should be led to reject entirely the God of the Scriptures, and substitute in his stead a shadowy abstraction. In place of the mysterious and incomprehensible Jehovah, whose infinite perfections will be the study and delight of an eternity, we have a God whose nature and essence we can now, while seeing through a glass darkly, thoroughly comprehend, and to whom faith is not permitted to attribute any thing of excellence or glory beyond what the human intellect can clearly discern. In place of the God

* Introd. to Hist. of Phil. p. 134. There is an admirable contrast between the pert self-sufficiency of M. Cousin, and the humble truth-loving spirit of the illustrious Descartes, who is honoured and lauded as the author of the Psychological Method, and the founder of the Ideal School of Philosophy. Cousin calls himself one of the sons of Descartes. Degenerate son of a noble sire! Compare the modest caution of the one with the all-embracing arrogance of the other. "Quod ut satis tuto et sine errandi periculo aggrediamur, eâ nobis cautela est utendum, ut semper quam maxime recordemur, et Deum auctorem rerum esse infinitum, et nos omnino finitos. Ita si forte nobis Deus de se ipso, vel aliis aliquid revelet, quod naturales ingenii nostri vires excedat, qualia jam sunt mysteria Incarnationis et Trinitatis, non recusabimus illa credere, quamvis non clare intelligamus; Nec ullo modo mirabimur multa esse, tum in immensa ejus natura, tum etiam in rebus ab eo creatis, quae captum nostrum excedant."—*Princ. Phil.* § xxv.

Another truly great man, of the same age, in urging the use of reason in theology, addresses to those who employ this noble talent in all other matters, but hide it under a bushel when they come to the study of God and of his word, the expostulation, "Cave, cave, ne quondam a te rigide satis rationes exigantur tam male collocati tui talenti." But he immediately adds, "Scio quam maxime, nec opus est ut monear, plurima esse, quae Deus in verbo suo nobis revelavit, captum nostrum infinitis superantia, qualia sunt momentosissima fidei capita de S. S. Trinitate, de eterna generatione filii, de ejus incarnatione, de resurrectione mortuorum,—haec sane credidi, credo, et per gratiam Dei semper credam, quia ea revelare mihi dignatus est."—*Joh. Bernouilli, Opera*, Vol. I. p. 196.

We could quote much to the same effect from Leibnitz, to whom M. Cousin does homage "as the greatest authority among modern philosophers." These were men who were seeking, with passionate earnestness, after truth: they were not founding new schools in philosophy. They were men of large powers and large attainments, and could afford to confess ignorance, where it is folly to be wise.

of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, the God to whom his people, in all ages, have fled for refuge, crying, do *Thou* deliver me and save me, we are presented with a vague personification of abstract principles, with a God who is described as the reason; thought, with its fundamental momenta; space, time, and number; the substance of the *me*, or the free personality, and of the fatal *not me* or nature; who returns to himself in the consciousness of man; of whose divine essence all the momenta pass into the world, and return into the consciousness of man; who is every thing, and it might, with equal significancy, be added nothing.

With this notion of God no one will contradict the position frequently assumed by M. Cousin, that Atheism is impossible. Who can deny the existence of reason, of thought, of the world? And if he cannot deny these he cannot deny God, for these are God. It is substantially upon this ground that M. Cousin rests the impossibility of Atheism. "Every man believes in his own existence, every man therefore believes in the existence of the world and God. Every man thinks, every man therefore thinks God. Every human proposition contains God: every man who speaks, speaks of God, and every word is an act of faith and a hymn. Every assertion, even though negative, is a judgment which contains the idea of being, and consequently, *God in his fullness*."* To the same effect we are told "that all thought implies a spontaneous faith in God, and natural Atheism has no existence." Every man who believes that he exists, believes all that is necessary. "If he believes this, I am satisfied; for if he believes that he exists, he then believes that his thought,—that he believes his existence—is worthy of faith; he therefore places faith in the principle of his thought;—now, *there* is God."† Even the sceptic who doubts every thing, is not to be brought as an objection to this doctrine. For does he deny that he denies? Does he doubt that he doubts? If he only affirms that he doubts, in that affirmation there is included faith in himself and in God. Behold then all men converted into believers—respect humanity, for all its members acknowledge the same God;—impute atheism to no man, for every man speaks, and each word is an act of faith in God; every man believes his own consciousness, and it is in human consciousness that God returns to himself; "human consciousness is like the divine essence which it

* Elem. of Psych. p. 401, 402.

† Introd. to Hist. of Phil. p. 174.

manifests." Such is the practical conclusion of this philosophy. And we admit its justness. It is logically connected with the premises. With the notion of God given us by M. Cousin, atheism is indeed impossible. And so is it impossible under any scheme of idolatry which assumes an object in the existence of which all men must of necessity believe, as its God. The African, having established that his *fetish* is God, will have no difficulty in proving that all men, or as many at least as believe in the evidence of their senses, believe in God. Atheism is a term that bears relation to the true God revealed in the Bible, to the God that is found under the "venerable form of religion," and the philosophy that approaches this form to disengage the idea of God, and change it to a new one, though it comes with many expressions of "profound respect and veneration," and with all the deferential and smirking politeness of a French *petit maitre*, is essentially atheistic in its character, and as such should be held in equal abhorrence with the open and frontless denial of God: M. Cousin, to do him justice, never fails in polite respect towards religion: he even refers, with evident approbation, to the pious politeness "of the octogenary author of the *Système du Monde*, (*an Atheist*), who bowed and uncovered his head, whenever God was named," But when a man robs us of our God, it is but little matter whether he does it with an open and rude violence, or with a smooth and complaisant legerdemain.

The idea of creation is of necessity modified by the idea of God. What is it to create? After stating and repudiating the "vulgar definition, which is, to make something out of nothing," M. Cousin proceeds to seek the true conception of this act among the facts of consciousness. "To create," he says, "is a thing which it is not difficult to conceive, for it is a thing which we do at every moment; in fact we create whenever we perform a free action.—Here is the type of a creation. The divine creation is the same in its nature. God, if he is a cause, can create; and if he is an absolute cause, he cannot but create; and in creating the universe he does not draw it forth from nothingness but from himself. God therefore creates, he creates by virtue of his creative power; he draws forth the world not from nothingness, which is not, but from him who is absolute existence. An absolute creative force, which cannot but pass into act, being eminently his characteristic, it follows, not that creation is possible but that it is necessary: it follows that

God is creating without cessation and infinitely, and that creation is inexhaustible, and sustains itself constantly.”* M. Cousin, on one occasion, intimates that he knows “he is speaking in 1828, and not in 1850,” and we presume a decent regard for the prejudices of the age in which his lot is cast, prevented him from stating an immediate inference from the principles here laid down. If it be the most eminent characteristic of God that he is an absolute creative force that cannot but pass into act, we are driven to believe in the eternal creation of the world, or rather in the eternal co-existence and oneness of God, and the universe. The possibility of a creation, in the strict and proper sense of the term, is denied by M. Cousin at the outset. He says that “Leucippus, Epicurus, Bayle, and Spinoza, and indeed all others whose powers of thought are somewhat exercised, demonstrate, that out of nothing, nothing can be drawn forth; that out of nothing, nothing can come forth; whence it follows that creation is impossible. Yet by pursuing a different route our investigations arrive at this very different result, viz, that creation is, I do not say, possible, but necessary.” And what is this different route which conducts from the same premises to so opposite a conclusion? It is, as we have seen, by changing the meaning of the word. It is by narrowing the term to signify only what we every moment do, what every cause, now in action, does. By confounding creation with causation, and defining God to be a creative force that could not but pass into act, either Leucippus or Spinoza might have proved as clearly as M. Cousin has done, that creation, so far from being impossible, is both possible and necessary. That they did not arrive at this “different result,” should be imputed perhaps rather to their candour, than to their want of penetration.

If the maxima “*nihil posse creari de nihilo*” be received as universally true, and applied in limitation of the Divine power, as well as human, creation is of course impossible. Creation is the making of something out of nothing, and if this cannot be done there can be no creation. We find matter now in existence. Unless it has existed eternally, there was a time when it did not exist. It must then have been formed either of something already existing, which by hypothesis is not matter, that is, of spirit, or it must have been formed of nothing. But matter cannot be a modified form

* *Introd. to Hist. of Phil.* p. 136—142.

of spiritual existence, and according to M. Cousin, it cannot be drawn forth from nothing. The only legitimate conclusion to which we can arrive from these premises is, that matter does not now exist, or that it has had an independent existence from eternity, or that it is an emanation from the Deity. The latter opinion seems to be the one held by M. Cousin. The material universe, he teaches us, was not formed out of nothing;—God drew it forth from himself. “We may, he says, go further. The creations of God are from himself; therefore he creates with all the characteristics which we have recognised in him, and which pass *necessarily* into his creation.”* We find too the following passage in his preface to the second edition of the Philosophical Fragments, translated by Dr. Henry, and appended to the Elements of Psychology. “God exists for us only in the relation of cause; without this, reason would not refer to him either humanity or the world. He is absolute substance only inasmuch as he is absolute cause; and his *essence* consists precisely in his creative power.”† M. Cousin’s theory of Cosmogony is now quite plain. The essence of God is his creative power. He is an absolute force, subjected to a necessity of acting, and of developing in its effects those characteristics and those alone which are found in itself. God is made the mere living force, the *vis viva*, of the universe, and all things are but the radiations and effluxes of this primary and interior energy. This is the theory taught, if we may credit the Hermetic Fragments, by the ancient Egyptians, and which is at this day held both by the Brahmins and Buddhists of the East. Among all the ancients, unless the Tuscans be an exception, the creation of something out of nothing was held to be a palpable absurdity. It was a common article in all the different creeds of Grecian and Roman philosophy that “*gigni de nihilo nil, in nihilum nil posse reverti.*” This led to two different theories of the origin of the visible universe, either of them exclusive of a creation properly so called. The one, that of most of the Greek schools, which taught the eternity, and independent existence of matter. The other, that of the oriental systems, which represented the universe as an emanation from within the Deity. Thus in the Yajur Veid, as translated by Du Perron, it is said: “The whole universe is the Creator, proceeds from the Creator, exists in him, and returns to him.

* Introd. p. 142.

† Elem. of Psych. p. 408.

The ignorant assert that the universe, in the beginning, did not exist in its author, and that it was created out of nothing. Oh, ye whose hearts are pure, how could something be made out of nothing? This first Being alone, and without likeness, was the *all* in the beginning: he could multiply himself under different forms; he created fire from his essence, which is light, &c." This doctrine was early carried into Greece, and adopted by many of their philosophers. It is found in the Orphic remains, especially in the poem *de Mundo*, as quoted by Aristotle and Proclus, in Aeschylus, and in most of the Greek poets. It seems to have special affinities for poetry. In modern times it has made its reappearance in the polished periods of Pope's Essay on Man, and it runs through the wild and impious imaginations of Shelley.* Under the poetic dress this system is more tolerable, because we can ordinarily make such deductions for poetic imagery as will bring it within the compass of truth. But when in the grave language of didactic philosophy we are told that the very essence of God is his creative power; that he is a force that was compelled to act and to pass with all his characteristics into the visible world; and that nothing now exists which has not from eternity existed in God; we are concerned, we are alarmed. This necessary transfusion of God into the universe destroys our very idea of God.† He is made the substratum, the substance of all existence; and we are only bubbles thrown up upon the bosom of the mighty ALL, to reflect the rainbow colours, in our brief phenomenal existence, and then be absorbed again into the ocean from which we came.‡

It will have been already anticipated from the exposition we have given, that M. Cousin's philosophy makes sad havoc with Christianity. He is indeed studiously polite to Christianity as well as to natural religion. "He knows that he is speaking in 1828, and not in 1850." This knowledge it is,

* Wordsworth occasionally borders on the very extreme of poetic license upon this subject. The philosophical principles of the Essay on Man were dictated by Bolingbroke, and it is supposed that Pope was not himself sufficiently aware of their tendency.

† If La Place had only personified under the name of God, the forces with which the attenuated matter of his *nebular* hypothesis was supposed to be endowed, he might, with as much justice as M. Cousin, have escaped the imputation of Atheism.

‡ The fittest symbolical form that has ever been given to this creed is that of an oriental sect, who represent the Deity as an immense spider seated at the centre of the universe, and spinning forth all things from his own body.

doubtless, that draws from him his kind and forbearing indulgence towards Christianity,—his patience, with its slowness of movement,—nay, his condescending patronage. "Christianity is the philosophy of the people. He who now addresses you sprang from the people, and from Christianity; and I trust you will always recognise this, in my profound and tender respect for all that is of the people and of Christianity. Philosophy is patient; she knows what was the course of events in former generations, and she is full of confidence in the future; happy in seeing the great bulk of mankind in the arms of Christianity, she offers, with modest kindness, to assist her in ascending to a yet loftier elevation."* And again, he says, "I believe that in Christianity all truths are contained; but these eternal truths may and ought to be approached, disengaged, and illustrated by philosophy. Truth has but one foundation; but truth assumes two forms, mystery, and scientific exposition; I revere the one, I am the organ and interpreter of the other."† Infidelity has, in most cases, assumed this guise of philosophical explanation of the truths of Christianity. Hume proposed only to place faith upon its proper foundation; and even Voltaire and the French Encyclopedists professed to be rendering true service to Christianity, while they were seeking to sap its foundations and overwhelm it with utter ruin. But unless it be to blind the eyes, and evade the arm of the ecclesiastical power, which in Catholic countries holds watch over the press, we see not what good purpose can be effected by so thin a disguise as that assumed by M. Cousin.‡ He surely cannot imagine that the most ordinary intelligence could fail to penetrate the flimsy hypocrisy. He comes down from the heights of philosophy, to meet Christianity in her helplessness and aid her in ascending to a loftier elevation! Though tolerant of her past slowness, yet knowing that she must move more rapidly to meet the wants of the future, he comes, with modest kindness, to disburden her of her mys-

* *Introduct.* to *Hist. of Phil.* p. 57.

† *Introduct.* to *Hist. of Phil.* p. 442.

‡ Among those whom we look to as readers of such articles as this there are some who are turning their steps to the enchanted ground of German literature, either in its primitive or its secondary and Gallicized division. Let us with all the earnestness of disinterested dread caution the young American. Under the disguises of romance and poesy, he will learn to tolerate the hell-born dogmas of the *young Germany*; the mingled lust and blasphemy of Heine, Pückler Muskau, and Schefer; or, if he wander in these domains as a theologian, the Iscariot Christianity of the disciples of Schelling, Hegel, and Daub.

teries, and quicken her steps! He presents himself as an interpreter, in scientific exposition, of a revelation from God, and the canon which he brings in his hand and openly exposes, is to admit nothing which this revelation contains as truth, unless by falling back upon our own pure reason we find it to be true in itself and in the form of ideas! In his solution of the mystery of the Incarnation, in which Reason is declared to be the Word made flesh, we have both proof and warning of the kind of assistance which Christianity may expect at his hands. All the sacred mysteries of revelation dwindle, in like manner, under his profane touch, into the stale truths of our own consciousness. Locke encounters the sneers of M. Cousin because he had not discovered this mode of making Christianity easy. Speaking of the appeals made by Locke to Christianity, to revelation, and to faith, he says, "By faith however and by revelation, he does not understand a philosophical faith and revelation. This interpretation did not exist in the age of Locke. He understands faith and revelation, in the proper orthodox, theological sense."* If we have a just idea of the temper of Locke, he would have scorned to avail himself of this slippery and deceptive interpretation. It is an ungracious task to be alarmists, and we should shun the office if only some specialties of this or that sect were at stake, and not, as we believe, the very basis of all religion and morals. Socinianism is evangelical when compared with the newest theology of Germany.

M. Cousin's patronage of Christianity becomes sometimes ludicrous. He declares, with gravity, that "it is the best of all religions, and it is the most accomplished of all." He assigns a reason for its accomplishments. It is this, "that the Christian religion is that which of all other religions came last; and it is unreasonable to suppose that the religion which came last should not be better than all others, should not embrace and resume them all."† The perfectibility of the human species is a cardinal doctrine with M. Cousin. Humanity is ever in the right; and its progress is steadily onward and upward. Each age is an improvement on its predecessor, and every new system is superior to all that have gone before it. The inferiority of Christianity will therefore be demonstrated, should the general apostacy which some predict take place after its universal prevalence.

We need not seek in the remote deductions and results of

* *Elem. of Psych.* p. 213.

† *Introd. to Hist. of Phil.* p. 339.

M. Cousin's philosophy for evidence of its irreconcilable hostility to Christianity. In its first principles it overthrows the foundation of divine revelation. The spontaneous reason, we are told by M. Cousin, is God, and the truths given by it are "literally a revelation from God." And since this reason is found in all men, "humanity is inspired." The original fact of affirmation, which is found by M. Cousin in human consciousness, beneath reflection, and anterior to all negation, and upon which he relies for proof of the existence of the spontaneous reason, "this fact it is, which the human race have agreed to call inspiration." This inspiration is attended always by enthusiasm. "It is the spirit of God with us: it is immediate intuition, as opposed to induction and demonstration: it is the primitive spontaneity opposed to the ulterior development of reflection."* As neither the senses or the will are concerned in this primitive act of pure apperception, we cannot refer it to ourselves. Therefore, "when man is conscious of the wondrous fact of inspiration and enthusiasm, feeling himself unable to refer it to himself, he refers it to God; and gives to this original and pure affirmation the name of revelation. Is the human race wrong?† When man, conscious of his feeble intervention in the fact of inspiration, refers to God the truths which he has not made, and which rule over him, does he deceive himself? No, certainly not; for what is God? I have told you; he is thought in itself, with its fundamental momenta; he is eternal reason, the substance and the cause of the truths which man perceives. When man therefore refers to God that truth which he cannot refer either to this world, or to his own personality, he refers it to him to whom he ought to refer it; and this absolute affirmation of truth, without reflection,—this inspiration,—enthusiasm,—is veritable revelation."‡ All men are inspired, and all are inspired in an equal degree. This spontaneity of reason, which is to all men a veritable revelation from God, "does not admit of essential differences." It gives pure truth, and in all men the same truth. "Every where, in its instinctive and spontaneous form, reason is equal to itself, in all the genera-

* *Elem. of Psych.* p. 301.

† The deification of collective humanity is regarded by many in Germany as the regenerative principle of our age. The fashionable pantheism of Berlin teaches that 'whatever is (in politics) is right;' a blessed creed for the courtiers of an absolute monarch; and which when applied to morals, forbids us, as does a living poet, to dim our mind's eye with any tears of penitence; for all hatred is only love seen on the wrong side!

‡ *Intro. to Hist. of Phil.* p. 165, 166.

tions of humanity, and in all the individuals of which these different generations are composed."* It is too plain for argument, that these principles destroy all that is peculiar and valuable in the Sacred Scriptures. The distinctive claim which they put forth, of containing a revelation from God, is set aside by a similar claim on behalf of every man. Humanity is inspired in all its members, and revelations of truth are made to all men in nearly equal degree. When holy men of God spake of old, as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, they were but giving utterance to the visions of the spontaneous reason, and the truths declared by Christ and his Apostles were from God only in the same sense in which all our own intuitions of truth are from God. The Koran is of equal authority with the Bible; all pretended revelations have one and the same authority, that is, the self-evidence of the truths which they contain. The Gospel of Christ is thus stripped of its high prerogative as a special message from God; and holy prophets and apostles, nay our Saviour too, were deceived in supposing that they had any other kind of communication with God, than that which every man enjoys. No special revelation could, according to this philosophy, be accredited to the world. No messenger or interpreter could be furnished for a divine mission among men. The truths revealed to any one man through the operations of his instinctive reason, and by him proclaimed to others, cannot be received except by such as find the same truths in their own spontaneity of reason. And the only way therefore by which God could make known his will, and give it authority among men, would be by enlarging the spontaneous reason of every man. At precisely this point the extremes of flat Rationalism, and the philosophy of the Absolute come together. Their osculation is seen in Strauss's "Life of Jesus," which has almost convulsed the religious world in Germany. Marheineke and Röhr, like Herod and Pilate, agree only when the Son of God is to be crucified. Would to God that our fellow Christians in America, before abandoning as shallow the philosophy of the great English fathers, would take the trouble to examine the issues of the paths on which they are entering! Let us have any philosophy however shallow, that leaves us in quiet possession of the Gospel, rather than the dark and hopeless bewilderment into which we are thrown by the deep metaphysics of M. Cousin. We say to

* *Introd. p. 174.*

him and to Dr. Henry, in the language of Edmund Burke, "If our religious tenets should ever want a further elucidation, we shall not call on infidelity to explain them. We shall not light up our temple from that unhallowed fire. It will be illuminated with other lights. It will be perfumed with other incense, than the infectious stuff which is imported by the smugglers of adulterated metaphysics."²

They who are accustomed to look to the sanctions of religion for the chief support of morality, will naturally surmise that M. Cousin is not unduly strict in his ethical code. When God is made to be thought, reason, space, time and number, there is not much room left for the commission of any serious offences against him. If humanity is inspired, there is no reason to doubt that humanity will always be in the right. We accordingly find that under the cheerful philosophy of M. Cousin it is a crime to "blaspheme humanity." Forms of government or of religion which have extensively prevailed could not have subsisted without the consent of humanity, and though it is our privilege to criticise, we are taught that it would be wrong to condemn them. The spirit of each particular age, the temper of each system of philosophy, in short, every thing which has existed through the concurrence of humanity, is right; "it has its apology in its existence." We are warned not to "accuse humanity," by condemning religious or political laws which have had the confidence and sympathy of the masses of mankind. "To imprecate power (long and lasting power), we are told, is to blaspheme humanity; to bring accusations against glory, is nothing less than to bring accusations against humanity, by which it is decreed. What is glory, gentlemen? It is the judgment of humanity upon its members; and humanity is always in the right."^{*} No appeal can be taken from the judgment of humanity, for "its judgment is infallible."[†]

We are thus led to a conclusion which M. Cousin does not scruple to avow and apply, that success is the criterion of moral excellence. He sets it down as "the peculiar characteristic of a great man, that he succeeds." He proves that in every battle which has ever taken place, "the vanquished party deserved to be vanquished—that the victorious party was the better, the more moral party; and that therefore it was victorious."[‡] This singular demonstration may be

* *Introd.* p. 309.

† *Introd.* p. 310.

‡ *Introd.* p. 282.

summed up in a single sentence, which we extract. "Courage is a virtue which has a right to the recompense of victory,—weakness is a vice, and, inasmuch as it is so, it is always punished and beaten."* Examination and reflection, we are told, will convince us, in every case, that "the vanquished ought to have been vanquished," and that our sympathy and applause should be "on the side of the victor, for his is the better cause."

We have never seen the odious maxim, Whatever is, is right, pressed to a more insane extent, than is given to it in M. Cousin's philosophy. It is this abominable principle which breathes into his system the cheerful inspiration upon which he so much loves to dwell. We may indeed thus learn to be cheerful under any aspect of affairs, we may bow the knee to any religion, we may cordially embrace any form of government, we may shout in the procession of any conqueror, we may rejoice with the successful oppressor, and insult the oppressed with the truth that he deserves to suffer,—but at what expense do we purchase this easy and cheerful temper! What a sacrifice of the tender charities of our nature, what a dreadful perversion of truth and conscience does it involve! We must first learn to believe what M. Cousin indeed distinctly teaches, that prudence, courage and strength, though united with ambition, revenge, cruelty and rapacity, constitute a moral excellence that deserves to triumph over imprudence and weakness, though associated with the greatest mildness, forbearance, and benevolence. We would rather weep sometimes with those that weep, than have our tears thus stayed.

There is to us a dark and dreary fatalism pervading M. Cousin's system, of which symptoms have already appeared in the extracts we have given. He does not indeed teach what is commonly meant by fatalism. He is a strenuous advocate for the freedom of the will, and talks much of our free personality. But then this freedom itself is but one of the products of a deeper fatalism which pervades the universe, and works out its results in all things. The mechanical theory of the French atheists, which was the product of the philosophy of sensation, and the ideal theory of the Transcendentalists arrive, in this respect, though by different

* *Introd.* p. 283.

routes, at much the same conclusion. And though each brings with it somewhat of the dust of the road by which it has come, there is not much to choose between them. The one is indeed more refined and *spiritual* than the other. We hear less of the working and grinding of the machinery. It is an abstract and ideal mechanism to which it subjects us, but still a mechanism. All things are moved on by a resistless destiny. Even God is represented as a creative force, which could not but pass into act. And again, we are told, "God could not remain in a state of absolute unity; that absolute unity, that eternal substance, being a creative force, could not but create.*" Cousin teaches us that every man who exists is but the exponent of some pre-existing necessity; that every book that is written is but the realization of an idea that must needs take this form, and that every thing which occurs represents an idea which could not but be represented at that precise time, and in that very manner. After a full exposition of the *a priori* demand for a Universal History, he concludes, "hence the necessity of Bossuet." The idea had been ripening for some time, and at length there was an imperative necessity for it to put on a concrete form, and it immediately assumed it in the person of the Bishop of Meaux. Nor is this all. It was not only necessary that Bossuet should come into existence at this precise moment, and that he should write a Universal History, but his plan also was subject to necessity. After a full account of the *a priori* urgency of an idea upon this subject, we are told, "hence, gentlemen, the necessity of Bossuet's plan." We have then an account of the necessity which called into being and set at work in their respective functions, Vico, Herder, Tenneman, and others. It would seem as if there had been some difficulty in finding concrete habitation for the abstract necessities of the Cartesian philosophy. Descartes himself was the product of a necessity which grew out of the dependence and subjection of the scholastic systems. It was necessary that there should be a revolution, in which reason might shake off the shackles of authority and enter upon the true method of philosophizing. And Descartes came to represent this idea. But then Descartes was a gentleman and a soldier; Malebranche was a monk, Berkeley an eminent bishop, Spinoza a recluse, and Leibnitz

* *Introd. to Hist. of Phil.* p. 303.

a statesman. There was therefore a necessity, in the Cartesian philosophy, for a great professor: "this was the place and destiny of Wolf."*

There is a wider domain, and a stricter rule given by M. Cousin, to this destiny, than is conceded by most even of fatalists. Not only do all men, and especially great men, represent ideas which it was necessary should find their representation in them, but "every place represents an idea." There is nothing in the world which has not its necessity for existing, and which does not therefore represent an idea. "Yes! gentlemen, says our author, give me the map of any country, its configuration, its climate, its waters, its winds, and the whole of its physical geography; give me its natural productions, its flora, its zoology, &c. and I pledge myself to tell you, *a priori*, what will be the quality of man in that country, and what part its inhabitants will act in history,—not accidentally but necessarily, not at any particular epoch, but in all: in short—what idea he is called to represent." The philosophy which denies that "all things hold and bind each other together, which emancipates man in any degree from the laws of brass and iron which work so effectually upon him even through nature, that "the existence of a particular country determines the existence of a particular people," is branded as a "sentimental and pusillanimous spiritualism, which, though well enough adapted to the minds of children and of women, would not be less fatal to science than materialism itself."†

M. Cousin has a reason, aside from the principles of his philosophy, for being a fatalist. "All great men, he says, have been fatalists." And as he has provided the way, in all other respects, for his being a great man, it would hardly answer for him to fail here. "A great man, he informs us, is a general idea, concentrated in a strong individuality, so that its generality may appear without suppressing his individuality." From this definition of a great man he infers that no priest, prophet, or pontiff, can be great, since their existence consists in their relation to the God whom they announce: with them "God is every thing, and man is noth-

* Introd. p. 240. The inference is obvious: there still remained a necessity in the philosophy of the age for a "peer of France;" Quere: Does the same principle of necessary emanation from the age and circumstances hold in the case of translations? Or could M. Cousin, by an inverse method, declare the horoscope of his admirers?

† Introd. p. 242.

ing;" "sacerdotal castes destroy individuality, for in them nothing appears but the name of the caste, and the name of the caste is the name of its God." Therefore it appears that no priest, and by parity of reason, no religious man, in whom the idea of the infinite prevails over the finite, and to whom "God is every thing, and man nothing," can be a great man. War and philosophy are the only two lines of life which are favourable to the development of great men. "Who are they, he asks, who have left the greatest names among men? They are those who have done their countrymen the greatest good, who have served them most effectually; that is, who have made the greatest conquests, for the ideas which in their century were called to dominion, and which then represented the destinies of civilization; that is, *who have gained the most battles.*"* But M. Cousin is not a warrior, except in the bloodless conflict of ideas, and it would not do to limit greatness to war. We have, in consequence, another demonstration, concluding, "therefore the great philosopher is, in his time and in his country, the ultimate perfection of all other great men, and together with the great captain he is the most complete representation of the people to whom he belongs."† The way is therefore open to M. Cousin. But it is "the peculiar mark of a great man that he succeeds." And M. Cousin has succeeded: for the "name of eclecticism, whether chosen well or ill, begins for some time since to be somewhat spread abroad, and to resound in France, and elsewhere."‡ Does not all the world, too, know that M. Cousin has been made a Peer of France. Without doubt, he has succeeded. What is further necessary? Why "all great men have in a greater or less degree been fatalists."§ And he has given sufficient proof that he labours under no lack of this qualification.

Let us again pause for a little season, and looking back upon our dreary way, take in at one retrospective survey so much of the field as may include the German, the French, and the mongrel philosophies. They are districts of the same kingdom; alike in arrogance, in nonsense, and in impiety.

Campbell has a chapter in his philosophy of Rhetoric, intended to point out the cause of the fact that nonsense so often escapes being detected, both by the writer and by the reader; but he did not live to see what we have seen. Grosser absurdities than those which may be selected from

* Introd. p. 321. † Ib. p. 323. ‡ Ib. p. 414. § Ib. p. 305.

the German, and the mock-German metaphysics, we believe the world never beheld; and these not in scattered places, but for page after page, and chapter after chapter. The Germans of the Transcendental School complain that we of the Anglo Saxon race are dull, terrestrial, and shallow; their defect is equally unfortunate, for no one of them has the faculty for descrying an absurdity, as such. The grossest and most drivelling nonsense, which could be expressed in a jargon of words, would probably to a transcendentalist exhibit nothing ridiculous, and perhaps something august. Except the Philosophy of the Absolute, few things can be imagined more ludicrously and disgustingly absurd than the revelations of Böhme; or Jacob Behmen, as we more familiarly call him. Yet these ravings of the inspired shoemaker are regarded with "affectionate reverence,"* not only by Schelling but by Coleridge; and, more amazing still, have conduced in no small degree to the production of the modern philosophy, as has been proved and acknowledged.†

In the land of their prevalence these systems have been frequently compared to the dreams of the early Gnostics, and the resemblance is too striking to escape any one versed in church-history; as has been to our knowledge admitted by some of those concerned. The very name *Gnosis* reminds one of the claim to direct knowledge of the absolute; but the parallel may be carried out in almost every particular of the two classes of opinion. This has been done in a profound manner by the learned Baur, in his work on the Gnosis of the Christian church. He has traced out at full length the horrid pictures of the Valentinians, and the Ophites; of Marcion and the admirers of the Pseudo Clementine Homilies; he has set over against this the portraiture of Böhme, of Fichte, of Schelling, and of Hegel; and, comparing their respective lineaments, has revealed a likeness as striking as it is frightful. This he does moreover not as an enemy, but as an adoring devotee of the new theogony. He shows the remarkable coincidence between Schelling and Böhme, and between both and the Gnostics; and he makes the analogy no less apparent in the case of Hegel.‡ In all these schemes, the ini-

* Thus Coleridge speaks of Jacob Behmen, *Biogr. Liter.* vol. i. p. 96, see also p. 90.—Baur's *Gnosis*, pp. 557—611.—Heinroth: von d. Grundfehlern der Erziehung, 1828, p. 415.

† We observe two new biographies of Jacob Böhme, among the latest German works.

‡ *Die christliche Gnosis, oder die christliche Religions-Philosophie in ihrer*

tiated are incited to an esoteric vision of truth, a Gnosis which the common herd cannot attain: in all, the promise is, Your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil. The conflicting sects agree in this, and in a consequent contempt for what they call popular, experimental, or empirical philosophy.* As there are certain limits to intellectual powers, which the immortal Locke endeavoured to ascertain, and beyond which we float in the region of midnight, so those who have forgotten these cautions have in their most original speculations only reproduced the delirium of other times, which in the cycle of opinion has come back upon us "like a phantasma or a hideous dream."† In the French imitation, no less than the German original, there is a perpetual self-delusion practised by the philosopher, who plays with words as a child with lettered cards, and combines what ought to be the symbols of thought, into expressions unmeaning and self-contradictory.‡ And as in this operation he cannot but be aware that these expressions are the exponents of no conceptions of the intellect, he demands, as the only possible prop of his system, a specific faculty for the absolute, the unconditioned, and—may we not add—the absurd! Thus Fichte asked of all such as would aspire to his primary,

geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Von Dr. Ferdinand Christian Baur.—Tübingen, 1835. In this elaborate work of Professor Baur, nearly two hundred pages are devoted to the exhibition of the parallel between the modern seers, and the frantic Ophites and other transcendentalists of the primitive age. Let the reader suspend his judgment until he shall have inquired into the justice of this comparison.

* Hegel gives himself great amusement at the English acceptance of the word Philosophy. He alludes to Lord Brougham's having, in a speech in parliament, spoken of "the *philosophical* principles of free-trade." He attributes a similar expression to Canning; and gives the following as the title of a recent English book, viz. "The Art of Preserving the Hair, on *Philosophical* principles."—*Hegel's Encyklopädie*, pp. 11, 12.

† When we look at the prodigious speculations of the schoolmen, we find expressions highly transcendental. Even Hegel is shorn of his originality, and Pantheism is discovered among the lucubrations of the dark ages. Thus, Joannes Erigena says of the divine nature: "Deus est omne quod vere est; quoniam ipse facit omnia, et fit in omnibus; omne enim quod intelligitur et sentitur, nihil aliud est, nisi non apparentis apparitio, occulti manifestatio, negati affirmatio, etc."—*De Divisione Naturae*. lib. ii. p. 80. Here we have pantheism. Again, "Per nihilum ex quo omnia creata esse scriptura dicit, intelligo ineffabilem et incomprehensibilem divinæ naturæ inaccessibilemque claritatem, omnibus intellectibus sive humanis sive angelicis inaccessibiliter incognitam." Lib. iii. p. 127, apud Rixner, vol. ii. pp. 13—15.

‡ "Little did Leibnitz, Wolf, &c. believe that the language of science would become a witch-jargon (*Hexensprache*) which we should learn like parrots."—*Herder Metakritik*, ii. 74.

free and creative act of the *Ich* or *Ego*, a certain power called the *Anschauungsvermögen*. It is the want of these optics, alas! which spoils us for philosophers. Reinhold, who often combated, and sometimes rallied his old friend, avowed that he was utterly destitute of this sense, a misfortune, adds M. Degerando, common to him with all the rest of the world.* It is however the happy portion of the absolute Philosophers, the Behmenites, the Gnostics, the Soofies, the Budhists, and a few of the Americans.

It would afford a subject for many more pages than we can allot to this whole discussion, to compare the new philosophy with that of the Oriental mystics. We look with amazement at the exact reproduction of almost every eastern error in the musings of Europe. It should seem that no form of profane absurdity can ever finally die out of the world, until the great suggester of them all shall be cast into hell. Pantheism has by some been regarded as the mother of Polytheism; but mother and daughter have loved to dwell together, and the parent has in many cases survived the child. This form of error prevails widely among the Soofies of Persia, and the Budhists of the remoter east, as well as in countless minor sects in that nursery of

All monstrous, all prodigious things,
Abominable, inutterable, and worse
Than fables yet have feigned, or fear conceived,
Gorgons, and Hydras, and Chimaeras dire.

Two valuable works of Tholuck relate to this subject: the one being a treatise on the Pantheism of Persia,† the other an Anthology of Oriental Mystic Poems.‡ There is scarcely a page of these volumes which does not show something to identify the ancient and eastern with the modern Pantheism. The resemblance is declared by the learned and pious author, who has a decided leaning towards the mystical philosophy. Hegel himself cites this Anthology, with acknowledgment of the same truth, complimenting Tholuck for his genial disposition towards profound philosophy, and at the same time lamenting his still remaining prejudice and narrowness.§ Among these Mo-

* Life of Fichte, by M. Eyriès.

† Ssufismus: sive Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica, etc. Frid. Aug. Deofidus Tholuck. Berolini, 1821.

‡ Bluethensammlung aus der Morgenländischen Mystik, u. s. w. von F. A. G. Tholuck. Berlin, 1825.

§ Encyclopaedie, p. 592, note.

hammedan heretics, the Soofies, we find the declaration that God is every thing; *nihil esse praeter Deum*.^{*} We have also the mental gaze of intuition, the absolute *Anschauung*.[†] We have creation represented as a necessary emanation from the divinity.[‡] We have the absorption of all self in God.[§] We have, ever and anon, the same glorification of nihility, *das Nichts*;|| and, as if no plague-spot of the pestiferous philosophy should be wanting, we have complete Hegelianism in the doctrine that sin is no evil, nay, from one sect of transcendental Persians, that sin is even preferable to holiness.[¶]

Every reader of the common religious news is informed that millions of the Indian and Indo-Chinese people are pantheists. Hegel dwells on this, and quotes the *Bhagavad Gita*, in which Krishna is introduced thus speaking: "I am the breath which dwells in the body of the living; I am the beginning, and the midst of the living, and also their end.—I am, under the stars, the radiant sun, under the lunar signs, the moon," &c. &c. He denies, however, that in this there is proper Pantheism, as he also denies it of his own system.^{**} It would be difficult to deny it of the books of the Vedam. "The school of Vedantam," say the Roman Catholic missionaries in China, "has an authority superior to that of all the others. It professes, as the fundamental principle of its doctrine, the opinion of the simple unity of one existing essence, which is nothing but the *Ego*, or soul. Nothing exists except this *Ego*, in its simple unity; this essence is in some sort *trine*, by its existence, by its infinite light and supreme joy; all is here eternal, immaterial, infinite. But because the inner experience of the *Ego* is not conformed to this beautiful idea, they admit another principle, but purely

* Ssufismus, p. 222.

† *Blüthensammlung*, p. 116. See also p. 198, where Tholuck says 'Here we have in simple terms the results of the loftiest speculations of modern times. From contrast and comparison the infinite can never be learned.'

‡ Ssufismus, p. 173, ff.

§ Ib. p. 64. "Dixit aliquando Bustami Deo: Quamdiu mi Deus inter Egoitatem et Tuitatem me manere vis, remove Egoitatem et Tuitatem ut Ego nihil fiam." And in the *Blüthensammlung*, Mewlana Dschelaleddin Rumi, a Persian poet "follows (says Tholuck) the pantheistic-mystic view, that all revelations in all religions are alike true, as being different, gradual, evolutions of God," &c. p. 69. So at pp. 87, 88, 89, are exhibitions of the sublimest pantheistic fatalism.

|| *Blüthens.* p. 66, note 1.

¶ *Blüthensammlung*, p. 123, note 1, p. 134, note 1, where Tholuck controverts this absurd doctrine with proper warmth.

** Hegel's *Encyk.* p. 586.

negative, [das Nichts] and which, consequently, has no reality of being; this is the *Maya* of the *Ego*, that is, *the error*. The key for the deliverance of the soul is in these words, which these false philosophers have to repeat incessantly, with a pride beyond that of Lucifer: *I am the supreme Being, Aham ava param Brahma.*"* We could not ask a more lucid or comprehensive view of the modern German system; for even if the missionaries invented what they say, they have in their invention, anticipated the grandest result of Schelling and Hegel.† And the Luciferian pride, engendered in the Chinese, is precisely the temper which is manifested by those of the Indo-Germanic school who have come to the conclusion that God never arrives at so high a degree of self-consciousness (to use their jargon) as in their own minds. When applied to the doctrines of revealed Christianity, these dogmas produce a portentous mixture. We then learn that the Messiah or God-man is self-developing humanity—the race at large. On this topic many illustrations might be offered; one of these, from a popular poet of genius, we throw into the margin, as neither caring nor daring to translate it: but let him that readeth understand.‡

So far as M. Cousin is concerned, we are ready to concede to him the possession of learning and genius. But his philosophy, as far as he has developed it, is to the last degree superficial and conceited. Making great pretensions to extraordinary profoundness, it does in truth but skim the surface of things, and then fly off into thin and unmeaning abstrac-

* Choix des Lettres édifiantes, Paris, 1809, T. iv. p. 246, ap. Tholuck's *Ssufismus*, p. 214.

† We should, perhaps, have said before, that Kant is altogether exempt from the charge of Pantheism, representing God as "not by any means a blind, acting, eternal, *Nature*, the Root of all things. but a supreme Being, who by understanding and freedom is the author of all things." See Jacobi, u. s. p. 114.

‡ Drum bitt' ich, vor der Hand den Prediger
Auf seinem Berge ungekränkt zu lassen,
Doch dass beschwor' ich, so gewiss das Alte
Der Alten nicht mehr neulebendig wird:
Der Mann, in welchem Gott war—Gott wird leben!—
Der Mann, wer er dereinst zu euch herabsteigt,
Und zweifach, dreifach, millionenfach
Bei euch als Mensch, als alle Menschen lebt:
Er wird nicht dreifach goldne Kronen tragen,
Er wird in's Knopfloch keinen Orden knüpfen,
Er wird der Herr von Bethlehem nicht heissen,
Er wird nicht weibesbaar im Kloster singen, u. s. w.

Laienbrevier von Leopold Schefer. Berlin, 1835.

tions. The "witch jargon" which it employs, when you have taken infinite pains to penetrate it in a given case, is often found to contain only some old truth, swathed and bandaged in this hieroglyphic dress. And one known truth, thus prepared, is then "made use of, to pass off a thousand nothings with." There is not, and in consistency with the first principles of this philosophy, there cannot be, any attempt at ratiocination. It is a string of assumptions, and of assertions of the most unqualified and dogmatic kind. The reader cannot have failed to remark, in the extracts we have given, the peculiar kind of generalization in which M. Cousin habitually indulges. Because England is an island, therefore every thing in England stops short of its proper development, and England can make no valuable contributions to science. Because in religion, God is ever thing and man is nothing, therefore no religious man can be a great man. Thus on all occasions he takes but a single step from the narrowest possible premises, from vague analogies, and sometimes from nothing more solid than verbal puns, to the most wide and peremptory conclusions. A hundred times in passing over his pages, we have been constrained to ask, is this philosophy, or is it poetry? It can surely make no pretensions to the one, and it is but sorry stuff, if meant for the other.

But the philosophical defects of this system, do not constitute its chief point of repulsion. We have a wide charity for what seems to us nonsense, and we can even extend an amiable and silent tolerance to the pretensions of those who utter it, to be the depositories of all wisdom. But when this nonsense begins to ape the German impiety, when it openly professes to cast off all subordination to religion, and prates in dogmatic superiority to divine revelation, we cannot but lift up our solemn protest against it. It has been made sufficiently evident that the philosophy of M. Cousin removes the God of the Bible, and substitutes in His stead, a philosophical abstraction; that it rejects the Scriptures, and thus robs as of our dearest hopes; and that, in common with other like systems, it erects a false standard in morals, and confounds the distinction between right and wrong. We cannot therefore behold in silence the efforts which are making to introduce this system of abominations among us.

It has already made some progress. The Introduction to the History of Philosophy was translated and published in 1832, by M. Linberg. The first edition of the Elements

of *Psychology* was published in 1834, and having been adopted, as the translator informs us, "as a text-book in several of our most respectable colleges and universities," a new edition is now issued which has been expressly "prepared for the use of colleges." It might be well if the names of these most respectable colleges and universities were made known to the public. We should like to know which of our public seminaries of education has so far distinguished itself in point of science as to take, for its text-book on mental philosophy, an immethodized set of criticisms upon Locke. The work of M. Cousin does not pretend to the order and method of a scientific treatise; it only claims to be a criticism upon the defects and errors of the sensual Philosophy. It formed a part of the author's regular course of lectures upon the History of Philosophy of the 18th century. And has it really come to this pass with any of our most respectable colleges and universities, that they are using fragments of Historical treatises as text-books upon science? Do they also learn the Newtonian Philosophy from Clarke's criticisms upon Rohault's *Physics*? And is Varignon's reply to Rolle, their text-book upon the Differential Calculus?

But, for more urgent considerations than those of science, is it important that these most respectable colleges and universities should be known to the public. Most of the extracts which we have given from M. Cousin, have been taken from his *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*, and yet it will be seen that some of the worst of them have been furnished by what Dr. Henry has dignified with the title of *Elements of Psychology*. And this latter work implicitly contains them all, since it teaches, in their application to criticism upon Locke, the same principles which in other modes of their application, yield the results which we have exhibited. It should be known therefore what college or university dares assume the responsibility of instilling the principles of this book into the minds of the young men committed to its care. Where are these literary institutions that are so ambitious to commence the work of flooding the land with German infidelity and pantheism? If they are willing to undertake the work, they will doubtless, in a measure, succeed. There is something in this new philosophy which will recommend it to many, and especially to young men. It has the charm of novelty. It affects to be very profound. It puts into the mouths of its disciples a peculiar language, and imparts to them a knowledge which none others can at-

tain. It gives them the privilege of despising all others, and makes them incommensurable with any standard of criticism but their own. If pursued and pressed by argument, they have but to rail, as their master does, at "the paltry measure of Locke's philosophy," and ridicule the bounded, insular character of all science except that in which they are adepts. It flatters the pride of the youthful heart, it takes captive the imagination, and, a still more dangerous recommendation, it tends to lighten and remove the restraints of passion. It recognises no standard of right and wrong but the reason of man, and permits no appeal from the decisions of humanity to the authority of the one living and true God. While it retains the name of God, and does not therefore at once startle and shock the feelings like open atheism, it teaches its disciples to deify themselves and nature, and to look upon all phenomena alike, whether of the material universe or of the mind of man, as manifestations of the Deity. Every emotion of the heart is an acting forth of God, and every indulgence of a passion, however depraved, becomes an act of worship.* The man who exercises in any way, according to his inspired impulses, his body or his mind, even though God is not in all his thoughts, is really rendering to Him as acceptable service, as if his heart were filled with emotions of adoration and reverence. The forge of every smithy, as Thomas Carlyle has taught us, is an altar, and the smith, labouring in his vocation, is a priest offering sacrifice to God.

Such being the recommendations of this philosophy, it cannot be doubted that it will find many willing disciples, some attracted by one set of its charms, and some by another. If any of our most respectable colleges have engaged in teaching it, they will not find refractory pupils. But we warn them that when this system shall have worked out, as work it must, its pernicious and loathsome results; when our young men shall have been taught to despise the wisdom of their elders, and renounce the reverence and submission which the human intellect owes to God; when in the pride and vain glory of their hearts, they shall make bold question of the truths which their fathers have held most dear and

* See ample evidence of this base and diabolical tendency of the doctrine of pantheism, in an article in Professor Hengstenberg's Journal for November 1836, entitled, *Bericht über ein pantheistisches Trifolium*. For example, as we have said elsewhere, we learn, that Schefer and his compeers teach "that *sin* is the hither aspect of that which on the other side of the heart is entirely laudable."

sacred; when the Holy Bible shall be treated as the mere play ground of antic and impious fancies, and an undisguised pantheism shall spread its poison through our literature; then shall they who have now stepped forth to introduce this philosophy among us, be held to a heavy responsibility. Are these idle fears? They are at least real. We believe, therefore do we speak. And we point the incredulous to the gradations of folly and wickedness, through which this same philosophy has led the German mind. If neither the internal evidence of the system, nor the lights of ancient and modern experience, are sufficient for conviction, we can only appeal to the verdict that time will give. In the mean while every parent and guardian in the land, has an interest in knowing which of our colleges are making experiment of the effects of this philosophy upon the minds of the young men entrusted to their care.*

We have another alarming symptom of its progress among us, in the Address delivered in July last, by the Rev. Ralph Waldo Emerson, before the Senior Class in Divinity, at Harvard University. This Address is before us. We have read it, and we want words with which to express our sense of the nonsense and impiety which pervade it. It is a rhapsody, obviously in imitation of Thomas Carlyle, and possessing as much of the vice of his mannerism as the author could borrow, but without his genius. The interest which it possesses for us arises from its containing the application of the Transcendental Philosophy in the form of instruction to young men, about to go forth as preachers of Christianity. The principles upon which Mr. Emerson proceeds, so far as he states them, are the same with those of M. Cousin. We find the same conception of the Deity as the substratum of all things, the same attributes assigned to the reason, and the same claim of inspiration for every man. But here we

* How the writers of 'Young Germany' regard the religious tendencies of their coevals, may be gathered from the extravagant and wicked writings of Heine. After saying in his 'Allemagne,' that Pantheism was the ancient faith of the Teutons, and that "man parts not willingly with what has been dear to his fathers," he says (we ask that it may be duly noted), "Germany is at present the fertile soil of Pantheism; that is the religion of all our greatest thinkers, of all our best artists—and *Deism* is already destroyed there in theory. You do not hear it spoken of—but every one knows it. *Pantheism is the public secret of Germany.* We have in fact outgrown *Deism.*" Again, "*Deism is a good religion for slaves, for children, for Genevese, for watch-makers.*"—"Pantheism is the hidden religion of Germany; and this result was well foreseen by those German writers who, fifty years ago, let loose such a storm of fury against *Spinoza.*"—See *Quarterly Review*, Vol. LV. for December, 1835, pp. 7, 8, 12.

have a somewhat more distinct avowal of the results to which these principles lead, in their application to Christianity, than M. Cousin has seen fit to give us. What we had charged upon the system, before reading this pamphlet, as being fairly and logically involved in its premises, we have here found avowed by one of its own advocates. Thus we have said that if the notion which it gives us of God is correct, then he who is concerned in the production of any phenomenon, who employs his agency in any manner, in kindling a fire or uttering a prayer, does thereby manifest the Deity and render to him religious worship. This consequence is frankly avowed and taught by Mr. Emerson. Speaking of the "religious sentiment," he says. "It is a mountain air. It is the embalmer of the world. It is myrrh, and storax, and chlorine, and rosemary. It makes the sky and the hills sublime, and the silent song of the stars is it." And again, he tells us, "Always the seer is a sayer. Somehow his dream is told. Somehow he publishes it with solemn joy. Sometimes, with pencil on canvass, sometimes with chisel on stone; sometimes in towers and aisles of granite, his soul's worship is builded." He even admonishes us that the time is coming when men shall be taught to believe in "the identity of the law of gravitation, with purity of heart." To show that this tree of knowledge resembles that in Eden in one respect, that it has a tempter beside it, we have but to quote at random from Mr. Emerson's Address. "Man is the wonder-worker. He is seen amid miracles. The stationariness of religion: the assumption that the age of inspiration is past, that the Bible is closed; the fear of degrading the character of Jesus by representing him as a man, indicate with sufficient clearness the falsehood of our theology. It is the office of a true teacher to show us that God is, not was: that he speaketh, not spake. The true Christianity—a faith like Christ's in the *infinitude of man*—is lost. None believeth in the soul of man, but only in some man or person old and departed." He complains grievously of this want of faith in the infinitude of the soul; he cries out because "man is ashamed of himself, and skulks and sneaks through the world:" and utters the pathetic plaint, "In how many churches, and by how many prophets, tell me, is man made sensible that he is an infinite soul; that the earth and the heavens are passing into his mind; that he is drinking for ever the soul of God?" Miracles, in the proper sense of the word, are of course discarded. "The very word Mira-

cle, he tells us, as pronounced by Christian churches, gives a false impression. It is Monster; it is not one with the blowing clover and the falling rain." And when Christ spoke of miracles, it was only because he knew "that man's life was a miracle, and all that man doth." Jesus Christ is made the mere symbol of a man who had full faith in the soul, who believed in the infinitude of our nature, and who thus assists in admonishing us "that the gleams which flash across our minds, are not ours, but God's." Any man may now become Christ, for "a true conversion, a true Christ is now, as always, to be made by the reception of beautiful sentiments."* There is not a single truth or sentiment in this whole Address that is borrowed from the Scriptures. And why should there be? Mr. Emerson, and all men, are as truly inspired as the penmen of the sacred volume. Indeed he expressly warns the candidates for the ministry, whom he was addressing, to look only into their own souls for the truth. He has himself succeeded thus in discovering many truths that are not to be found in the Bible; as, for instance, "that the gift of God to the soul is not a vaunting, overpowering, excluding sanctity, but a sweet natural goodness like thine and mine, and that thus invites thine and mine, to be, and to grow." The present mode of interpreting Christianity, even under the form of Unitarianism, he abhors as utterly repugnant to reason, and insufficient for the wants of our nature; he stigmatizes it as a historical traditional Christianity, that has its origin in past revelations, instead of placing its faith in new ones; and "like the zodiac of Denderah, and the astronomical monuments of the Hindoos, it is wholly insulated from any thing now extant in the life and business of the people." He treats Christianity as a Mythos, like the creeds of Pagan Greece and Rome, and does not even pay it sufficient respect under this aspect to be at the trouble of interpreting for us more than a few of the hidden meanings that lie concealed under its allegorical forms. In a word, Mr. Emerson is an infidel and an atheist,

* "Our world," says Lichtenberg, a witty German philosopher, "will yet grow so refined, that it will be just as ridiculous to believe in a God, as now-a-days in *Ghosts*. And then after a while, the world will grow more refined still. And so it will go on, with great rapidity, to the utmost summit of refinement. Having attained the pinnacle, the judgment of the wise will be reversed; knowledge will change itself for the last time. Then—and this will be the end—then shall we believe in *nothing but Ghosts*. We shall ourselves be like God. We shall know that essence or existence is and can be nothing but—a phantom."—*Vermischte Schriften*. B. I. S. 166.

who nevertheless makes use, in the esoteric sense of the new philosophy, of the terms and phrases consecrated to a religious use.* We have at least to thank him, on behalf of those whose eyes might not otherwise have been opened, for giving us so distinct and ample an illustration of the kind of service which M. Cousin professes himself willing to render to Christianity by means of his philosophy. We would call public attention to this Address, as the first fruits of transcendentalism in our country. We hold it up as a warning evidence of the nature of the tree which has produced it.

We know not with what degree of favour Mr. Emerson's rhapsody was received by those to whom it was addressed; but we are pleased to learn that it was offensive to the authorities of the university. Professor Ware has since delivered and published a sermon, containing an earnest and strong defence of the personality of the Deity.† In obvious allusion to Mr. Emerson, he thus expresses his opinion, "Strange as it may seem to Christian ears that have been accustomed to far other expressions of the Divinity, there have been those who maintain this idea; who hold that the principles which govern the universe are the Deity; that power, wisdom, veracity, justice, benevolence, are God, that gravitation, light, electricity, are God." We noticed too, some months since, in one of our public papers, a severe rebuke of Mr. Emerson, which was attributed to another of the Professors of the university.‡ This then cannot be one of "the most respectable colleges and universities," which have adopted the *Elements of Psychology* as their text-book on mental science.§

* It is within the compass of the transcendental philosophy to accommodate itself to any form of religion, and appropriate its language. Schelling himself, and some of his disciples, who had been educated in the Protestant faith, embraced, it is said, the Romish religion, and formed within its pale, a sort of inner church, whose symbol and watchword was the name of the Virgin Mary. We have shown it among the Ophites, the Soofies, and the Chinese. Mr. Bancroft has with distinctness laid it open in the scheme of early Quakers, (*History*, Vol. II. chap. 16.) and it is now proffered to us by a clergyman of a church, to say the least, as little tinctured with this sort of poison as any in Christendom.

† *The Personality of the Deity.* A Sermon, preached in the Chapel of Harvard University, September 23, 1838. By Henry Ware, Jr., Professor of Pulpit Eloquence and the Pastoral Care. Published at the request of the members of the Divinity School. Boston. 1838.

‡ A paragraph has fallen under our eye, while writing this, which informs us that this same Mr. Emerson has received so much encouragement for what are softly called, "his daring and imaginative speculations," from the people of Boston, that he is now engaged in the delivery of a Course of public Lectures upon them.

§ Since the body of this article was completely written, we have received the *Christian Review*, of Boston, in which there is a notice of the system of Cousin.

It is suited to excite a feeling of surprise, not unmingled with sorrow, that a system of philosophy, which in its immediate and natural results is indignantly repudiated by Unitarians, should be urged upon us, with high praise of its merits, by an accredited minister, and a Doctor in Divinity, of the Protestant Episcopal Church. We are willing to believe that he knows not what he is doing; that fascinated by the first charms of the new philosophy, or perchance dazzled by the brilliancy of a correspondence with a Peer of France and the great founder of Eclecticism, he is not able to see the end from the beginning. But this excuse, the only one that we can make for him, increases our apprehension. M. Cousin informs him, in a letter which has been given, in several different forms, to the public, that he "shall watch with the liveliest interest, the progress of philosophy in America," and that in one of the works which he intends yet to publish, he "will endeavour to be useful to America." In the mean time, he says to Dr. Henry, "it is with great pleasure that I see you resolved to establish yourself in the state of New York, where public instruction is so far advanced, but where philosophy is yet so very languishing; it will be *your duty* to re-animate it, to give it a strong impulse." Dr. Henry has taken care to inform the public that he has been honoured with this commission from the great head of the sect; it has been published and re-published until the whole nation have learned that he has been consecrated by no less a personage than M. Cousin, to the duty of re-animating our philosophy. Can he now abandon this work, and leave the duty assigned him to be performed by any meaner hand? We fear not. We fear that if any misgivings should cross his mind, they will give place to assurance with the arrival of the next packet that shall bring a letter and a presentation copy of some new work from M. Cousin, or even at the very thought of such an arrival.

If our augury should prove right, we too will watch his labours. We read the Introduction to the History of Philosophy, and the Elements of Psychology, upon their first appearance, but we kept silence because we did not wish in any degree to draw public attention to them until evidence was afforded that they were read. We now have this evidence, and have felt it our duty to be no longer silent. But, having

We are encouraged by these signs of healthful resistance, and corroborated in our judgment, by finding that the author of this sound and conclusive review, who has evidently seen the monster in its native German forests, recognises its tracks in the attempts of M. Cousin.

done so, we gladly desist from the attempt to trace the pedigree or indicate the family traits of these various systems. Be they Indian, Teutonic, or French, we regard them alike with fear, as if some demon were bent on playing fantastic tricks with poor, proud, purblind man. We pretend not, as we have said, to comprehend these dogmas. We know not what they are: but we know what they are *not*. They are not the truth of God; nay, they gainsay that truth at every step. They are, if any thing can be, profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science *falsely so called*.* So far as received, they rob us of our most cherished hopes, and take away our God. No one who has ever heard such avowals can forget the touching manner in which pious as well as celebrated German scholars have sometimes lamented their still lingering doubts as to the personality of God. But while these systems rob us of our religious faith, they despoil us of our reason. Let those who will rehearse to us the empty babble about reason as a faculty of immediate insight of the infinite; we will trust no faculty which, like eastern princes, mounts the throne over the corpses of its brethren. We cannot sacrifice our understanding. If we are addressed by appeals to consciousness, to intuition, we will try those appeals. If we are addressed by reasoning, we will endeavour to go along with that reasoning. But in what is thus offered, there is no ratiocination;† there is endless assertion, not merely of unproved, but of unreasonable, of contradictory of absurd propositions. And if any, overcome by the *préstitige* of the new philosophy, as transatlantic, or as new, are ready to repeat dogmas which neither they, nor the inventors of them can comprehend, and which approach the dialect of Bedlam, we crave to be exempt from the number, and will contentedly abstain for life from "the high priori road."‡ The more we have looked at it, the more we have been convinced of its emp-

* The original is pregnant: τὰς βεβήλους κenoφωνίας καὶ ἀντιθέσεις τῆς λευδωνύμου γνώσεως.

† Bretschneider, though a German, seems to have felt this. "It would be unreasonable," says he of Schelling, "to demand a *proof* of such a system. For as to *prove*, means but this—to deduce something true, from something else previously known as true, there can here be no such thing as proof from higher principles, since we seek the *first truth* from which all others are deduced." Bretsch. Grundasicht, p. 7.

‡ Even the Critique of Kant, which was rational and common place when set by the side of our recent philosophy, was by Herder regarded as so extravagant, that in his answer to it, he cites from Swift's Tale of a Tub, the ninth section, being "A digression concerning the original, the use and improvement of *Madness* in a Commonwealth." Herder, Vol. ii. p. 223, ff.

tinness and fatuity. It proves nothing; it determines nothing; or where it seems to have results, they are hideous and godless. Moreover, we think we speak the sentiment of a large body of scholars in our country, when we say, that if we must have a transatlantic philosophy, we desire to have it in its native robustness and freshness. We do not wish to have it through the medium of French declaimers, or of the French language, than which no tongue is less fit to convey the endless distinctions of the German. We wish to have it before it has undergone two or three transmutations; not from subalterns but from masters.* We do not wish to have a philosophy already effete, long since refuted, and heartily denounced by the best men in the country of its origin; and above all we do not wish to have a philosophy which shall conduct our young scholars into the high road to Atheism. We learn with pain that among the Unitarians of Boston and its vicinity, there are those who affect to embrace the pantheistic creed. The time may not be far off, when some new Emerson shall preach Pantheism under the banner of a self-styled Calvinism; or when, with formularies as sound as those of Germany, some author among ourselves may, like Dinter, address his reader thus, *O thou Son of God!*† For the tendency of German philosophizing is towards impious temerity. We have long deplored the spread of Socinianism, but there is no form of Socinianism, or of rational Deism, which is not immeasurably to be preferred to the German insanity. In fine, we cleave with more tenacity than ever to the mode of philosophizing which has for several generations prevailed among our British ancestors; and especially to that Oracle in which we read, what the investigation of this subject has impressed on us with double force, that God will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent; that the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and that when men change the truth of God into a lie, he will give them over to a reprobate mind.

* 1. *Witch*. Say, if thou'dst rather hear it from our mouths,
Or from our masters.

Macbeth. Call *them*, let me see them.

† Evangelische K. Zeitung, 1836, p. 569.



ART. IV.—*Fragments from the Study of a Pastor.* By Gardiner Spring, *Pastor of the Brick Presbyterian Church in the City of New York.* Vol. I. New York: John S. Taylor. 1838. 12mo. pp. 160.

IN taking notice of this little volume, nothing is further from our endeavour than to introduce the author to the attention of our readers; for among many able ministers of the Lord Jesus Christ, there are few in our country more widely or more favourably known than Dr. Spring. It is his happiness to have laboured long in one city, and for one church; and this alone, in his case, and a few that are like it, affords a presumption in favour of those who have weathered the storms of the last fifteen years, which have unsettled a thousand pastors. In former times—and we make the remark of our own country—there was something so tender and binding in the pastoral tie, that it was often viewed under the figure of a marriage; and to break it was a matter for long advisement, hesitation, and tears. The aged clergyman could look from the pulpit over a whole generation of whom he had baptized almost every one; whose parents he had not merely addressed but educated, and, by a regular system of instruction that is almost precluded by our present habits, had nourished up in sound doctrine. Who can say how much more mightily the word fell from the lips of one who had walked for many years among its hearers; or how much more reverent was the regard of youth towards the man who had consigned their fathers to the grave with solemn rites; or how much more cordial the counsels to the dying from one whose smile and hand had offered the same paternal aid, for a thousand times! It was good thus to dwell among one's 'own people:' and we shall be slow to believe that any of the boasted advantages of novelty or excitement can ever indemnify for the total absence of these permanent and healthful connexions.

The work of a bishop is a good work; it is, we heartily believe, the best work on earth. No chair of science or literature however conspicuous, no brilliancy of authorship, no vigorous activity in even the best public enterprises, can for a moment be placed in competition with the office of an able minister of Jesus Christ. None are more blind than they who willingly forsake it, whether for the pursuit of

learning and fame, or for the baser covetousness of farms and merchandise. It is a good work, and best of all when it is successfully carried on for years in the same place and among the same hearers. Many a man can make a great impression in a new place, with the few picked discourses of twenty years; or excite a temporary enthusiasm as he itinerates from state to state with a series of his choicest labours. Many a flaming zealot can burn brightly for two years, or even for three, supposing an uncommon supply of oil in his vessel, but to be a burning and shining light in a high place for the best part of a life time, is so far from being an ordinary attainment, that we seriously fear some of our young probationers do not even set it before them as a definite object of pursuit. Preachers as well as people are implicated in the faults which lie at the bottom of this condition of things; but while we would not absolve either the one or the other, we do not feel called upon at this time to trace the unfortunate fact to its real causes. That it is a fact that the term of pastoral connexion is shorter than it used to be, is not, we believe, denied. That this is a great evil, it would be very easy to show. When, therefore, in looking over the churches, our eyes alight on one and another who has been able to maintain his ground, and not only so, but to gather influence every hour, we are irresistibly impelled to say Happy shepherd! happy flock! and to inquire wherein this great strength lieth. It was therefore with much pleasure that we saw this book of fragments announced, as hoping to have some of our inquiries answered.

Dr. Spring has not given many printed sermons to the world, and what he has here offered has nothing of the pulpit about it: but seems, as he says, to be literally small detached portions collected by an occasional employment of those leisure hours and fragments of time which have remained after the more serious duties of the week have been discharged. In surveying the Table of Contents we were at once arrested by the fourth title, namely, the Letter to a Young Clergyman; and it has not disappointed our expectations. It is such a letter as every young clergyman might rejoice to receive at the outset of his race: happy would it have been for many of us if we had adopted its principles in years long past! It is the scope of this Letter to set the preaching of the gospel in its true light; to magnify the preacher's office, and to rescue it from the degradation into which some have in late years sought to sink it, as compared with certain other

ministerial functions. "I know not," says the author, "how you can more magnify the pastoral office, than by exalting, and performing acceptably and profitably, *the appropriate services of the sacred desk*. By far the most important part of your labours will be found in the duties which devolve upon you as a *public teacher*." This, with the argument that follows, commands our assent; and we are glad to see it thus boldly declared from a source which no man can undervalue as incompetent or inexperienced. There is nothing in these sixteen pages which we would not here joyfully insert, but that we respect Mr. Taylor's copyright. Dr. Spring goes on to point out the ordinance of preaching as one of the great peculiarities of Christianity, unknown among the heathen priests and philosophers, and affording to true religion its self-perpetuating power; the heritage of the poor, and the light of the world. What is next said about the indisposition of people to read the best of books is all too true; though it seems not to be sufficiently considered even by our most benevolent and philanthropic book-makers and tract-distributers. There is no sufficient provision made to generate a taste for reading, without which millions of books, however duly scattered, will be but as loaded tables spread before a loathing multitude: on the other hand, there is, and under the Christian dispensation always will be, a taste for hearing. "Even the most intelligent portion of the reading community derive their religious instructions from the sacred desk. Few, very few of them are readers of religious books. Other streams there are; but a well furnished pulpit is the fountain of religious knowledge. I have no doubt that the public instructions of the sanctuary mould the moral intellect and character of men more than any other, and all other causes combined."

"Can this be doubted, if we look at the real state of the case? Think of such men as Edwards, or Witherspoon, or Davies, or Chalmers, having access to some five hundred, or two thousand minds, two or three times in each week;—minds that are broad awake, and perhaps intensely interested! Such a preacher puts a volume of well digested instruction upon subjects the most deeply interesting and important that can be conceived, not into the hands of a solitary individual, or of a family, but simultaneously into the hands of hundreds. He does this one hundred and fifty times a year. Who does not see that if his own mind be taught of God, and laboriously disciplined, and liberally furnished, and if he is faith-

ful to his trust, an immense amount of truth must thus be poured upon the benighted intellect of men, even within the short compass of a very few years? Let such a ministry be widely and densely scattered throughout the land, delivering the truth, *not in the enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power*; and how soon would it bloom like Eden and become as the garden of the Lord! Not to a village, a city, or an extended district, would such a ministry confine its influence; but, like the sun, its going forth would be from the end of the heaven, and its circuit would be unto the ends of it; and nothing would be hid from the heat thereof."

There are perhaps some of our readers who will be at once disposed to exclaim, that in all this there is nothing new, and that they have always conceded to the preaching of the gospel this importance. But these very persons, will possibly find, on a more careful reconsideration of the subject and of themselves, that they have been accustomed to set other ministerial performances higher than that of preaching; and, if they happen to have any personal concern in clerical employments, that they have allotted a meager portion of their time to direct preparation for the pulpit. To all such we address the words of our experienced author, believing that, with the discriminations which he premises, they are precisely what are needed by our young preachers.

"In the whole course of your ministrations therefore, let your mind be directed toward that department of labour to which it must always be mainly applied. Aim early, aim constantly to furnish yourself to become a preacher. Every thing you do, or leave undone, should have influence on your usefulness as a preacher. Instruction from the pulpit is to be your great business. It is a part of a minister's duty, which holds the first place, and which may never be yielded to any other. No other contributes so much to his usefulness. Other duties he has. He must visit the sick and the dying. He must bind up the broken hearted in the house of mourning. He must lift his consolatory and warning voice in the land of silence and amid the memorials of the dead. He must be watchful too, how he neglects to cultivate those social affections whose cheerful and benignant influence the piety of the gospel elevates and purifies, and which wind their way into the kindest sympathies of those he serves. But after all, he must remember that his great business is to prepare for the public service of the house of

God. In no other ought he to be, and for no other does he need to be so well furnished. Nothing may interfere with his duty of preparing for the Sabbath. Next to actual immorality and the want of personal religion, there is no such defect in a minister's character as deficiency in his public instructions. I look upon the minister who neglects the wants of the whole body of his people from a false regard to the wants of a single family, or a single individual, as criminally unfaithful to his high and holy trust. Judge ye whether it is the more profitable to discourse instructively, appropriately, tenderly, with a single family, or to discourse instructively, appropriately, tenderly, with the assembled tribes of God's Israel! I would not have you depreciate pastoral visitation. God forbid! But I would have you appreciate the paramount duties of the Sanctuary. A minister should *never* leave the place of study and prayer, except for the performance of duties which do not interfere with his preparations for the pulpit. I have known men who devoted five days in the week to pastoral visitation, and satisfied their consciences with a single day's preparation for the Sabbath. And I have heard their congregations exclaim, *My leanness! my leanness! wo unto me!* And I have seen their once verdant and prolific field of labour becoming like the heath in the desert."

This is not mere argument; it is testimony; and what our author has heard and seen, we have also heard and seen, and that in many places. No differences among congregations can be more marked than such as have this origin. The collected intellect of a whole people is under a perpetual process of elevation, and their capacity for very high attainment in theological science, as well as in spiritual religion, is constantly expanding, when they come several times a week for years together to listen to a man who is devoting his heart and powers to the acquisition of knowledge for them; who studies and thinks for them; who penetrates for them into the darkest, deepest, richest mines of the Bible, and daily brings them things new and old from pregnant veins that are all unknown alike to pastor and flocks of those who are content to nibble at the surface; and when on the other hand the preacher sees, knows, feels at every utterance of the word that he is pouring out his new and precious discoveries in bible-study into the minds of an eagerly attentive people. Such preachers, such hearers there were among one Presbyterian ancestors, as among the Calvinists of the Re-

formed churches generally. Their discourses were unwieldy and formal, often heterogeneous and uncouth; but they were full of matter, full of argument, full of the scriptures. Their gold had not passed under the hammer, their jewels, if uncut, were innumerable and sparkling. They worked for this. There was meaning in the appellation which they so often used,—they were *painful ministers*; their studies were consequently magazines of good things for their hearers, like Hezekiah's 'treasuries for silver and for gold, and for precious stones, and for spices, and for shields, and for all manner of precious jewels.' And when our diminutive theologians complain of the high discourse, and, as to them it seems, overladen argumentation, and abstruse inquiry of Howe, Baxter, Bates, Owen, Flavel, and the like, let them remember that they preached to congregations who had grown up under just such discipline, who had never lived on a milk-diet since their spiritual nonage, and who felt in their masculine health that strong meat *belongeth* to them that are of full age, even those who *by reason of use* have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil. Such use they had, carrying their bibles to church, verifying every citation; and the pulpit-men of that day were not cautious of multiplying texts, as if these would spoil the ambitious rounding of a sentence or lest the *callida junctura* of a paragraph should be broken in upon by the words of the Spirit. These sermons were sometimes rough, but they were full; each of them was, as Hall said of Foster, 'a lumbering wagon of gold:' and they were so because the preacher *sought* to find out acceptable words, ('words of delight'), and that which was written was upright, even words of truth. They did not expect, that after a week spent in lounging, or in gay company, or in mere human science or elegant letters, or in the farm, or the nursery, or the stock-market, or the shambles, they should by special inspiration be enabled to give their people what God or they could approve. They could not in conscience rely on mouldy skeletons of ancient sermons, brought out from the charnel house of the drawer or barrel, as bones that are 'very dry;' nor yet on the extemporaneous gush of a voluble tongue pouring out thoughts which took longer to deliver than they had taken to conceive. No: their opinion was like that expressed by good old John Norton of Boston, who used to say in his diary, *Leve desiderium ad studendum; forsam peccato admisso*; or that of Charnock, who replied to the importunity of his friends, "It cost Christ his life to

save, and what if it cost me *my* life to study for him?" Or of Thomas Shepard, another father among the pilgrims, who in still stronger terms declared: "God will curse that man's labours, that lumbers up and down the world all the week, and then upon Saturday in the afternoon, goes to his closet; when, as God knows, that time were little enough to pray in, and weep in, and get his heart into a fit frame for the duties of the approaching Sabbath." From the instructions of such men the Reformed churches gained a strength which even the palsy of our modern day has not been able wholly to destroy; and when we find young preachers summoned to something like the old preparation for conflict, by one who knows the weight of the armour, it stirs up our souls within us like the sound of the trumpet.

Dr. Spring avows the hesitation with which he enters upon the delicate task of suggesting the best methods of preparation for the pulpit. None but a very ignorant or a very self-sufficient man could dream of enjoining his own plans to every one. Indeed, as no really able preacher sermonizes exactly like any body else, so no two methods of preparation can be exactly alike, except among pitiable imitators. The individuality and subjective character of a man must let itself out, before he can ever do any thing great: he must be himself. And therefore we shall never think of wasting argument upon the race of dictators, who maintain that every sermon must be written out in full, or on the other hand that no sermon should be written out in full; until we alight on one of them who shall preach as ably and successfully as Whitefield and Hall who never wrote, or as Edwards and Davies who wrote always; and as silently shall we listen to all prescriptions that discourses should have no declared partition, or that each shall have just as many 'heads' as Cerberus. For talents differ, modes of thought, feeling and elocution differ, auditories differ, and therefore preparation will differ. But preparation of some sort, and that stated, laborious, life-long preparation, there must be; and we are grateful to Dr. Spring for the hints he gives, which are applicable in their spirit to all the diversities of preliminary labour; these hints are far too good to be omitted.

"The youthful ministry are very apt to be determined in their selection of subjects by their own resources; whereas a rigid determination, so far as is possible, to furnish *appropriate* instruction, while it would necessarily augment their resources, would commend them to every man's conscience

in the sight of God. I need not tell you that a preacher needs a *Common Place Book*, as much as an antiquary, or a statesman; and that the more it is enriched, the more certainly will he give variety and richness, as well as tenderness and power, to his illustrations of God's truth. I am confident that I have been the loser by inattention to this article until comparatively a late period in my ministry. You will of course also have your *Text Book*, where you will note down from time to time such subjects for sermons as strike you, and where you will make references to such valuable thoughts as may fall in your way in the course of your general reading and reflection. If I mistake not, you may find the following hint of some service. In your daily and careful study of the Scriptures, you will find now and then favoured hours, when light shines upon the sacred page; when your heart burns within you; when your mind is active, and almost every paragraph and clause suggest a topic and a method for a sermon. I have found it important to make the most of such seasons, even by turning aside from my projected labours and employing several hours together in sketching plans for future discourses. The fruit when ripe must not only be shaken from the tree, but stored away with care for future use, otherwise it will wither and become unsavoury. Do not trust to memory to retrace these thoughts, but commit them to writing, so that without labour you can call them up when you need them. Such skeletons will always come to good service; and when well elaborated, will rarely disappoint your first vivid impressions. I have known ministers who were perpetually complaining for want of subjects for their public discourses; but I cannot but think that you will rarely be at a loss for subjects, if you are habitually and prayerfully familiar with *the Bible*; but rather will your Text Book be always rich, and far in advance of your necessities. *We* become exhausted without much difficulty; *the Bible* never.

“If you *write* your sermons, which I strongly recommend, never allow yourself to prepare more than one written discourse a week. One sermon a week, well planned, well digested, carefully written, and faithfully applied, is labour enough for any man who allows himself any time for intellectual improvement. One such sermon a week will enable you to draw upon your Text Book for two or three others without much preparation. In your most laboured discourses, let the force of your mind and the ardour of your heart be

laid out in the application of your subject. Ministers often fail in this, and it is a sad failure. In a word, make every discourse as good as you can make it. Sure I am, my dear brother, that if you are like the writer of this letter, you will find defects enough in your best performances to fill you with discouragement."

On one of these sentences it would be easy, as it might be useful, to say more; it is a golden aphorism: *WE become exhausted*—the BIBLE, *never*. Here we have indicated the genuine source not only of richness but of variety. We may pardon and pity the preachers of a soulless "creed outworn," whose ministers are flying from preaching to politics, and whose whole system is a grand negation of fundamental truth, when they tell us, as does the Rev. Orville Dewey, that the pulpit wants variety, and that "it is made dull by the restriction and reiteration of its topics."* We do not think any orthodox Bible-student will ask a wider range of subjects than the scriptural body of evangelical doctrine. Our most lively, interesting, and never-tiring sermonizers are those whose discourses are most biblical; while the most jejune and self-repeating are such as fly from the investigation of the sacred text, in its trains of argument, and infinite flow of history. Instead of a Common Place Book of Heads in Theology, we would open before every man the Bible as his Common Place Book: his series will then be large enough. "He who preaches upon *subjects in divinity* (we now quote Bishop M'Ilvaine), instead of passages of Scripture, fitting a text to his theme, instead of extracting his theme from his text, will soon find that, in the ordinary frequency of parochial ministrations, he has gone the round, and traced all the great highways of his field, and what to do next, without repeating his course, or changing his whole mode of proceeding, he will be at a great loss to discover. Distinct *objects* in the preacher's message, like the letters in his alphabet, are few—few when it is considered that his life is to be occupied in exhibiting them. But their combinations, like those of the letters of the alphabet, are innumerable. Few are the distinct classes of objects which make up the beautiful landscapes under the light and shadows of a summer's day. The naturalist, who describes by *genera* and *species*, may soon enumerate them. But boundless is the variety of aspects in which they appear under all their diversities of shape, co-

* Moral Views of Commerce, &c. By Orville Dewey. Preface.

lour, relation, magnitude, as the observer changes place, and sun and cloud change the light. The painter must paint for ever to exhibit all. So as to the great truths to which the preacher must give himself for life. Their variety of combinations, as exhibited in the Bible, is endless. He who treats them with strict reference to all the diversities of shape, proportion, incident, relation, circumstance, under which the pen of inspiration has left them, changing his point of observation with the changing positions and wants of his hearers, allowing the lights and shadows of Providence to lend their rightful influence in varying the aspect and applications of the truth—such a preacher, if his heart be fully in his work, can never lack variety, 'so far as it is proper for one who is to 'know nothing among men but Jesus Christ and him crucified.' He will constantly feel as if he had only begun the work given him to do—furnished only a few specimens out of a rich and inexhaustible cabinet of gems."

This is an admirable illustration of the truth, which we have quoted from the work before us; a suggestion, we may observe as we pass, strikingly exemplified in the discourses of Melvill, recently presented to the American public by Bishop M'Ilvaine, whose further remarks we shall here subjoin :

"Melvill is strictly a preacher upon *texts*, instead of *subjects*; upon truths, as expressed and connected in the Bible, instead of topics, as insulated or classified, according to the ways of man's wisdom. This is precisely as it should be. The preacher is not called to deliver *dissertations* upon questions of theology, or *orations* upon specific themes of duty and spiritual interest, but expositions of divine truth as that is presented in the infinitely diversified combinations, and incidental allocations of the Scriptures. His work is simply that of making, through the blessing of God, the Holy Scriptures 'profitable for doctrine, reproof, correction, and instruction in righteousness.' This he is to seek by endeavouring 'rightly to *divide* the word of truth.' Too much, by far, has the preaching of these days departed from this expository character. The praise of *invention* is too much coveted. The simplicity of interpretation and application is too much undervalued. We must be content to take the bread as the Lord has created it, and perform the humble office of *distribution*, going round amidst the multitude, and giving to all as each may need, believing that he who provided it will see that there be enough and to spare, instead of

desiring to stand in the place of the Master, and improve by our wisdom the simple elements, '*the five barley loaves,*' which he alone can make sufficient 'among so many.'"

Such concurrence of writers and preachers in different branches of the church, as it regards both principle and practice, augurs well, and gives promise of returning vitality in American sermons. It is but a few years since we were in all the din and consternation of the new-measures; during this the pulpit was neglected, except when in the so-called "protracted-meeting" it was employed, not to instruct but to electrify, and when the serious exposition of scripture was sacrificed to a strain of scriptural oburgation and ill-bred menace, which was called pungent, close, and to the conscience. During this agitation, the regular stated instructions of God's house, such we mean as admit of being kept up with a healthful glow for years, and the deliberate education of the church in the full course of biblical knowledge which is the true end of the pastoral office, and which can be secured only by men mighty in the scriptures, and meditating in them day and night, were undervalued and set aside, in favour of a kind of harangue which needed no preparation, and which aimed at 'breaking down' the sinner as it was significantly termed. This whole bubble has burst. The leaders in this mighty revolution have slunk into corners, and those good and unstable or ambitious and mistaking men, whether preachers or professors or presidents, who were high in the praise of the Reverend Professor Finney or the Reverend President Mahan, are too happy to have the whole thing forgotten, and to have no inquiry made respecting the time and place at which they sorrowfully turned back from that hurried multitude which has since gone on to Perfection. This inundation has passed and receded, we hope for ever, but it has left its slime; and not only some of its canting phrases, but some of its opinions abide, and must be purged away. Do we not still hear many speak of *pastoral labour* as if the only proper labour of the pastor were his dealing with individuals or with families? Is there not still a craving for those paroxysms which to both preacher and people were an excuse for retiring from calm and spiritual labouring in God's holy truth? Is there not a readiness in many to believe that the old way of Christianity is an obsolete way, and that the spirit of the age requires high stimulation instead of never-ending instruction? Where these things may be affirmed with truth, there is much to be unlearned. We must honour

God's institution, and especially abide by his word, or we shall be liable, at the very next rise of the tide, to be swept away.

Let us say distinctly, we set a high value upon parochial visitation, and upon all proper instruction and advice to individuals. But by this we mean veritable religious visits by the pastor or elders of the church; such visits as Kidderminster received from Richard Baxter; but not the hasty calls of a clergyman, to gossip, hat in hand, on the weather and the news, or the more serious and protracted interviews of the clerical tradesman or politician in which hours are sacrificed to party or to avarice. And even of visits strictly religious, we are persuaded the demand of large congregations can never be satisfied; and the attempt to satisfy them is a yoke and a snare to many a conscientious servant of Christ. The shepherd should know his flock; he should be familiarly acquainted, if possible, with every individual of his hearers: but if he were to act out some of the principles which we have seen laid down by imprudent men, he would never have an hour with his books, and after all would fail to go through his routine to the satisfaction of himself or the parish. Those who complain most of the want of attention from their pastor, are often the very persons who are most disconcerted when he comes, and to whom pointed religious conversation is least welcome. No congregation should therefore complain of their minister, when they know him to be studying the Scriptures for their sakes, and when they are assured that his absence from their homes is not occasioned by any secular labours or amusements.

We have left ourselves no more space for the other articles of this volume, than to say, that they are remarkable for the characteristic traits of the author, seriousness, good sense, tenderness, and polish. The *Church in the Wilderness* is a felicitous apologue; and the smaller papers are attractive and edifying. As this is marked as the first of a series, we hope to greet similar productions again and again.

ART. V.—*General History of Civilization in Europe, from the fall of the Roman Empire to the French Revolution.* Translated from the French of M. Guizot, Professor of History to La Faculté des Lettres of Paris, and Minister of Public Instruction. First American, from the second London edition. New York: D. Appleton & Co. pp. 346.

THE new series of leading events which began with the birth of civilization in modern Europe seems destined to extend its widening progression to the end of time. All the preceding states of society are now seen to have been intrinsically defective, even in the rare cases of rapid and brilliant development; and if now the more civilized nations of the world have taken broader and firmer ground as the basis of their social order, a comparison of their present position with that of the primitive societies of Europe, may give them at once a pleasing sense of security and a joyful hope for their advancement.

The chief value of history lies in its faithful representations of the progress of human improvement. The great facts in the annals of the world are the pregnant indications of a progressive intellectual and moral movement, under a wise and righteous superintendence; and it is reading history with eyes that see not, to overlook the significance of the world's vicissitudes, and suffer the thoughts to adhere in the rigid surface of a bare narration. We feel a lively interest in directing the attention of our readers to the history of Europe as an illustration of the progress of the human mind. Although the subject in its general aspect is not new, yet at successive periods, it comes before us with new associations, and is adapted to produce new and useful impressions.

We return, therefore, our cordial thanks to Professor Guizot for his Lectures on the History of Civilization in modern Europe, and to the translator for giving them to the English reader. Whatever may be their imagined adaptation to meet a particular crisis in either Europe or America, they are full of instructive illustrations of the great principles on which real and permanent social order must, in any country and in any age depend. We contemplate, with satisfaction, the state of society, and the course of public thought which have given being to such a book. The appearance of this

work is an interesting social phenomenon. To say nothing of the inherent importance of the subject, or the internal excellence of the work, we regard the publication as the index of an advanced state of society. The very act of surveying the past with the eye of philosophy, implies a readiness if not an ability to draw gratifying comparisons between the past and the present. There is an evident propensity in the intellect of the present century, to test the purity and stability of the existing social systems of the world, and to appreciate their superiority over those of earlier date and briefer duration. It is a favorable omen. The progress of human society has furnished invaluable records of experience to instruct the present and all coming generations; and when these records are explored, and their contents digested and given to the world with the ability displayed in the work before us, we are prepared to anticipate inestimable good to the interests of mankind. Let the friends of humanity consult rather the dictates of a sound philosophy than their preference for favourite theories, let them reason, reflect and act, in their social relations, with the history of the social systems of the world before them, and their course will be attended with less noise, perhaps, and less display, but with more substantial prosperity, and brighter and surer prospects.

An intense desire to draw the attention of our readers to this book of M. Guizot, or to some such views of European history as he presents, has led us to consult that object in the preparation of this article. The work itself is a series of Lectures delivered by M. Guizot, in his capacity of a Professor of the Faculty of Letters, at Paris, and appear to constitute an introduction to a more extended course. We propose to ourselves the pleasing task of placing before our readers, in a condensed view, the outline of this animated, philosophical, and instructive History; presuming it will prove a more acceptable service to the public, than a discursive review of the work, with the selection of a few literal and isolated extracts.

The civilization of the different states of Europe is sufficiently uniform to permit its being collected under one distinctive head as European, and too various to be presented in the history of any single state. Civilization is one of the great moral facts pertaining to the history of the world; the great fact in which all others merge, and in which they find their importance. Hence, we judge of minor facts as they affect this greater one, and even overlook and forgive the

evils of some of the heaviest calamities of nations, if they have but aided the progress of civilization.

The common idea of civilization comprises two elements; the progress of society and the progress of individuals in improvements; the amelioration of the social system, and the development of the faculties of man. We should not recognise our common notion of civilization among a people enjoying only a satisfactory regulation of physical existence, while the moral and intellectual energies are repressed; where the people, like so many flocks of sheep, are carefully tended, but destitute of moral and intellectual activity; nor do we find it in many of the countries of Asia, where the people have less physical comfort, while the deficiency may perhaps be compensated by a stinted allowance of mental light, from which every sentiment of personal liberty is excluded; nor is that civilization which consists in the widest range of personal liberty, where disorder and violence reign, where might makes right, and the weak are oppressed by the strong—a condition of human existence, which once prevailed in Europe; nor, finally, do we discern it in the fullest extent of liberty, and a free acknowledgment of social equality, while there exists no general interest; where the people entertain few public ideas; where men live isolated, with little regard for society, and scarce a sentiment of its influence. No one of these states corresponds with our general idea of civilization. There must be advancement; a progressive development of human nature; improvement of the social system, and improvement in the condition and character of individual man.

The first step in our course will be, to seek out the elements of European civilization at the time of its birth, the fall of the Roman empire. We will then put these elements in motion, and follow their progress through the fifteen centuries which have since rolled away.

Before entering on the history of the civilization of Europe, let us notice one feature by which it is distinguished from all the instances of civilization which preceded it. Take any case of civilization antecedent to that of Europe, and we find it possessed by a single ruling principle. Each case seems to have emanated from a single idea. In Egypt and India the ruling principle was theocracy; in the commercial republics of Asia Minor and Syria, in Ionia, and Phoenicia, the ruling principle was democracy. There were frequent struggles, indeed, between different principles which sought

to prevail; but the war always terminated in the ascendancy of one, which then took sole possession of society, and imparted its hue and form to all the social institutions. This predominance of single distinct principles gave each instance of civilization a peculiar character, and led to different results. In Greece, the unity of the social principle produced a development of wonderful rapidity. The course was brilliant and short. Greece lived fast through her glory. The principle of her civilization seemed exhausted by its own development. In India and Egypt, by the prevalence of a different principle, society became stationary, monotonous, and torpid. The intellectual productions, also, of the different civilized nations, bear the character of unity which distinguished their civilization. The monuments of Hindoo literature, lately introduced into Europe, were all struck from the same die. Religious and moral treatises, history, poetry, all bear the same physiognomy. And even the literature and the arts of Greece were pervaded by this same remarkable unity.

But turn to modern Europe, and all the principles of social organization are found existing and acting together. Powers temporal, powers spiritual; theocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, democracy; infinite gradations of liberty, wealth, and influence, are here jumbled together, in continual struggle among themselves; no one being able to master the others, and take sole possession of society. You see the same variety of moral character and of sentiments. Opinions of all imaginable sorts crossing and limiting and modifying each other; the advocates of one extreme checked and restrained by the advocates of the opposite; an indomitable thirst for independence dwelling side by side with the greatest aptness for submission, a singular fidelity between man and man, with an imperious preference in each man for his own way. In literature and the arts how vast the diversity. Particular departments may not have reached the same perfection with the products of ancient civilization; but if Europe has not brought any single fruit to so high perfection, she has ripened an infinitely greater variety. Compare too, her long continued progression; not indeed with Grecian rapidity, but with far more than Grecian constancy and perseverance; having advanced for fifteen centuries, and still advancing, with a boundless career before her.

Here it is that European civilization reveals at once its distinctive character, and its immense superiority. It is a

civilization for the world; where various powers and principles incessantly intermingle and contend. It has cast off the special character; penetrated into the scheme of the universal providence, and prepared itself for general propagation among the nations of the earth.

This characteristic of European civilization can be discerned in its very cradle; at the moment of its birth, when the Roman empire fell. For what was the Roman empire? A mere assemblage of municipal institutions. Nations then were only confederations of cities. There was no country population, but slaves, or mere labourers. Rome extended her power in Europe, by conquering or founding cities. Hence Rome could conquer the world more easily than govern it; and an empire was attempted, which should bind the scattered society together. Between the reigns of Augustus and Dioclesian, the improvement of civil legislation arranged throughout the empire a chain work of subordinate functionaries, which knit the people to the imperial court, conveyed abroad the will of the government, and brought in the tribute and obeisance of the people. The incoherent assemblage of little republics, thus held together, acquired a sudden attachment to the central power, and sank rapidly into obedient respect for the sacred name of emperor; but in the fourth century, all these bonds were as suddenly broken; the provinces severally yielded to barbarian invasion, and no longer indulged concern for the common destiny. This crisis suggested the extraordinary idea of a representative system, as an instrument of reviving the patriotic sentiment, and preserving the unity of the empire. The call for a representative assembly of the provinces in the south of Gaul, was made by Honorius and the younger Theodosius in the year 418, but it received no response. The primitive nature of the society was opposed to it; the municipal principle everywhere re-appeared. The Roman empire had been formed of cities, and to cities it again returned.

There were then bequeathed to Europe by the ancient Roman civilization, these two elements of social organization: the municipality, and the empire; the idea of the city corporation, and the idea of imperial power. In intimate conjunction with these, came also another most important element, which had grown in the heart of Roman society; the *Christian Church*, with its independent government, its priesthood, its polity, and its revenues. It is not the Christian religion that is here intended, but the Christian

Church; an ecclesiastical institution, to be contemplated in a political view, in its relation to civilization. At first, a simple association of believers for the exercise and enjoyment of a common faith, with no formal creed, no settled rules of discipline, no body of magistrates; then, assuming a form of doctrine, rules of discipline, and a body of magistrates, still leaving the power in the general body of believers; then, thirdly, separating its clergy from the people, and making an uncontrolled and irresponsible government over the private members of the church. Here were trained men of great strength and zeal, who stood ready to catch the civil authority as it fell from the hands of the expiring municipalities, and who did, without being guilty of usurpation, and by the common law of nature, become gradually invested with immense temporal power and responsibility.

From this point we date the powerful co-operation of the church in the cause of European civilization. The church arose to exercise a moral power at a time when the world would else have fallen under mere brute force. She also, at that period, undertook the separation of temporal and spiritual authority, and revealed the true basis of the strictest and most extensive liberty of conscience; and thus, in the fifth century of her existence, conferred great benefit upon the cause of humanity. Would that she had not subsequently transcended that modest and useful sphere.

These three elements of Roman civilization, are now to be contemplated in that combination with barbarian principles, in which they dropped into European society, in the cradle of modern civilization. In the true picture of a barbarian, you perceive the pleasure of personal independence; of enterprise and adventure; degenerate, indeed, and developed as a gross passionate desire, in connexion with a brutal and stupid selfishness, and yet denoting some of the nobler elements of moral character. It was the pride of personal liberty, not the sentiment of political liberty; and therefore unknown to Roman society, and brought into European civilization by the rude barbarians of Germany. You perceive the features of the warrior; the foundation of a firm fidelity between man and man, and of a graduated subordination which grew into the aristocratic organization of the feudal system.

We have, then, before us, the three sources from which the elements of our society were derived; municipal society, the last remains of the Roman empire; Christian society; and

barbarian society. We find the love of the most absolute independence by the side of the most devoted submission; military patronage, with ecclesiastical domination; spiritual power and temporal power every where together; the canons of the church, the learned legislation of Rome, the almost unwritten customs of the barbarians; a co-existence of nations, of language, of manners, of ideas, of impressions, in endless diversity. What wonder that the progress of European society has been so slow and troublesome!

These elements of civilization thus combined and set in motion, we are to follow in their progress; and we enter first the dark age—the age of barbarism. Here we are met on the threshold with a simultaneous advancement of claims to the exclusive possession of power, and the agitation of the great question of political legitimacy. Theocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, and even the church; each, would found claims of precedence first on justice and right, then on antiquity, and hence the idea of legitimacy is not attached to monarchy alone, but appertains to all the elements of European society. From this simultaneous advancement of claims by all the principles, we conclude that, during the period of barbarism, Europe was under the sole dominion of no one of them. The dispute respecting which bore chief sway, proves that all existed together, while none so prevailed as to give society either its form or its name.

We find at this period four classes of persons: 1st, Freedmen, who depended on no superior; 2nd, *Lendes*, *Fideles*, *Antonstions*, &c. who were first connected with each other as companion and chief, afterwards as vassal and lord; 3rd, Freedmen; 4th, Slaves. These classes were not stationary, as to the persons who composed them; but individuals were constantly passing from one rank to the other. Property was also held in various ways. Institutions were unstable. Monarchy, aristocracy, and free institutions, all existed, but were subject to constant change. States also were created and suppressed, united and divided, and a confusion of principles, governments, nations, languages, formed the chief characteristic of barbarian Europe.

The period of barbarism closed with the termination of the invasion; at which time, the progress of civilization was hastened on by the natural aspirations of the people, the remembrance of Roman civilization, the Christian church, and the appearance of great men. These various causes led to several attempts of social organization: 1st, An attempt by

the barbarians themselves, in reducing their rude laws to writing; 2d, In Italy and the south of Gaul, there was a slight resuscitation of municipal order; 3d, In Spain the church undertook the work of civilization, and until the great invasion of the Saracens, her efforts were great and successful; in France, Charlemagne was the great promoter of civilization, and in England, Alfred the Great. But all these causes, however promising, were unsuccessful in putting an end to the period of barbarism, and establishing a general social organization. When the northern invasions had ceased, society gradually became more settled and secure. In the south, the Arabs had settled in Spain, and were still contending with the Christians; the Saracens still infested the coasts of the Mediterranean, but the career of Islamism was arrested. Meantime in the interior of Europe, the wandering life declines, populations become fixed, estates and landed possessions become settled; local attachments and little societies begin to be formed; on one hand, we see the proprietor settling in his domains, on the other, the subordination of services and rights pertaining to a military organization; and thus we perceive the feudal system oozing at last out of the bosom of barbarism.

Wherever barbarism ceased, feudalism prevailed; proving that, in the tenth century, the feudal system was the only social system practicable. Every institution—the church, the free community, royalty, accommodated itself to this new order of things. Churches became sovereigns and vassals, cities became lords and vassals, royalty was hidden under the feudal suzerain. Not that the feudal principle so universally prevailed; it was only the feudal form, under which the different social institutions respectively exercised their own principles. The church retained its theocracy, the free cities clung to their democracy, royalty to its monarchy; and all strove to free themselves from that system whose livery they were compelled to put on. But every thing became feudal in its aspect.

Under this system, as a great physical cause, Europe underwent an important change. The conquerors of the territory, once settled in cities, or moving in bands, were distributed at long distances apart, each isolated in his particular domain; carrying the government of society from the cities to the country, and splitting the public body into a thousand little sovereignties. The possessor of a fief plants himself in his castle, in the midst of his household, who are

now to be his companions; where at once begin to rise into importance the domestic relations, and especially the social character of woman. At the foot of the castle hill, stands a huddle of cottages, inhabited by the serfs, the cultivators of the feudal domain. Here religion has planted a church and a priest. Thus the Baron, the people of his domain and the priest, present us with the original outline of the feudal society.

The feudal family had its characteristics, which distinguished it from all other family systems, and which produced a social development peculiar to itself. The patriarch lived with his children and his servants, had the same occupations, led the same life. The head of the Scottish or Irish clan, separated himself from his servants, and while they were employed in supplying his wants, he lived in idleness, or in war. Yet their common parentage, their common remembrances and associations, created a moral tie, and a feeling of equality between the head and all the members of the clan. Not so the feudal family. The proprietor and his family are separate from the rest of the population, lead not the same life, claim not the same origin. The family is small, forming no tribe, but consisting of only the possessor of the fief, his wife and his children, linked together by domestic affections, and prepared to form, in the progress of their improvement, the domestic character and manners, and to give to the feudal possession a permanent identity by means of the principle of inheritance.

The lord of the domain considers the serfs as his property, indulging towards them, perhaps, those kindly feelings which the relation permits, yet not yielding to them, as men, either rights, guarantee, or society. Hence of all the despotisms which the world has known, the feudal despotism is the only one that has been the object of invincible and invariable hatred to the common people. It tyrannized over the destinies of men, without ruling in their hearts. The religious element of feudalism was no alleviation; the priest could do little to affect the mutual relation or conduct of lord and servant, being himself an inferior and under the sovereign control of the baron. The serfs were not known in any general society. Beyond the fief which sustained them they had no relations, no concern, either with persons, or government. They were no part of a nation, had no common country, no common destiny. But the possessors of fiefs held relations

to each other, and the attempt was made to build on these relations a body of general laws and institutions; in other words, to organize the feudal system. But there was no predominant will, to which the independent barons would submit; there was no united will of individuals to constitute a public power, and the laws had therefore no guarantee, and of course no stability.

Feudalism, therefore, while it produced elevated feelings and character in individual minds, accomplished little in favour of general society. It seemed indispensable as a step from barbarism; but was, in itself, radically vicious, and could neither regulate nor enlarge society. It permitted no substitution of public authority for private will; a substitution which is the chief element of social order. It produced an offspring of noble sentiments, of splendid achievement, of beautiful forms of humanity, but it every where opposed the establishment of social order, and the spread of general liberty.

The influence of the church upon modern civilization has been more powerful, perhaps, than her most violent adversaries, or most zealous defenders have supposed. It was the only institution which, in the fifth century, possessed youth and vigour. All others had the weakness of either infancy or old age. The church existed as an ecclesiastical corporation, a government of religion. It derived an immense force from its respect for equality, and the various kinds of legitimate superiority. It was the most popular society of the time, the most accessible; the only one which opened its arms to all the talents, to all the noble ambition of man. It was, indeed, her great error that she denied the rights of individual reason; and assumed the right of compulsion; that she undertook to govern human thought and opinions. Yet this error notwithstanding, where was there ever a society in which reason and conscience more boldly developed themselves than in the church? Witness her sects, her heresies, the fruit of individual opinions; the proof of the life and moral activity which reigned within her.

When the church erected herself amid the ruins of the Roman empire, and found herself surrounded by barbarian kings, between whom and herself there existed no connexion of interest, she felt herself in danger; and it became her policy to attach these barbarians to her interest. To accomplish this, she increased at once, and largely, the number of her imposing ceremonies, and surrounded herself with great pomp and splendour, to dazzle their senses, and excite their

imagination. And still further to preserve herself against barbarian violence, she announced anew and with increased emphasis, her principle of separation between temporal and spiritual power; and by the aid of this principle, she dwelt freely among those who felt little interest in her welfare.

From this desire for liberty, it was but a step to the desire of power. From independence she aspired to authority. Finding herself in possession of all the intelligence of the age, at the head of all intellectual activity, she very naturally would assume the general government of the world. Add to this, the miserable state of temporal government, at that epoch, when its power was mere brute force, and its moving spring a rapacious ambition; when the interpositions of spiritual authority in temporal affairs were often salutary and welcome to the oppressed and injured people, and seemed like the offices of heavenly pity intended for the refuge of the defenceless;—and we perceive ample cause for the success of the usurpations of the church. She always laboured, however, under this great disadvantage, of having no physical power of her own, and of being obliged to call in the aid of the secular arm, and borrow the civil power to enforce her own authority. Unfortunately also for the church she persisted in completing the separation between the governing and the governed. The independence of the clergy was in process of time fully established. The laity had no other concern with the government of the church than as mere lookers on. The people had, indeed, an influence upon the government, but no legal concern with it; and out of this circumstance arose many of the evils which have cost the church so dear. The clergy and [the laity were however bound together by the general dispersion of the clergy through the social system. From the thatched cottage of the husbandman,—from the miserable hut of the serf at the foot of the feudal chateau, to the palace of the monarch—there was everywhere a clergyman. The bishops, also, were mixed up with the feudal system, members, at the same time, of the civil and ecclesiastical government; and by these means a degree of sympathy was ever maintained between the clergy and the laity, while the legal separation of the two classes was complete.

The influence of the church on individual character and manners was confined chiefly to the bosom of her own society. For the instruction of the clergy she was anxiously alive. She excited and kept alive a general activity of mind by the

offer of her dignities to select individuals; but beyond this she did little for the mental improvement of the laity.

To the social state her influence was more beneficial. The great vices of the social world, particularly slavery, she perseveringly opposed. She laboured worthily for the improvement of civil and criminal legislation; preserving and defending those mild and rational ideas of justice which had been derived from Roman society, as well as those which she derived from her own code of divine morals. The system of penance, so far as the application of moral law was concerned, accorded with those notions of modern philosophy which make repentance and example the ends of punishment. And her steadfast opposition to the practices of violence and war, was calculated to ameliorate the social system by an infusion of gentleness and conciliation.

An immense influence has, then, been exerted on the moral and intellectual order of Europe by the Christian church. The progress of Europe has been essentially theological. Down to the time of Bacon and Descartes, theology was the blood in the veins of the European world. It possessed and directed the human mind; every idea bore its stamp; every question of philosophy, politics, history, was considered in relation to it; and even the mathematical and physical sciences were compelled to submit to its doctrines. Bacon in England, and Descartes in France, were the first who carried the human mind out of the pale of theology. The influence of the church thus kept up the salutary intellectual movement in Europe, and stamped upon that movement its own superior impress. It gave unprecedented extent and variety to the mental development of the world. The intelligence of the east was altogether religious. In Greece there was nothing religious. In Europe religious intelligence is mingled with all other knowledge; and thus the two great sources of human development, humanity and religion, have been open at the same time, and flowed in plenteous streams.

While we admit that the church has exerted a salutary influence on the moral and intellectual character of man, and largely contributed to ameliorate the social condition, we cannot deny that in a purely political view, her influence has been baneful. Her political spirit was either the spirit of theocracy or of imperial tyranny. In her weakness she sheltered herself under absolute power in the empire; in her strength she laid claim to that power herself; and whenever

a question arose between power and liberty, the church always took the part of despotism.

Look now at the several states of the church from the fifth century to the twelfth. First, she appears the church imperial. Just as the Roman empire fell, the church believed that she had conquered paganism and heresy; and thus attained the summit of her hopes. But she found herself among new pagans and new heretics; among Goths, Vandals, Burgundians, and Franks. The fall was great. She tried to re-establish the empire, and besought the barbarian kings to become emperors, and take the same relation to the church which had been taken by the Roman emperors. The struggle was in vain; and the church, like the civil world, sank into the arms of barbarism. This was her second state; and in this period came a new separation of the temporal power from the spiritual, that the church might again assume her independence; and there came also the establishment of monasteries, where religious men could defend themselves by peculiar sanctity against barbarian spoliations. Her next state was her connexion with the feudal system, divided and weakened, and dispersed among the independent fiefs, and struggling to keep herself together by some federating principle, yet without success. She lost her order and harmony, and even her moral character. In the eleventh century she entered upon her fourth state, that of a theocracy supported by monastic institutions. In this period the holy see was raised to the summit of its power, and strenuous efforts were made to reform the abuses which were prevailing in the church. Important advances were also made towards the attainment of intellectual liberty. A serious struggle occurred between the clergy and the advocates of free inquiry. This was the nature of the strife between Abelard and St. Bernard; and it was the great event of the twelfth century.

About this time, corporate cities begin to make a figure in history. Their previous existence indeed merits attention, but it was not till the eleventh or twelfth century that they performed any important part in the world, in connexion with modern civilization. Between the fifth and tenth century, the towns were neither in a state of servitude nor freedom. They suffered all the evils to which weakness is liable; they were a prey to the continual depredations of the strong; yet impoverished as they were they maintained a certain degree of importance. There was commonly a bishop, whose presence gave a sanctity to their independence; and there

were some valuable fragments of Roman institutions. But all seemed to decline. The bishops having incorporated themselves into the feudal frame, thought less of their municipal life, and the rising importance of agriculture drew the people out of the cities into the country; and thus from the fifth century to the time of the complete organization of the feudal system, the cities languished. Then they began to resume activity and importance. When society had become settled under the feudal system, the proprietors of fiefs began to feel new wants, and acquire some taste for improvement, and for the benefits of commerce and industry in the towns of their domains. The cities also afforded a refuge to fugitives from oppressive powers, and thus acquired accessions to their population in some instances, of high character and rank. They gradually grew, therefore, in strength, in wealth, and in the importance of their interests, and about the beginning of the eleventh century, broke forth in rebellion against the lordly and overbearing proprietors of fiefs. Each town arises in open resistance against its lord, and commences an enterprise against the neighbouring castle. The towns become confederate for the common benefit, and by united resistance are able to sustain a protracted struggle, till at length, both parties incline to peace; and Europe, particularly France, which had, for a whole century, abounded in insurrections, now abounded in treaties of peace and charters. As the royal power was frequently called upon to interfere in the quarrel, there arose a close connexion between the citizens and the king. By the enfranchisement of the cities a new general class of society was produced, the merchants, and little land or house proprietors of the cities. These were the elements of the present class of European citizens.

Then came the struggle between the different classes of population; and this struggle, perpetual and universal, is the grand characteristic of European civilization. In Asia, one class has completely triumphed, and the conflict of classes has resulted in the system of castes; and society has there become entirely stationary. In Europe, no class, thank God, has ever yet conquered and subjugated the others; and the continual conflict of ideas, interests, and manners, is an unquestionable source of the activity and the progressive development of European society.

We have now arrived at the crisis when the monarchical principle began to be decidedly developed. Until nearly

the twelfth century, the civilization of Europe was in a process of formation; then succeeded a period of attempts, and experiments, during which the different elements of society approach and combine, and prepare to act together, a period extending to the sixteenth century; after which came the period, in which human society in Europe takes a definite form, and proceeds with a rapid and general movement towards a clear and precise end; this is the period which began in the sixteenth century and is now pursuing its course.

The second of these periods is the one on which we now enter. The great event of this period was the crusades; an event which wrought an important change in the condition of nations.

They were universal; all Europe concurred in them. They were the first European event. In relation to each separate nation, they were a national event. All classes of society yielded to the same impulse, and the moral unity of nations was now for the first time made manifest.

There were two great causes which impelled Europe to the crusades, the *first* was moral, the impulse of religious feeling and belief. These enterprises were the continuation, and the height of the great conflict of Christianity with Mohammedanism. The *second* cause was social. The lapse of time, after the organization of society, discovered that the limits of human enterprise were too narrow; that the thoughts and energies of men aspired beyond their contracted sphere; and the people threw themselves into the crusades, as into a new state of existence, in which they had more space, and more variety. At the end of the thirteenth century these causes ceased to exist; and the crusades consequently came to an end; leaving, however, a new and distinct aspect upon the condition of the human mind. We observe an immense advance towards enlarged and liberal ideas. The crusaders became travellers. They observed different nations, different manners; and their minds were disengaged from their old and narrow prejudices. They saw in both Greek and Mussulman society, something superior to their own degree of civilization, and were struck with the riches and elegance they beheld on every side. They collected a vast amount of information, much of which was useful, and returned to their families, full of the remembrance of incidents, marvellous and often exaggerated by their own imaginations, yet expanding, by their natural tendency, the range of thought and interest. Religious doctrines

underwent no essential change; but thought had become more free, and religious creeds were not the only subjects which exercised the mind. The social state was partially revolutionized, by the necessity under which the feudal proprietors fell, of selling their fiefs to the kings, to raise money for the crusades. Property and power fell into fewer hands, and feudal power began to exist on a larger scale. The extension of great fiefs, and the consequent dependance of the smaller fiefs upon them for protection, were important results of the crusades in reference to feudalism. And as to the towns, the crusades created great civic communities, and gave to maritime commerce the greatest impulse it had yet received.

The European mind had now expanded beyond the exclusive dominion of the few contracted religious ideas, which had moved to the crusades; and the progress of the social relations had furnished a greater variety to life in Europe, and removed the necessity of going abroad for mere entertainment. Now kings began to see the road to political aggrandizement. The people saw the road to wealth open before them, and gave up foreign adventures to engage in industry. The feudal nobility only, not being disposed to industry, retained their former manners, and endeavoured to renew the crusades. All things seemed now to wear a new aspect as the effect of these remarkable movements. On the one hand we observe the emancipation of thought, on the other a general enlargement of the social sphere; more individual freedom, and more political unity. Society was drawn from a narrow road to follow broader paths, and European society assumed the form of *governments and nations*, the grand characteristic of modern civilization.

We are now to contemplate the connexion of monarchy with the progress of human society in Europe. When society had seemed to complete its organization, and government and people were the only objects of historical interest, the settled form of government in all the great European states was that of monarchy. It is a significant fact that we find monarchy holding the most prominent place, and the most general and permanent of all institutions, the one most difficult to preclude where it does not exist, and where it does exist, the most difficult to extirpate. It has penetrated every where and accommodated itself to all situations.

In surveying the effects of monarchy in modern Europe

we are not considering the effects of the individual will of a sovereign. We take monarchy as the personification of legitimate sovereignty; of the collective wisdom and will of the people. That there is a legitimate sovereignty, is the doctrine of every people; for they have always endeavoured to place themselves under its empire. Human nature must believe in legitimate sovereignty. All political philosophy labours to discover it. Theocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, all boast of having found the seat of legitimate sovereignty, and promise to place society under the authority of its rightful master.

European monarchy has been in some sort, the result of all the possible kinds of monarchy. The barbarian monarchy was essentially elective. The rulers were military chiefs, whose power was accepted by many of their companions; and who were obeyed as being the bravest and most competent to rule. As the families from which the monarchs were selected grew powerful, the election was more confined to them, until the course of things gradually gave rise to the idea of hereditary succession. Meanwhile, religion spread its sanctity over the origin of the ascendant family, and suggested the doctrine that kings were decendants of the Gods, and the proper objects of religious veneration. The monarchy of the Roman empire was the personification of the state; the emperor was the representative of the whole republic; as, in France, the sovereignty of the people was transferred to Napoleon; and the people, represented in him, were the real monarch. After three centuries of these monarchies had passed away, the principle began to assume a religious form, and the monarch began to be regarded as a representative, or delegate of God. These three kinds of monarchy, the barbarian, the imperial, the religious, made their appearance, in the fifth century, on the ruins of the Roman empire, and proceeded in their different courses.

In France, under the first race, barbarian monarchy, with some mixture of inheritance and of religious notions, remained predominant. In Italy, the imperial monarchy prevailed. In Spain, the monarchy was more religious. In England, it was essentially barbarian. In the eighth century, the principle began to assume a more uniform character; its varieties were more blended together, and especially did there enter into the composition a stronger infusion of the religious character. In the reign of Louis le Debonnaire the king fell into

the hands of the clergy, and a monarchy subordinate to religious authority was on the point of being established. Through the tenth and eleventh centuries the prevalence of the feudal system produced a fourth kind of monarchy, of the feudal stamp in which the king became in theory a *suzerain* over *suzerains*, a lord of lords. But in the twelfth century, the institution of monarchy began to assume the character of a great magistracy, whose office was to maintain peace in society, to protect the weak, and decide differences which could not otherwise be settled. Here originated the vital principle of modern monarchy. At different periods of history we observe the reappearance of all the varieties, each in its turn striving for the ascendancy; and while the clergy preached a religious monarchy, and the civilians contended for the imperial, and the nobility for the elective, or the feudal system, monarchy itself made them all contribute towards the advancement of its own power; and at last reduced all the elements of society to two:—the government and the nation.

All attempts to bring the various portions of society together without destroying their diversity failed. The attempts were very numerous and occupied the space of time during which the metamorphosis of European society was accomplished. Too many of them arose from selfishness and tyranny, yet some were pure and disinterested. They were of two kinds; one intended to exalt to supreme rule one of the social elements, and making all the others subordinate to it; the other proposing to unite them all, ensuring to each its due share of influence.

The first was, the attempt at theocratic organization; the effort of the clergy to obtain the government of Europe. It proceeded naturally from the political and moral superiority of the church. But it was met by a series of obstacles which it could never overcome. One was the nature of Christianity, a system of moral influence only. Of course the church, however great its moral influence, could not obtain the political power. Another obstacle was the feudal nobility, who would never give way to the power of the church. A third was the celibacy of the clergy which rendered the church dependent on the laity, for the perpetuity of its own existence; and the fourth, the greatest of all, was the divisions and disputes of the ecclesiastical world itself. The national churches of most of the European states quarrelled with the Roman court; the councils, with the popes;

heresy, schism, dissension, disturbed the peace and destroyed the unity of the ecclesiastical body. These obstacles, however, did not prevent a vigorous and protracted effort; till in the reign of Gregory the seventh, the pompous proclamation of the designs of the church awoke a general and irresistible reaction, first, in the people, then in the sovereigns. At the end of the thirteenth century, the church gave up the project of temporal dominion, and thence forward acted only on the defensive.

The second attempt was that of a republican organization. The free cities of Italy had grown more vigorously than those of any other state in Europe. The barbarian nobles became extensively residents in the cities; the conquerors and the conquered were mixed together within the same walls. The Italian towns acquired in this way an immense and precocious superiority; while the towns of other states remained poor, insignificant communities. This is the reason why the republican organization was so successful in this part of Europe. In the Italian republics, however, with all their brilliancy and energy and wealth, there was no security of life; there was no progress of institutions; and to this day, the best of Italian patriots regret the success of republican organization in their country in the middle age. If this attempt thus failed in Italy, much more elsewhere. The democratic organization attempted by the Albigenses in the south of France was resisted by the feudal interest of the north. Among the Swiss it succeeded better a little later. In the north of France, it triumphed in the internal government of cities, but was confined to them. The feudal nobility terrified and jealous formed coalitions to arrest the progress of republican principles, and after a long and wearisome struggle, there appeared a very general disposition for mutual concession, and an attempt at mixed organization. We now see coming forth upon the history of Europe, the States-general of France, the Cortes of Spain and Portugal, the Parliament of England and the States of Germany; all assemblies in which the nobility, the clergy, and the cities or commons, met and laboured to unite themselves into one sole society.

The first was an indifferent affair, resorted to by all parties from a feeling of necessity, regarded with interest by none. It was indirectly useful to France, in keeping alive the remembrance and the claims of liberty, but it never became a means of government, and never answered its original design.

The Cortes of Spain and Portugal came to the same general result, and like the states-general have been a mere accident in history; never a system of government.

England experienced a different fortune. There were no great vassals sufficiently powerful to maintain a contest with the crown. The high aristocracy were forced to unite for common defence, while the minor proprietors of fiefs were brought with the burgher class, into the House of Commons, composing a body capable of influencing the government of the country. Thus the effort to unite the various elements of society into one body politic succeeded in England, while it failed in every part of the continent.

In Germany, the attempts at a mixed organization, though undertaken, were coldly followed up, and the various elements have remained more distinct in Germany to the present day. Here feudal interest appears in the election of royalty; ecclesiastical sovereigns were continued, and free cities were preserved with a true political existence and sovereignty.

All these efforts then failed, except in England. Society was not yet sufficiently advanced to adapt itself to unity. Political ideas were not yet truly public. It was necessary that an active and powerful civilization should assimilate the incoherent ingredients of society, and that a public authority and a public opinion should be created. We are now approaching the period when this great consummation was effected. It was in the sixteenth century that modern society really commenced.

It is the characteristic of the fifteenth century that it constantly tended to create general interest and general ideas; to produce what had not till then existed on a large scale, nations and governments. This process was begun in the fifteenth century, but carried out in the two centuries next following.

Let us glance at the political and moral facts of the fifteenth century. In France, the last half of the fourteenth century and the first half of the fifteenth were occupied in great national wars with England, for the independence of her territory and her name. Thus the nationality of France began to be formed. The history of the French as a nation began with the princes of the house of Valois; when, for the first time, the nobility, the citizens, the peasants were united by the tie of a common cause and a common honour. At the same time also did France enlarge, fix and consoli-

date her territory. Then, too, began a unity of government. Taxation, administration of justice, military force, became parts of one great system, and the feudal powers were superseded by the power of the state.

In Spain, we observe movements simultaneous and similar. By the conquest of Grenada, in the fifteenth century, the conflict between the Christians and the Moors was brought to an end; the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella united the two kingdoms of Castile and Arragon under one dominion, and Spain was consolidated into one kingdom. The monarchy was extended and confirmed. It had indeed, the Inquisition instead of a parliament; an institution which though, at last, employed in defence of religious faith, was at first erected for the support of civil order.

Germany also came forward in her order. In the middle of the fifteenth century, the house of Austria came to the empire; the election thence forward became a mere sanction of hereditary right, and unprecedented permanence was given to imperial power.

The fifteenth century in England was occupied in war with France abroad, and between the two houses of York and Lancaster at home. At the end of these struggles, the English nobility were diminished in wealth, number and power; the Tudors ascended the throne, and with Henry VII. began the era of political unity in England.

Italy reared no monarchy, but, in the fifteenth century, she reduced her republicanism and extinguished its spirit; and foreign sovereigns asserted dominion over the different parts of the peninsula.

The change we are now contemplating was every way momentous. The old elements of society every where disappeared. There was something deeply melancholy in the process. In France, in Germany, above all, in Italy, the patriots of the fifteenth century resisted the revolution with ardour, and lamented it with despair; denouncing as despotism, and that justly, what they saw rising every where around them. It was, however, inevitable—it was useful. The old forms were hopeless as means of security and progress to society, and the social destiny of human nature demanded that the primitive system of Europe should fall.

In this century of political wonders, the moral phenomena were scarcely less imposing. The church awoke to a pervading energy in ecclesiastical reform; the people awoke with equal energy to a religious reform; and an intellectual

revolution gave birth to a quenchless ardour of devotion to literature and the arts. It was the period of physical activity; of voyages, travels, enterprises, discoveries, and inventions, hitherto unparalled in their extent and their results. The Portuguese now made their expeditions along the coast of Africa, De Gama discovered the new passage to India by the cape of Good Hope, Columbus discovered America, and European commerce was vastly and suddenly extended. In this century gunpowder changed the system of war; the compass, the system of navigation. Painting and engraving were cultivated and filled Europe with masterpieces of art. Paper made of linen became common, and finally printing was invented, the art of arts, the subject of so many eulogies, which no eulogies however can sufficiently praise. It is impossible to form an adequate idea of the greatness of this fifteenth century, in its relation to the civilization of the world.

Descending now to the sixteenth century, we come at once upon the reformation; the great revolution of the world. The causes to which this event has been attributed are, on the one hand, accidents and mischances, such as the sale of indulgences being committed to one order of monks, which thus excited the jealousy of the others; or, on the other hand, a pure desire of reforming the abuses of the church. But, in a larger view, there was a general cause to which all others were subordinate. The reformation was a vast struggle of the human mind for freedom; a great endeavour to emancipate human reason; an insurrection of mind against absolute power. The labours of the mind in religion and philosophy had been long accumulating; and the time was now come when they must have a result. More men were educated, and educated men wished more to think for themselves. At last came the revival of the literature and the arts of antiquity; and all these causes aroused the intellect of this period to an invincible purpose of going forward. The spiritual power, on the other hand, was imbecile and stationary; sufficiently indulgent, far from being unusually tyrannical; its indulgence favoured the boldness of its subjects, and its weakness tempted their attacks, till, at a providential juncture, the open and eventful conflict began.

Wherever the force of this religious revolution was felt, whether it achieved its full and immediate object or not, its general result was an immense progress in mental activity and freedom. The very reproaches cast upon this event

prove the fact here asserted; the multiplicity of sects, the excessive license of thought and speculation, show that the mind of man felt and enjoyed its emancipation.

This rising spirit of free and independent thought, having shaken off the bonds of ecclesiastical oppression, came at once into conflict with the temporal powers. The first shock occurred in England, where the right of free inquiry, and the desire for general liberty, had been most fondly cherished, and where, at the same time, the power of monarchy was most systematic and overbearing. The leading fact of the English revolution—the struggle between the spirit of free inquiry and pure monarchy—was sure to be repeated in France, and such was the event, when this spirit arose in the eighteenth century against what remained of the government of Louis XIV.

The last two lectures of our author are devoted to a philosophical description of the English and the French revolutions; the first of the two to that of England, the other to that of France.

Our readers will not need to be reminded of the imperfection with which so vast a subject must be represented in so small a compass. If the view given above of the course pursued in the book of M. Guizot, shall recommend the work, and particularly the general subject of it, to the careful attention of any of our fellow citizens, our object in this article will be mainly accomplished.

The believer in Christianity must contemplate the part taken by the church in the cause of civilization with a mixture of satisfaction and mortification. That the church should lead the van of the world, in the career of intellectual as well as moral improvement, was the natural result of her moral constitution. That she should be found with the most perfect organization, amid a general chaos of the social elements, was to be expected from the operation of her divine economy. She was officially concerned with all the great questions which engage the attention of the human mind. Her intellectual activity and vigour, and the rules of her order and discipline, brought her into constant intercourse with the principles of social organization, and gave her, in this respect, an advantage over all other conditions of human society. Nor need we wonder that her influence upon the cause of civilization was so great. She had all the means of influence within her reach. The educated intellect of the world was within her pale. She had constant access to the sources of

moral power. The greatest interests of men were committed to her charge, and her sanctity and divine authority became objects of veneration. No other institution, in the infancy of society, could have a power, for good or for evil, like that which was held by the church. Her superior influence was the natural ascendancy of truth; and with all the weakness and deformity of great corruption, she still proved herself comparatively mighty in the greatest affairs of mankind.

But we look with grief on those pages of her history which show that her heaven-descended laws which were ordained to life, became the instruments and occasions of death. It is mortifying to be told by a cool and candid philosopher that at any period of the world, the church exerted a baneful influence on human society; that she so far forgot her office, and abandoned her province, as rather to retard than accelerate the progress of human improvement, even in political affairs. That this were ever the fact, would be deplorable, and next to be regretted would be the plausible occasions afforded by her history for preferring the charge, even though that charge should be found upon examination to be groundless. It is undeniable that the church transcended, in the middle age, the proper sphere of a religious institution; that her example, as the light of the world, was not only defective, but pernicious; that her course tended to propagate false views of both the faith and the practice of Christianity; that, in this respect, she exerted a baleful influence on the interests of mankind. But as to the relative political evil of her influence, a hasty judgment would be very liable to be unjust. It must be estimated with a careful regard to the state of society around her. The struggles for liberty against which she is charged with having taken her stand, where in many cases such as, under any government, would be resisted by the friends of order, and dreaded as the eruptions of anarchy.

We presume that no citizens of our republican country can read this work of M. Guizot, moderate as it really is, and impartial as it claims to be, without feeling their own principles courteously and gently, yet firmly assailed. The whole work is, by implication, an insidious argument for monarchy; not, indeed, for an absolute, despotic monarchy; but a neutral and powerless form; a shadow, an attenuated abstraction of monarchy, perched on the apex of a popular government, to meet the innate craving of mankind for legitimate sovereignty. We are thankful for his philosophical

suggestions even on this point. We allow his opinions, and honour them, though we may not adopt them. There is however an ambiguity about certain of his speculations on the notion of legitimacy which betrays either diffidence in his assumed positions, or a conscious necessity of adapting his definitions of legitimate sovereignty to the actual state of society in this country. The old doctrines of legitimacy require modification to adapt them to the views of a people who never received them into their political creed. And we cannot but notice the apparent efforts of this writer to expand his construction of legitimacy, in order to cover the idea of a prosperous republic, which his definition must of necessity embrace. Such evidence of the influence of our social system on the theories of an intelligent advocate of monarchy is both gratifying and instructive; proving that the eye of the most discerning philosophy sees more of promise than of discouragement in the progress of our civil institutions.

The American partakers of European civilization are so solemnly concerned in the question relating to the proper elements of permanent social order, that the simplest rules of political wisdom recommend a careful application of all such discussions to our own constitution. It would betray no want of a rational firmness, or of a settled and conscientious preference for our national institutions, to hold ourselves respectfully open to the hints which such a writer so modestly offers for our benefit. As a disinterested philosopher, in the application of his principles to our case, he doubtless would coolly remind us, that the ascendant principle of our social order was brought from the midst of European society in times of a peculiar character; that the spirit which animated the fugitive May-Flower, in her voyage to plant the germ of this nation by the rock of Plymouth, was evolved from the effervescent compound of social elements, then in temporary agitation in Great Britain; the excess of one of the constituents of the mass, after the natural solvent had been saturated; that, unable to subject the monarchical and aristocratical ingredients of English society to its own control, or to neutralize their opposition to itself, it sought escape from their power; and was separated from the mixture, by the joint impulse of a forcible ejection, and its inherent volatility; that the necessity of its expulsion lay in the same principle which must prevent its quiet residence in any of the fixed states of society, and which will introduce, wherever it governs, a pervading contingency into the progress of civiliza-

tion; that it left behind the proportion of mingled elements, to which the progress of social improvement has, for fifteen centuries, been tending, and at which it has now taken its final stand, the only proportion in which the elements of society have ever yet been permanently combined; nay, that it was itself expelled, that this proportion might be preserved.

He would, then, perhaps, proceed to suggest the inquiry, whether, in the form of our social organization, we are not attempting to repeat the frail and shallow simplicity of the old world. In England, he would say, where alone the identity of civil institutions has survived a protracted advance of civilization, and where it seems likely yet long to survive, the great principles of society are wonderfully blended. Theocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, all find a response to their respective claims in the nature of man. The history of the world asserts this truth; and hence, the perfection of the social organization may yet be found in the skilful combination and mutual adjustment of these great elements in the constitution of society. Now the principle of social order in the United States, is but one of the several elements combined in European society; and therefore the same narrow basis, from which the societies of the old world have, for centuries, been tumbling, is the only basis of those popular institutions.

Should we meet him with our favourite argument from success and unrivalled prosperity, he would turn our argument against ourselves. He would admonish us that this rapid development is the very proof of our imperfection. The portentous precocity of states, like that of individuals, is matter of history and of general observation. Greece was a wonder during her brief day; but where now is Greece? The single principle of our social organization will now, as it did then, produce a rapid and surprising evolution of some of the properties of human nature; but these productions will soon fade and fall, like false blossoms from boughs which live on the single material for luxuriant bloom, without the elements of rich and durable fruit.

Such suggestions we understand to be legitimate inferences from the statements and reasonings of our author. We disclaim, for our country, any peculiar or pressing necessity for such admonitions as he indirectly offers; yet the exceeding plausibility of his hints is calculated to awaken a salutary caution among the firmest believers in republican doctrine. From the degree of freedom which would suit all the friends of a popular government, it is but a step to political licen-

tiousness. Liberty may degenerate into lawlessness. The love of freedom is not always distinguished from aversion to moral restraint. The vicious propensities of our prosperous republic are now unquestionably under strong excitement, and if it be true that they have not the requisite checks in the spirit of our constitution, the final results of our political experiment will soon be known. May our country profit by the seasonable admonitions of history, and not spurn, to her future sorrow, the counsels of the dark and troublesome, but instructive ages of the world.

We are encouraged to believe that nations are becoming more thoroughly established in the principles of peace. The advance of civilization in each nation must necessarily produce improvement in the laws of its intercourse with other nations. Whatever tends to the perfection of society at home, must promote a proper deportment abroad. International civilities will increase in their value and popularity, as society in the different nations becomes completely organized, and enjoys quiet and prosperity. We consider every step of advancement from barbarism a step of approximation towards the ascendancy of reason and justice over brute force; and towards the destruction of the absurd practice of war for the settlement of national disputes. The practice of suspending individual claims of justice on the event of a battle was among the first to fall before the power of civilization, and the kindred practice of war, either to ascertain or to procure justice between nations, must fall in its turn. We are so sanguine as to believe that, notwithstanding all the recent warlike manifestations, it would be now difficult to involve any two of the most civilized nations of the world in war with each other. It seems to us cheerfully evident that the leading nations of the civilized world were never before so fully prepared to entertain sentiments of peace, as at this moment. The solemn dissuasives from expensive, bloody and demoralizing warfare, may now be urged with the hope of unprecedented success; and the friends of civilization may derive from this fact the most substantial encouragement in relation to the future progress of their cause. War may once have contributed to the improvement of society. But the state of society which war would improve must be at the lowest extreme of barbarism. The civilized nations have risen above the elevating influence of military discipline, and are prepared to practice and enjoy the higher and more refining arts of peace.

If our hopes in this matter are not entirely groundless, we cannot easily exaggerate the promise which the present state of the world affords, of the future progress of civilization. The prevalence of universal peace will give fair opportunity for the resources of the nations to fall into permanent channels of intellectual and moral improvement. These channels will grow deep and broad, and the waters which fill them will grow active and pure. The religion of the Bible which has been the leading instrument in bringing the world to this stage of advancement, will impart fresh impulses of increasing power, to which the human mind will be better prepared to yield. Nations will be as emulous of moral excellence and moral power as they now are of commercial and intellectual importance, and the world will speedily recognise the predicted reign of peace and light and love.

We are most agreeably indebted to the French minister of instruction, for the variety of interesting reflections which his *History of European civilization* has awakened in our minds. We esteem his views on most of his subjects worthy of the high station he holds. We deem it creditable to France that she sustains in one of her high offices, and honours with her confidence, a man of so genuine public spirit, and so lofty and magnanimous principles as M. Guizot. We admire the elevation from which he surveys the world, and the dignified, philosophical calmness of his speculations on the most confused and violent revolutions in human affairs; and we take peculiar pleasure in inserting at the close of this article, a paragraph from one of his pages, not less honourable to his views of philosophy than to his respect for a doctrine of theology.

"It is thus that man advances in the execution of a plan which he has not conceived, and of which he is not even aware. He is the free and intelligent artificer of a work which is not his own. He does not perceive or comprehend it, till it manifests itself by external appearances and real results; and even then he comprehends it very incompletely. It is through his means however, and by the development of his intelligence and freedom, that it is accomplished. Conceive a great machine, the design of which is centered in a single mind, though its various parts are entrusted to different workmen, separated from, and strangers to each other. No one of them understands the work as a whole, nor the general result which he concurs in producing; but every one executes, with intelligence and freedom, by rational and vol-

untary acts, the particular task assigned to him. It is thus that, by the hand of man, the designs of Providence are wrought out in the government of the world. It is thus that the two great facts, which are apparent in the history of civilization, come to co-exist; on the one hand, those portions of it which may be considered as fated, or which happen without the control of human knowledge or will; on the other hand, the part played in it by the freedom and intelligence of man, and what he contributes to it by means of his own judgment or will." p. 257.

QUARTERLY LIST

OF

NEW BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS.

A Grammatical Analysis of Selections from the Hebrew Scriptures, with an exercise in Hebrew Composition. By Isaac Nordheimer, Doctor in Philosophy, &c. &c. 8vo. pp. xii and 148.

This volume is a companion to the author's Hebrew Grammar, and, as a specimen of printing, still more beautiful. Its use is, not to supersede the study of the grammar, but to point out the right method of pursuing it. By carefully referring to the rules here cited, the learner will, on finishing the course, have mastered the substance of the grammar, learning each thing as he wants it, and that not abstractedly, but in connexion with the study of the text. He will then be prepared for a full and systematic perusal of the grammar in detail, which, if undertaken earlier, would only serve to puzzle and disgust him. The omission of the Hebrew text not only saves much room, but accustoms the student to the complex notation of the Masoretic Bibles. The author has availed himself of this opportunity to rectify some inadvertent errors in the Grammar, as well as to anticipate some portions of the syntax, which is not yet published. The least valuable part of the Analysis consists in the translations, which, if never incorrect, are often infelicitous, and in a majority of instances, superfluous. Many of the idioms which are thus explained, are perfectly familiar to our students through the literal versions of the English Bible. Another fault is the unnecessary repetition of the same references after the reader must be perfectly familiar with the rule referred to. As an instance, we may mention the extraordinary frequency with which the use of shurek with the *vav* conjunctive is explained, at length, or by a reference to the grammar. Even

after the learner has reached the extracts from Hosea, in the last sheet of the volume, he is still referred to § 684. 3. *a.* It is obvious, however, that both these faults have arisen, not from negligence, but from an extreme anxiety to do the subject justice. The only other feature of the work which seems objectionable is the selection of the passages explained, especially in Genesis and the Minor Prophets. The creation and the flood were certainly entitled to the preference; but instead of the scraps which follow, we should have been glad to see the history of Joseph, or some other uninterrupted context, such as the book of Ruth. Beauty of style and interest of matter are better grounds of choice in Germany than here, where every man who learns the language of his own accord, has read the whole of the Old Testament in English, and expects to read the whole of it in Hebrew. We know too by experience and observation, that, to students, few things are less interesting than mere scraps or fragments. The selections from Isaiah and the Psalms are made with judgment. After this explicit statement of the few faults which we find in the Analysis, we cheerfully pronounce it far superior, in plan and execution, to any other work of the same kind within our knowledge. We would especially commend it to the notice of clergymen and other men in active life, who wish to recover what they once knew of Hebrew, and extend their knowledge, in accordance with the system of the new grammarian. A careful study of this book will make them well acquainted with the essential parts of the best Hebrew Grammar in the English language.

Comprehensive Commentary.

Since our notice of this work in a previous number, we have seen what purports to be a corrected impression of the last volume. We learn by a letter from one of the publishers that the editor has, in some cases, expunged notes which were deemed objectionable; and in others, has so guarded them "that they will not be likely to be misunderstood." On a slight examination of this revised copy, we were glad to see that the more prominent phrenological articles, which were justly considered one of the greatest objections to the work, have been removed. We were also gratified to perceive that some of the doctrinal notes to which objection had been taken, (for example those from Wetstein and Macknight on Rom. 3: 25, 26) had been left out, while others have been partially modified. We greatly regret, however, that the editor has not judged it best to expunge entirely all the notes which are not in harmony with the views of the authors whose commentaries form the basis of the work. He seems to have thought it sufficient to guard against any evil from this source, to add references to other portions of the work where correct views are inculcated.

The truth of the matter as we understand it is just this. Dr. Jenks has given as far as we know, the principal portions of the commentaries which he undertook to abridge, but he committed the great error in judgment, as we must regard it, of inserting here and there a note containing views not only opposed to those of Henry and Scott, but which, as we hope and believe, he himself seriously disapproves of. To a considerable extent this error has been corrected in the revised copy.

We should infer from the manner in which the work has been spoken of in some of the religious papers, that the impression prevails that the objectionable notes are much more numerous than they really are. We looked through the fifth volume as first printed, and did not notice more than fifteen or twenty which we considered seriously objectionable; of these the phrenological portion, as already stated, appear to have been, in general expunged; others have been altered and references added. The book, therefore, contains a vast amount of pious and excellent matter, but continues to be deformed by occasional notes entirely out of keeping with the rest of the work. It will be understood that our strictures on this commentary in our previous number, as well as the present notice, relate exclusively to the fifth volume, which is the only one which we have examined.

A Dissertation on Oaths. By Enoch Lewis. 12mo. pp. 100.

A defence of the Quaker doctrine on this subject, from the Scriptures and the Fathers.

Notes, Critical and Practical, on the Book of Genesis; designed as a general help to biblical reading and instruction. By George Bush, Prof. of Hebrew and Oriental Literature, New York City University. In two volumes. Vol. I. 12mo. pp. xxxvi.

As we learn that this interesting work has met with a very encouraging reception, we regret the less, that the extended notice of it, which we mean to take, must be deferred till a future number.

An Address delivered before the Union Literary Society of Miami University, at its thirteenth annual celebration, Aug. 8th, 1838. By John C. Young, President of Centre College. 8vo. pp. 29.

The Inaugural Address of the Rev. R. H. Morrison, D.D., pronounced at his inauguration as President of Davidson College, North Carolina, Aug. 2, 1838. Published by request of the Board of Trustees. 8vo. pp. 23.

Sound doctrine well expressed, with perhaps too much quotation, and an excess of proper names, and without originality, except upon the point of manual labour, which the author wishes to see introduced, not only into colleges and schools, but into society at large, as an accomplishment of educated men, and a means both of physical and moral discipline.

The Subject and Spirit of the Ministry. A sermon preached before the Synod of New York at the opening of its late revisions at Newburgh, Oct. 16, 1838. By Erskine Mason, Moderator of the Synod. 8vo. pp. 34.

Faith the Life of Science. An Address delivered before the Phi Beta Phi Society of Union College, Schenectady, N. Y., July 1838. By Tayler Lewis. 8vo. pp. 38.

An excellent corrective of utilitarian nonsense with respect to education. The train of thought and manner of expression are of that manly, scholar-like description, which we had begun to think extinct among us, and which can only be revived by a recurrence to the liberal and thorough training of that good old school, to which the author of this pamphlet must undoubtedly belong. If he has gone too far in undervaluing material science and inductive reasoning, or overlooked the dangers which demonstrably beset the 'high priori road,' these

are errors and excesses which are not very likely to do serious mischief in our age and country.

The Inaugural Address of the Rev. P. J. Sparrow, A.M., pronounced at his inauguration as Professor of Languages, in Davidson College, North Carolina, Aug. 2, 1838. 8vo. pp. 24.

Another anti-utilitarian pamphlet, but with more specific reference to the study of the classics, and in style very different from that of the preceding. The good qualities by which it is distinguished, lose much of their effect, by a colloquial carelessness of manner.

Claims of the Gospel Ministry to an Adequate Support. An Address of the Presbytery of Elizabethtown to the Churches under its Care. 8vo. pp. 23.

This is a judicious and able exhibition of an important subject. An extended notice of it, which we had prepared for the present number, is crowded out, and will appear in our next.

The American Student. A Valedictory Address to the Senior Class of the Oneida Institute, delivered September 12, 1838. By Beriah Green. Published by request of the Senior Class. Whitesboro. 8vo. pp. 32.

A mingled compound of smartness, effrontery, ignorance, and vulgarity, in which the author proves that men may become learned without learning; that they may be educated, without the means of education; and that Oneida Institute, with its homoeopathic doses, is the true and only hope of our country.

An Inaugural Address, delivered by the Rev. Joseph Smith, A.M., upon his entrance on the office of President of Frederick College, Frederick City, Md., October, 1838. Frederick. 8vo. pp. 16.

A Brief Examination of the Nature and use of the Drinks mentioned in the Scriptures: with some Remarks suggested by the Connexion of the Subject with the Cause of Temperance. By A. O. Hubbard. Sherbrooke, L. C. 8vo. pp. 16.

This tract, though brief, and not dignified by a Prize, contains a candid and thorough examination of the subject. The method and spirit of the author are worthy of all praise, in these days when even good men are so ready to pervert the scripture in support of any foregone conclusion.

Old and New Theology: or an Exhibition of those Differences with regard to Scripture Doctrines which have recently agitated, and now divided the Presbyterian Church. By James Wood. Philadelphia. 8vo. pp. 243.

This is a seasonable and important publication. It furnishes an account, in extracts from different writers, of the doctrinal errors which have been recently broached and advocated within the pale of our Church, as well as upon its borders. The outcry of misrepresentation cannot well be raised when an author's own words are employed in the statement of his opinions. And no one can read this book, without being brought to the conviction that grave errors, if estimated according to the formularies of our church, have been taught by those who professed agreement with our standards. We consider the public as much indebted to Mr. Wood for this volume. He has executed his task with fidelity and judgment. The spirit of his book is as commendable as its matter and style. It is marked by uniform mildness and respectfulness towards those from

whom the author differs. It contains nothing that can give offence, unless it be the stubborn and unsightly facts which it discloses. We commend it to all, and especially to such as have been persuaded to believe that no serious doctrinal errors had made their way into our church.

Errors in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine. A Sermon delivered before the Synod of Genesee, at their Annual Meeting, at Buffalo, October 10, 1838. By John C. Lord, A.M. Pastor of the Pearl Street, Church Buffalo, 8vo. pp. 18.

This Sermon is a faithful call upon the ministry of reconciliation "to resist the alarming innovations upon the doctrine and order of the Church, which, under the colour of alleged discoveries of new and more correct interpretations of the Sacred Scriptures, are making fearful progress in portions of our Zion." It is worthy of attention both on account of its intrinsic merit, and of the quarter whence it comes.

True Consolation in Death. A Sermon on the Life and Character of the Rev. Thomas Morrell, for fifty three years a Minister of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Preached in the first Presbyterian Church, Elizabethtown, September 9th, 1838. By Nicholas Murray. Elizabethtown, N. J. 8vo pp. 31.

A just and eloquent tribute to the memory of a revolutionary soldier, a venerable patriarch of the Methodist Church, and a most estimable man.

Religion of the Bible, in Select Discourses. By Thos. H. Skinner. New York. 12mo. pp. 323.

The Life and Character of Rev. Samuel H. Stearns. Second edition. Boston. 12mo. pp. 252.

The Popular Objections of Infidelity, stated and answered, in a series of Lectures addressed to the Young men of Buffalo. By John C. Lord, A.M. Pastor of the Pearlstreet church. Buffalo. 16mo. pp. 223.

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Riches without Wings, or the Cleveland Family. By Mrs. Seba Smith. Boston and New York. 1838. 16mo. pp. 162.

Bogota in 1836-7; being a narrative of an expedition to the capital of New Grenada, and a residence there of eleven months. By J. Stewart. New York.

The Crook in the Lot, or a Display of the Sovereignty and Wisdom of God in the Afflictions of Men, and the Christian Deportment under them. By Rev. Thomas Boston. Philadelphia. 16mo. pp. 162.

An Illustration of the Types, Allegories, and Prophecies of the Old Testament. By William M'Ewen, Minister of the Gospel at Dundee. Philadelphia. 16mo. pp. 272.